Chadbourne v. Springfield St. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 October 1908
• Citation: 199 Mass. 574,85 N.E. 737
• Parties: CHADBOURNE v. SPRINGFIELD ST. RY. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

199 Mass. 574

85 N.E. 737

CHADBOURNE v. SPRINGFIELD ST. RY. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

October 19, 1908

Oct 19, 1908.

COUNSEL

Daniel E. Leary, Edward W. Beattie, Jr., and Geo. D. Cummings, for plaintiff.

Henry W. Ely and Joseph B. Ely, for defendant.

OPINION

SHELDON J.

The question of the plaintiff's due care was for the jury. She seems to have conducted herself as an invited guest of the driver of an automobile or other vehicle naturally would do. She trusted him as to the running of the machine; that is, she did not attempt to interfere with his management of the automobile. In view of her inexperience and of what might have been found to be the skill and experience of the driver the jury might well have thought that this was a wise course on her part. Nor was there any relation of agency between her and the driver such as of itself would affect her with negligence on his part. She had no right to control him. There was no mutuality in a common enterprise between them. It cannot be said as matter of law that she ought to have warned the driver against turning out from behind the car which he had been following, especially in view of the face that he was turning both in the direction required by statute (Rev. Laws, c. 54, § 2), and in the only direction in which the width of the bridge afforded room for him to pass that car. And she had a right to rely somewhat on the acquaintance with the road which she might presume that he had.

Accordingly we need not consider whether it can be said that Reed's conduct was, as matter of law, negligent. Even if this were so, the plaintiff's own due care was for the jury. Shultz v. Old Colony St. Ry., 193 Mass. 309, 79 N.E. 873, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 597, 118 Am. St. Rep. 502; Miller v. Boston & Northern St. Ry., 197 Mass. 535, 83 N.E. 990.

It is a more difficult question whether there was any evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant's servants. But it might have been found that the motorman was driving the car which ran into the automobile at a rate of nearly 15 miles an hour to and upon the bridge. This bridge was so narrow that it was impossible to pass with a vehicle between a car and the guard rail of the bridge; and the approaches to the bridge are at so sharp a grade that, from one side, a car coming from the other side cannot be seen until both cars are substantially on the bridge. Another car of the defendant was coming in the opposite direction, at a very slow rate of speed, and any vehicle turning out from behind it necessarily must come upon the track on which the colliding car was coming. Apparently there was considerable travel over the bridge. Under these circumstances, a jury might say that due care required the motorman to keep his car under sufficient control to avoid running into a vehicle approaching behind the other car which might be practically compelled to turn out upon the track in front of...