Chaffin v. Christian County, 49073

• Decision Date: 10 September 1962
• Docket Number: No. 49073,49073
• Citation: 359 S.W.2d 730
• Parties: Joe N. CHAFFIN, Respondent, v. The COUNTY OF CHRISTIAN, Thomas F. Eagleton, Attorney General, and Haskell Holman, State Auditor, Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 730

359 S.W.2d 730

Joe N. CHAFFIN, Respondent, v. The COUNTY OF CHRISTIAN, Thomas F. Eagleton, Attorney General, and Haskell Holman, State Auditor, Appellants.

No. 49073.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

Sept. 10, 1962.

Thomas F. Eagleton, Atty. Gen., Wayne W. Waldo, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for defendants-appellants.

Moore, Pettit & Steinle, J. Hal Moore and Walter S. Pettit, Jr., Aurora, for respondent.

STORCKMAN, Judge.

This is a declartory judgment action to determine the constitutionality of subdivision 2 of Sec. 48.030, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., and the rights of the plaintiff thereunder. The part of the section questioned provides in substance that although otherwise qualified no county of the fourth class shall become a county of the third class until the question is submitted to the people and approved by a majority of the electors at a general election. The amount of the plaintiff's salary as treasurer of Christian County is dependent on the outcome. In addition to Christian County, the attorney general of Missouri and the state auditor are defendants. The trial court declared subdivision 2 of the statute unconstitutional in accordance with the plaintiff's contention. The defendants appealed.

Jurisdiction of the appeal is in this court because state officers, as such, are parties and the construction of the constitution of this state is involved. Art. V, Sec. 3, Constitution of Missouri 1945, V.A.M.S.; Marshall v. Kansas City, Mo., 355 S.W.2d 887, 879.

The facts are stipulated and establish that the plaintiff began his present term as treasurer on January 1, 1959, at which time Christian County was a fourth-class county. On January 28, 1959, the defendant Haskell Holman, acting in his capacity as state auditor, sent a letter to the plaintiff and other officials of Christian County advising them that the county had had an assessed valuation in excess of $10 million for five successive years and under the provisions of Sec. 48.030 Christian County had changed from a fourth-class to a third-class county effective as of January 1, 1961.

Thereafter, the general assembly enacted House Bill No. 297 effective August 29, 1959, which repealed Sec. 48.030 and enacted another section with the same number. The substantial change in the section was the addition of subdivision 2. On January 14, 1960, the defendant Holman by letter notified the plaintiff and other county officials of Christian County of the change in the law and advised them that pursuant to an opinion of the attorney general Christian County would not become a county of the third class until the new classification was approved by the voters in accordance with subdivision 2 of the new statute. A proposal to change Christian County from the fourth to the third class, submitted to the voters at the general election in November 1960, was defeated. There were 1,488 votes in favor of the proposal and 3,109 votes against it.

On December 14, 1960, plaintiff filed an 'Officer's Budget Estimate' in the office of the county clerk of Christian County specifying his salary at $3,000, which would have been the salary of the treasurer of Christian County as a third-class county. The county court declined to accept this estimate and approved and filed a budget designating plaintiff's salary at $2,700, which was on the basis of Christian County being a fourth-class county. On May 1, 1961, plaintiff was paid his salary for the months of January, February, March, and April 1961, based on an annual salary of $2,700. The plaintiff submitted a bill to the county court for additional salary for these four months figured on the basis of a third-class county which bill was rejected by the county court.

In due course, the plaintiff filed suit for a declaratory judgment and the defendants filed their joint answer. A stipulation of facts was filed and the cause was submitted to the court on the pleadings and the facts stipulated. The trial court rendered its judgment on July 31, 1961, declaring that subdivision 2 of Sec. 48.030, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., was unconstitutional, that Christian County became a county of the third class on January 1, 1961, and that the plaintiff was entitled to back salary as treasurer of a third-class county from January 1, 1961.

The defendants first contend that the amended petition should have been dismissed because the plaintiff did not plead or prove a claim upon which relief could be granted in that no justiciable controversy was shown to exist. The petition is consistent with the facts stipulated and will be treated as if amended to embrace the issues made by such facts. S.Ct. Rule 55.54, V.A.M.R.

