Chadbourne v. Hartz
| Decision Date | 28 October 1904 |
| Docket Number | 14,093,14,115 - (116,118) |
| Citation | 101 N.W. 68,93 Minn. 233 |
| Parties | MARY E. CHADBOURNE v. ALEXANDER HARTZ |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action of ejectment in the district court for Mille Lacs county. The case was tried before Baxter, J., who found in favor of plaintiff. From an order denying a motion for a new trial defendants appealed. Affirmed.
Decree of Probate Court.
A decree by the probate court having jurisdiction, assigning the residue of the estate of a deceased person, is in the nature of a judgment in rem, and is conclusive upon all persons interested in such estate. Greenwood v Murray, 26 Minn. 259; Ladd v. Weiskopf, 62 Minn. 29.
Certified Copy -- Presumption.
The copy of a resolution (as found in the judgment roll) passed by the board of county commissioners, designating the newspaper in which the tax list shall be published, if improperly certified by the county auditor, overcomes the presumption that the court acquired jurisdiction, and it will not be presumed that another and properly certified copy of such resolution was originally made and filed. A copy of such resolution, found in the judgment roll, contained the following attestation: Held, not a certification in compliance with the statute, and consequently the court never acquired jurisdiction, and the tax judgment is invalid.
Tax Deed.
A tax deed issued by the state upon premises acquired by the state under a tax sale is void if the amount paid therefor by the purchaser does not include the amount of the then due and delinquent subsequent tax. Hoyt v. Chapin, 85 Minn. 524.
Tax Assignment Certificate.
Two state tax assignment certificates were issued by the county auditor upon the same day; the first assigning the right of the state acquired at the tax sale pursuant to the tax judgment entered in 1896, and the second assigning the right of the state acquired under the tax judgment entered in 1897. Held, the first assignment certificate was void for the reason that the delinquent tax then due for 1895 was not included, and the second assignment certificate was void for the reason that the premises consisted of two separate tracts, were assessed as such, and judgment entered against each separately, whereas it appeared from the assignment certificate that the county auditor sold both tracts as one parcel, and the same was bid in as such for a lump sum.
Deed of Confirmation.
A deed was executed and delivered June 19, 1884, by Robert J. McBrady and wife to J. L. Brady, at which time the grantor owned an undivided one-third interest in the premises conveyed, and the wife of the grantee, Mary J. Brady, claimed to own a tax title thereto. September 9, 1891, Mary J. Brady and husband executed and delivered a quitclaim deed to Robert J. McBrady, which contained a provision to the effect that the conveyance was given to confirm the title of a like deed bearing date June 19, 1884, which had been lost, and not recorded. Held, in the absence of any other evidence it may be reasonably inferred that either deed was executed first, and the trial court did not err in holding that the intention of the parties was to vest the title in McBrady.
E. L. McMillan and S. & O. Kipp, for appellants.
A. Y. Merrill and R. J. Powell, for respondent.
Plaintiff's title was derived from the heirs of John McBrady, the original patentee. Defendant claims title to the whole premises through certain tax assignment certificates, and, if these are void, then to an undivided one-third interest therein through a deed claimed to have been executed by one of the heirs of the patentee.
1. To prove that plaintiff's grantors were the owners of the premises as heirs of John McBrady, plaintiff introduced in evidence the decree of distribution issued in the probate court. A decree by a probate court having jurisdiction, assigning the residue of the estate of a deceased person, is conclusive upon all persons interested in such estate. Such decree is in the nature of a judgment in rem, which binds all the world. Greenwood v. Murray, 26 Minn. 259, 2 N.W. 945; Ladd v. Weiskopf, 62 Minn. 29, 64 N.W. 99.
The case of Backdahl v. Grand Lodge A.O.U.W., 46 Minn. 61, 48 N.W. 454, is not in conflict with this rule. There the action was brought to recover the amount claimed to be due upon a life insurance policy, and the decree was introduced for the purpose of showing that plaintiffs were heirs of the deceased. The defendant was a stranger to the proceedings in the probate court, for the reason that it was in no way interested in the estate decreed. Neither are the cases of Dawson v. Helmes, 30 Minn. 107, 14 N.W. 462, and Burrell v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 43 Minn. 363, 45 N.W. 849, in conflict. They simply hold that an order of confirmation of a guardian sale under the statute passes upon nothing else than the specific things required with reference to the order. Morin v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 176, 22 N.W. 251, has no bearing, for the matter there involved was to the effect that the judgment of a probate court of a cofeign state does not establish title to land in Minnesota, and the decision rests upon the ground that the res which was the subject of the former adjudication was in no way connected with the subject of the action in this state.
The reference in Kosmerl v. Snively, 85 Minn. 228, 88 N.W. 753, to two of the foregoing cases, was not intended to deny the rule that a decree as to heirship is final as to the real estate distributed by the decree in such proceedings.
2. Defendant claims title in part through a tax assignment certificate from the state to Mary J. Brady, of date December 20, 1882. A copy of the resolution of the board of county commissioners designating the newspaper in which the list should be published was filed with the clerk of court, and attested as follows: To certify means to testify to a thing in writing. State v. Brill, 58 Minn. 152, 59 N.W. 989; Kipp v. Dawson, 59 Minn. 82, 60 N.W. 845. This attestation, if accepted as a certification, might refer to the signature of the county commissioner attached to the resolution. It is not in compliance with the statute, and consequently the tax judgment was invalid.
Tax judgments are presumed to be regular and valid to...
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