Wilson v. Beckwith
| Decision Date | 29 June 1897 |
| Parties | Wilson, by Next Friend, v. Beckwith, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. Leroy B. Valliant Judge.
Reversed and remanded (with directions).
Martin L. Clardy for appellants.
(1) The fact that this case was retried in accordance with the principles announced in the decision of this court (117 Mo 61) is no reason why the court should not review its former adjudication, and if it is manifest that the principles of law involved have been incorrectly decided and that great injustice will be done to one of the parties by adhering to its opinion, reverse such decision and render the judgment that should have been rendered in the first instance. Chambers v. Smith, 30 Mo. 156; Grumley v Webb, 48 Mo. 602; Boone v. Shackelford, 66 Mo. 497; Bell v. Railroad, 72 Mo. 50; Eans v. Eans, 79 Mo. 53; Wernse v. McPike, 100 Mo. 476; Gwin v. Waggoner, 116 Mo. 143; Bird v. Sellers, 122 Mo. 32; Rutledge v. Railroad, 123 Mo. 131. (2) The said acts of 1855 and 1857, having been passed before the execution of the trust deed, by the Cairo & Fulton Railroad Company, the purchasers from the trustees took and held subject to any lien which the State acquired under these acts. If, therefore, these acts, or either of them "covered this land, then the foreclosure sale made in 1866 cut out and utterly destroyed the title of those claiming under the deed of trust." Wilson v. Beckwith, 117 Mo. 73, 74; Wilson v. Boyce, 92 U.S. 325; Foster v. Reynolds, 38 Mo. 553; Brant v. Robertson, 16 Mo. 129; Wolfe v. Dyer, 95 Mo. 545; Christian v. Newberry, 61 Mo. 446; Kansas City Savings Ass'n v. Mastin, 61 Mo. 435. (3) All the questions arising in this case have been settled adversely to the plaintiff in the following well considered cases: Whitehead v. Vineyard, 50 Mo. 30; Wilson v. Boyce, 92 U.S. 320; Chouteau v. Allen, 70 Mo. 327; Railroad v. McGhee, 115 U.S. 476; Wilson v. Ward Lumber Co., 67 F. 674. These decisions have become a rule of property, and titles have been vested upon the strength of such rule. The certainty of the rule is even more important than the reason of it; the maxim "Stare decisis et non quieta movere" is the only safe rule, and should be adhered to. Even one decision in regard to title will be scrupulously guarded and preserved. The titles are for all time, and should stand as passed upon, if possible. 23 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, art. "Stare Decisis," p. 21; Harrow v. Myers, 29 Ind. 470; Reed v. Ownby, 44 Mo. 206; Wells on Res Adjudicata and Stare Decisis, secs. 598, 599 and 611; Dunklin County v. Chouteau, 120 Mo. 577; Smith v. Clark County, 54 Mo. 70; 2 Hermann on Estoppel and Res Adjudicata, pp. 116, 117-123; Wilson v. Ward Lumber Co., 67 F. 674.
Harry J. Cantwell and A. N. Edwards for respondent.
(1) Section 17 of the act of March 3, 1857, does not constitute the contract between the Cairo & Fulton Railroad Company and the State of Missouri. The act of February 20, 1855, the provision of section 20 of the act of March 3, 1857, the object to be attained by the advance of State aid, the then existing conditions, the contemporaneous construction by both parties, shall all be considered. Wilson v. Beckwith, 117 Mo. 61. (2) The object of all rules of interpretation is to discover the intent. When the terms of a law or contract are ambiguous the subject-matter and object of the statute is to be considered in construing it. Wilson v. Beckwith, supra; Spitler v. Young, 63 Mo. 44; State ex rel. v. Diveling, 66 Mo. 379; Platt v. Railroad, 9 Otto (98 U.S.), 48. (3) The act of February 20, 1855, authorizing the railroad company to mortgage the lands for funds to build the road was not repealed by the act of December 10, 1855, nor by that of March 3, 1857, and the act of March 3, 1857, must be construed with it. Wilson v. Beckwith, 117 Mo. 61; McVey v. McVey, 51 Mo. 406; U. S. v. Gear, 3 How. 120; Ex parte Cow Dog, 109 U.S. 556; State v. Stoll, 17 Wall. 425. (4) The subsequent declarations of the State that no lien was ever intended to be created on the lands are admissible, and effectual as a waiver of any lien the State ever had, if any, on these lands. Brown and Brown, Trustees, v. State of Maryland and Railroad, 62 Md. 439; State to use, etc., v. Heman, 70 Mo. 441. (5) Now the Constitution of 1865 (Const. 