Chafin v. Gibson

• Decision Date: 27 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 30620.,30620.
• Citation: 213 W.Va. 167,578 S.E.2d 361
• Parties: Gerald L. CHAFIN; Elmer Ray Spence; Earl Spence; and James Earl Spence, Plaintiffs Below, Appellants v. W.R. GIBSON, Individually and in His Capacity as a Member of the West Virginia Division of Public Safety, Defendant Below, Appellee
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

578 S.E.2d 361

213 W.Va. 167

Gerald L. CHAFIN; Elmer Ray Spence; Earl Spence; and James Earl Spence, Plaintiffs Below, Appellants v. W.R. GIBSON, Individually and in His Capacity as a Member of the West Virginia Division of Public Safety, Defendant Below, Appellee

No. 30620.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted January 14, 2003.

Decided February 27, 2003.

Michael C. Allen, Allen & Allen, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorney for the Appellants.

Ancil G. Ramey, Michelle E. Piziak, Steptoe & Johnson, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorney for the Appellees.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal by Gerald Chafin, Elmer Spence, Earl Spence, and James Spence (hereinafter "Appellants") from a decision of the Circuit Court of Mingo County granting summary judgment to Sergeant W.R. Gibson (hereinafter "Appellee"), individually and as a member of the West Virginia Division of Public Safety. The Appellants contend that the lower court erred in granting summary judgment on this defamation action where the Appellee had indicated during a press interview that the Appellants were possible suspects in a hit and run automobile accident. The Appellants claim that the Appellee lacked objective support for that statement and that the lower court erred in granting summary judgment for the Appellee. Upon a review of the arguments, the record, and pertinent authorities, we conclude that the lower court correctly granted summary judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the lower court.

I. Factual and Procedural History

On December 12, 1991, Mr. Shelby Hall was struck and killed in a hit and run automobile accident in Mingo County, West Virginia. The driver of the motor vehicle was never located. During the ensuing investigation, evidence was discovered which led state investigators to believe that local law enforcement personnel may have been involved in an effort to conceal the identity of the driver of the hit and run vehicle. Newspaper articles appearing in the Williamson Daily News in June 1995 indicated that the Appellee, as a member of the West Virginia Division of Public Safety, had supplied information leading to printed comments that the Appellants were suspects in the investigation of the hit and run incident. Specifically, according to the Appellee's deposition testimony, he had stated that "anyone at the scene" was a "possible suspect" in an alleged cover-up concerning the hit and run accident. Although the Appellee did not specifically name any of the Appellants, a reporter¹ gained access to information regarding the individuals present at the scene and learned that the Appellants were present at the incident.²

Based upon the information disseminated through the newspaper articles, the Appellants filed a civil action against the Appellee for defamation in June 1996.³ Subsequent to substantial discovery, the lower court granted summary judgment for the Appellee. The lower court found that truth was an absolute defense and that the Appellants were indeed suspects, regardless of whether there was any objective basis for the theory. The lower court also found that the Appellee had a qualified privilege to provide information to the press. The Appellants have appealed to this Court.

II. Standard of Review

This Court applies a plenary review to an order of a circuit court deciding a summary judgment motion. As we stated in syllabus point one of Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994), "[a] circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo." We have emphasized that "[t]he function of summary judgment is `to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required."' Powderidge Unit Owners Ass'n v. Highland Props., Ltd., 196 W.Va. 692, 697, 474 S.E.2d 872, 877 (1996) (quoting Hanlon v. Chambers, 195 W.Va. 99, 106, 464 S.E.2d 741, 748 (1995)). Consequently, we have consistently held that "`[a] motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.' Syllabus Point 3, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963)." Syl. Pt. 1, Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 187 W.Va. 706, 421 S.E.2d 247 (1992).

West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) succinctly states that summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." W. Va. R. Civ. P. 56(c). This Court has defined a "genuine issue" as follows in syllabus point five of Jividen v. Law, 194 W.Va. 705, 461 S.E.2d 451 (1995):

Roughly stated, a "genuine issue" for purposes of West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is simply one half of a trialworthy issue, and a genuine issue does not arise unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for that party. The opposing half of a trialworthy issue is present where the non-moving party can point to one or more disputed `material' facts. A material fact is one that has the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law.

The nonmoving party, in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, must show that there will be sufficient competent evidence available at trial to warrant a finding favorable to the nonmoving party. Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52, 60-61, 459 S.E.2d 329, 337-38 (1995). In Gooch v. West Virginia Dept. of Public Safety, 195 W.Va. 357, 465 S.E.2d 628 (1995), this Court explained that "[t]o meet its burden, the nonmoving party must offer `more than a mere "scintilla of evidence" and must produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in a non-moving party's favor." Id. at 365, 465 S.E.2d at 636, quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202. Rule 56(e) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure clarifies this concept, as follows:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

W. Va. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

III. Discussion

We initiate our evaluation with the recognition that the Appellants herein must be categorized as "public officials" for purposes of a defamation claim analysis. As explained above, the Appellants were all public officials in Mingo County, West Virginia. As this Court observed in Pritt v. Republican Nat'l Committee, 210 W.Va. 446, 557 S.E.2d 853 (2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 71, 154 L.Ed.2d 14 (2002), such a case must proceed as directed by this Court in syllabus point one of Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 158 W.Va. 427, 211 S.E.2d 674 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882, 96 S.Ct. 145, 46 L.Ed.2d 107:

A candidate for political office is governed by the same rules with regard to recovery for libel as a public official and can sustain an action for libel only if he can prove that: (1) the alleged libelous statements were false or misleading; (2) the statements tended to defame the plaintiff and reflect shame, contumely, and disgrace upon him; (3) the statements were published with knowledge at the time of publication that they were false or misleading or were published with a reckless and willful disregard of truth; and, (4) the publisher intended to injure the plaintiff through the knowing or reckless publication of the alleged libelous material.

Such recognition was also made in syllabus point one of Hinerman v. Daily Gazette Co., Inc., 188 W.Va. 157, 423 S.E.2d 560 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 960, 113 S.Ct. 1384, 122 L.Ed.2d 759 (1993),⁴ as follows:

In order for a public official or a candidate for public office to recover in a libel action, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) there was the publication of a defamatory statement of fact or a statement in the form of an opinion that implied the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion; (2) the stated or implied facts were false; and, (3) the person who uttered the defamatory statement either knew the statement was false or knew that he was publishing the statement in reckless disregard of whether the statement was false.

"Thus, to sustain a cause of action for defamation, a public official, after establishing the existence of an allegedly defamatory statement, must prove that the statement was (1) false and (2) published with actual malice[.]" Pritt, 210 W.Va. at 454, 557 S.E.2d at 861. This approach was developed and utilized by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). The New York Times model has become the standard for this Court's evaluation of claims of defamation by public officials.

Our Court has specified the manner in which the issue of falsity must be approached. In syllabus point four of State ex rel. Suriano v. Gaughan, 198 W.Va. 339, 480 S.E.2d 548 (1996), this Court stated:

The law of libel takes but one approach to the question of falsity, regardless of the form of the communication. It overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth. Minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be justified. A statement is not considered false unless it would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.

Regarding the second element of a public official's claim for defamation, actual malice is present where the statement at issue was made "with knowledge that [the statement] was false or with...