Chamberlain v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 December 1899
• Citation: 122 Mich. 477,81 N.W. 339
• Parties: CHAMBERLAIN v. LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

81 N.W. 339

122 Mich. 477

CHAMBERLAIN v. LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 21, 1899

Error to circuit court, Monroe county; Edward D. Kinne, Judge.

Action by William Y. Chamberlain against the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff defendant brings error. Affirmed.

C. E. Weaver (Geo. C. Greene and O. G Getzen-Danner, of counsel), for appellant.

Willis Baldwin, for appellee.

LONG J.

October 28, 1895, plaintiff was ejected from defendant's train between Flatrock and Trenton for refusing to pay a fare of 25 cents. He tendered 19 cents fare, which was refused, and defendant's conductor ejected him. He had been accustomed to travel over this line once a week or once in two weeks for a number of years, and had been compelled to pay 25 cents between these two points. The distance between these places is somewhat in dispute; the plaintiff claiming that it is only 6.3 miles, while defendant claims it to be 6.48 miles. On the trial, however, the time-table of the defendant was offered in evidence, from which it appears that the distance therein stated is 6.3 miles. It is admitted that the defendant company has no right to charge more than 3 cents per mile. In either view of the case, however, the defendant had no right to charge 25 cents. The utmost that could be charged, even upon the defendant's theory that the distance was 6.48 miles, would be 19 cents. Calling the distance that number of miles, at 3 cents per mile would be 19.44 cents. The fraction over the 19 cents is less than one-half of 1 cent. In Zagelmeyer v. Railroad Co., 102 Mich. 214, 60 N.W. 436, the statute fixing rates of railroad fare within this state (Act No. 202, Laws 1889) was under consideration, and it was said: 'That language would apparently not permit a charge for a fraction of a mile unless it was so large a fraction as to make the charge one cent or more, not in excess of the three cents per mile. The statute formerly provided that the price of tickets might, for convenience in making change, be fixed at that multiple of five which was nearest the exact amount of fare. But the present statute (Act No. 202, Laws 1889) contains no such provision.' The plaintiff in the present case had judgment for $650. Defendant brings error.

It appeared that in 1892 the defendant company had ejected the plaintiff because he had tendered 21 cents instead of 25 cents fare between these points. On that trial it was admitted that the distance was only 6.3 miles, and that distance only was shown by the time-table. In that case the plaintiff recovered a judgment for $400. The case was removed to this court, and was here affirmed at the October term, 1896 (110 Mich. 614, 68 N.W. 423). That case had resulted in a judgment against defendant in the circuit court before the present case was brought. On the present trial the plaintiff offered in evidence the files and records in the former suit. This was objected to by defendant's counsel but the court overruled the objection and admitted such files and records. This is claimed to be error. We think there was no error in this. It appears that the plaintiff had continued to pay 25 cents fare for several years prior to the former suit. In that suit it was admitted that the distance was only 6.3 miles; yet after that suit had gone to judgment, and the defendant and its officers knew by the ruling in that case that 19 cents fare was the utmost limit it could charge, it continued to demand from its passengers 25 cents fare between these points. The wrong to the plaintiff was aggravated by these facts. In Welch v. Ware, 32 Mich. 84, it was said: 'When the law gives an action for willful wrongs, it does it on the ground that the injured person ought to receive pecuniary amends from the wrongdoer. It assumes that every such wrong brings damage upon the sufferer and that the principal damage is mental and not physical. And it assumes further that this is actual and not metaphysical damages, and deserves compensation. When this is once recognized it is just as clear that the willfulness and wickedness of the act must constitute an important element in the computation, for the plain reason that we all feel our indignation excited in direct proportion with the malice of the offender, and that the wrong is aggravated by it.' See, also: Warren v. Cole, 15 Mich. 265; Tefft v. Windsor, 17 Mich. 486; Brushaber v. Stegemann, 22 Mich. 266; Swift v. Applebone, 23 Mich. 252; Leonard v. Pope, 27 Mich. 145.

Some claim is made that the damages are excessive. It appears that the plaintiff was ejected in the presence of 30 to 35 passengers, and was compelled to walk from that point to Trenton, a distance of about 5 miles. We think the circumstances of the ejection were such that the jury very properly gave him substantial damages....