Chambers' Adm'r v. Smith's Adm'r
| Decision Date | 31 March 1860 |
| Citation | 30 Mo. 156 |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
| Parties | CHAMBERS' ADMINISTRATOR, Respondent, v. SMITH'S ADMINISTRATOR, Appellant.<sup>a1</sup> |
1. When a case has been retried in an inferior court according to the principles laid down in the decision of the supreme court, none of the questions, which were decided when the case was first in the supreme court, should be open for re-examination on a second writ of error or appeal, unless some general principle of law has been manifestly decided incorrectly the first time, or injustice to the rights of the parties would be done by adhering to the first opinion.
Appeal from St. Louis Land Court.
The facts of this case are sufficiently set forth in the report of the cause when the same was in the supreme court for review before.
Whittelsey, for appellant.
I. The court should have arrested the judgment. The plaintiff had no cause of action if the breach of the covenants was made by the execution of the deed by Beckwith in December, 1848, as administrator by order of court. The heirs of Chambers, and not the administrator, were the proper parties plaintiff. (Rawle on Cov. 602; 10 Ohio, 442; 3 Dev. 200; 3 Mon. 95; Meigs, 187; 9 B. Monr. 48.) William Chambers died May 9, 1848. The heir of Chambers still holds the title to the lot, and can recover in ejectment--the act of the court and of the administrator of T. F. Smith, in making the deed, being void because E. B. Smith and the heirs of W. Chambers were not parties to the proceedings. The suit of Todd v. Smith's administrator was a void suit. T. F. Smith had no estate at the time of his death. (24 Mo. 87; 4 Johns. Ch. 559; 5 Johns. Ch. 193; 11 Paige, 277.) The land court had no jurisdiction of this cause. The suit was covenant, sounding in money damages entirely, and did not relate to land except collaterally. (Sess. Acts, 1853, p. 90; 20 Mo. 596.) Plaintiff's claim is barred because not presented within three years. (R. C. 1845, p. 91; 11 Mo. 237; 17 Mo. 557; 9 Mo. 225.) The breach has produced no actual damage. The heirs of Chambers have the title, and can demand the lot or the money due. The damages are excessive. Interest is computed from November 21, 1843, the date of the deed of Thomas to Elias B. Smith, and not from the date of the supposed breach.
B. A. Hill, for respondent.
I. The same points are made again by defendant that were made when this cause was here before. The judgment must stand unless the court should overrule its former decision. See brief in case when it was here before.
When the case of Roberts v. Cooper, 20 How. 467, was before the supreme court of the United States the second time, after it had been tried in the circuit court on the principles established by the supreme court in the first trial, it was decided that the court could not be compelled, on a second writ of error in the same case, to review their decision on the first; that after a case had been brought there and decided and a mandate issued to the court below, if a second writ of error was sued out it brought up for review nothing but the proceedings subsequent to the mandate; that none of the questions which were before the court on the first writ of error could be reheard or examined upon the second, and to allow a second writ of error or appeal to a court of last resort on the same questions which were open to dispute in the first, would lead to endless litigation; for there would be no end to a suit if every litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court to listen to criticisms on their opinions or speculate on chances from changes in its members.
The practical wisdom of these observations commend themselves to our consideration as particularly appropriate to the decisions of this court, which is liable to casual and periodical changes in its members, and for that reason a greater degree of conservatism is required than would perhaps be necessary in a court less subject to mutation. Whilst, then we do not adopt the rule so forcibly stated in Roberts v. Cooper, in all its extent, we think it ought to be declared that when a case has been retried in an inferior court according to the principles laid down in the mandate of this court, none of the questions which were decided when the case was first here should be open to reëxamination on a...
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Wilson v. Beckwith
...by adhering to its opinion, reverse such decision and render the judgment that should have been rendered in the first instance. Chambers v. Smith, 30 Mo. 156; Grumley Webb, 48 Mo. 602; Boone v. Shackelford, 66 Mo. 497; Bell v. Railroad, 72 Mo. 50; Eans v. Eans, 79 Mo. 53; Wernse v. McPike, ......
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...the exceptions with precision, the scope and trend of them may be arrived at by a summary review of some of the cases. Thus: In Chambers v. Smith, 30 Mo. 156, a very pronouncement of the general rule in Roberts v. Cooper, 61 U.S. 467, 20 HOW 467, 15 L.Ed. 969 (quod vide), was considered and......
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Mangold v. Bacon
...the exceptions with precision, the scope and trend of them may be arrived at by a summary review of some of the cases. Thus, in Chambers v. Smith, 30 Mo. 156, a very strong pronouncement of the general rule in Roberts v. Cooper, 20 How. 467, 15 L. Ed. 969 (quod vide), was considered, and we......