Section 527.020, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., M.S., provides among other things that any person whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the statute and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. Since there was a bona fide dispute between the parties with respect to the constitutionality of the statute on which plaintiff's claim for compensation as county treasurer depended, a justiciable controversy existed and the plaintiff was entitled to a determination of the validity of the statute under the Declaratory Judgments Act. St. Louis Housing Authority v. City of St. Louis, 361 Mo. 1170, 239 S.W.2d 289; Smith v. Pettis County, 345 Mo. 839, 136 S.W.2d 282; Maxwell v. Andrew County, 347 Mo. 156, 146 S.W.2d 621. Under this assignment the appellants also assert that the evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption of the validity of the statute and to support the judgment. The determination of the specific constitutional questions presented renders separate treatment of this general allegation unnecessary.

In the course of implementing the 1945 Constitution, the general assembly divided the counties of the state into four classes 'for the purpose of establishing organization and powers in accordance with the provisions of Section 8, Article VI'. Laws 1945, pp. 1801-1802. The classification section of the act became Sec. 48.020 of our statutes. It classifies the counties on the basis of assessed valuation as follows: Class 1. All counties having an assessed valuation of $300 million and over. Class 2. All counties having an assessed valuation of $70 million and less than $300 million. Class 3. All counties having an assessed valuation of $10 million and less than $70 million. Class 4. All counties having an assessed valuation of less than $10 million.

Another section of the same act provided that no county should be deemed as moving from a lower to a higher class or from a higher to a lower class until the assessed valuation was such as to place it in such other class for five successive years. Laws 1945, p. 1802. This became Sec. 48.030, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., to which subdivision 2 was added in 1959. The pertinent portions of Sec. 48.030, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., with the new provision in italics, read as follows:

'48.030. Method of determining classes. 1. For the purpose of determining the initial class of the various counties, the assessed valuations of the respective counties as set forth on pages 333 to 400 of the 'Journal of the Board of Equalization of the State of Missouri for the Year Ending December 31, 1944' shall be used. Hereafter no county shall be deemed as moving from a lower class to a higher class or from a higher class to a lower class until the assessed valuation of the county is such as to place it in the other class for five successive years. * * *

'2. In addition to the required increase in valuation for five successive years, and the certification by the state equalizing agency, no county of the fourth class shall become a county of the third class until the question is submitted to a vote of the people at a general election, and a majority of the electors voting on the question shall vote in favor thereof. The change from one classification to another shall become effective at the beginning of the county fiscal year following the general election at which the approval of the people is obtained.'

Subdivision 2 was the only part of the statute declared unconstitutional by the trial court. One of the grounds was that it violated Sec. 8 of Art. VI, a new section first appearing in the 1945 Constitution, which reads as follows:

'Provision shall be made by general laws for the organization and classification of counties except as provided in this constitution. The number of classes shall not exceed four, and the organization and powers of each class shall be defined by general laws so that all counties within the same class shall possess the same powers and be subject to the same restrictions. A law applicable to any county shall apply to all counties in the class to which such county belongs.'

Section 7 of Art. IX of the 1875 Constitution, which provided for the classification of cities and towns, was carried over without change into the 1945 Constitution as Sec. 15 of Art. VI. Except for the last sentence of each section, the language used in Secs. 8 and 15 of Art. VI of the 1945 Constitution are very much the same. The last sentence of Sec. 15 provides that the general assembly shall also make provision by general law whereby any city, town or village existing by virtue of any special law or local law 'may elect to become subject to, and be governed by, the general laws relating to such corporations.' Section 8 contains no suggestion of choice by a county of the class to which it will belong. It provides instead that: 'A law applicable to any county shall apply to all counties in the class to which such county belongs.'

In urging that the statute does not violate Sec. 8, the defendants rely primarily upon decisions construing Sec. 15 of Art. VI. In State ex rel. Halsey v. Clayton, 226 Mo. 292, 126 S.W. 506, the classification statute provided that all cities...