1865, sec. 15, art. 77) prohibited the legislature from releasing the lien of the State upon any railroad. The "sell out act" declared the purchasers should not acquire the "swamp" lands at said sale. If the "congress" lands were included in the lien of the State, then the "swamp" lands surely were, for they are "property" in an equal degree. (6) The contract between the State and the railroad company did not become consummate until the issuance of the bonds in April, 1859. Trustees v. Rider, 13 Conn. 87; Town of Concord v. Portsmouth, 92 U.S. 625; Tilley v. Chicago, 103 U.S. 155; Ellison v. Henshaw, 4 Wheat. 225; Bank v. Hall, 101 U.S. 43. (7) The word "property" has no fixed meaning. It may, when used in a will -- to take effect after a man has no further use for "property" -- be sufficient to include all he was possessed of, but it can only be construed to have that effect in other instances when there is no other evidence to limit the sense in which it was used. Wilson v. Beckwith, 117 Mo. 61; Alabama v. Montague, 107 U.S. 602; Smith v. McCullough, 104 U.S. 25; Myer v. Johnson & Stewart, 53 Ala. 237, and 64 Ala. 603; Dinsmore v. Railroad, 12 Wis. 649; Seymour v. Railroad, 25 Barb. 284; Railroad v. Livermore et al., 47 Pa. St. 465. (8) Act of Congress of July 28, 1866, was a waiver of forfeiture and not a new grant. The selection under the act of February 9, 1853, and not the issuance of the patent vested the title. Doe v. Laramore, 116 U.S. 198; Railroad v. McGee, 115 U.S. 469; Act of Congress, June 10, 1852. (9) "Stare decisis" means to adhere to and abide by the decided law (Bouvier). Not to decided facts, but to decided law. 1 Kent, *477, and cases cited in first clause of appellant's brief.
Gantt, J. Barclay, C. J., concurs in the judgment. Robinson, J., concurs in toto. Macfarlane, J., concurs in the first and second paragraphs, but dissents as to the third. Brace, J., concurs in the first, and dissents as to the second and third paragraphs. Sherwood and Burgess, JJ., concur in the above opinion but not in all the language employed.
In Banc.
-- This is an action of ejectment for the possession of forty acres of land, the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of section 10, township 26, range 16, situate in Mississippi county in this State. The action was originally commenced in said county and a change of venue awarded to the city of St. Louis. This is the second appeal in the cause to this court. The defendant recovered judgment on the first trial in the circuit court of St Louis and that judgment was reversed and the cause remanded by Division number 1 of this court. The opinion then rendered will be found in 117 Mo. 61, 22 S.W. 639. On the last trial plaintiff recovered and defendant appealed. As was said by Black Judge, on the former appeal, the importance of the questions involved demand a clear and full statement of the facts. The forty acres directly involved in this appeal constitute but an insignificant part of the large domain the title to which will be affected by our decision. The essential facts are as follows:
On the ninth of February, 1853, Congress passed an act (10 U.S. Stats. at Large, p. 155), granting to the State of Arkansas and Missouri a right of way though the public lands for a railroad, from a point on the Mississippi river, opposite the mouth of the Ohio, to Fulton on the Texas boundary, by the way of Little Rock; also granting to said States, respectively, every alternate section of land, designated by even numbers, for six sections in width, on each side of the road "for the purpose of aiding in making the railroad and branches as aforesaid," and providing that the legislature might dispose of the lands "for the purposes aforesaid, and no other."
Section 5 provides: "That the lands hereby granted to said States shall be disposed of by said States only in the manner following; that is to say, that a quantity of land not exceeding one hundred and twenty sections, and included within a continuous length of twenty miles of said road, may be sold; and when the Governors of said State or States shall certify to the Secretary of the Interior that twenty continuous miles of said road is completed, then another like quantity of land hereby granted may be sold; and so from time to time, until said road is completed; and if said road is not completed within ten years, no further sales shall be made, and the land unsold shall revert to the United States."
On the twentieth of February, 1855, the legislature of this State, passed an act (Acts 1854, p. 314), granting to the Cairo & Fulton Railroad Company, a corporation organized under the laws of this State, the lands granted to this State by the act of Congress aforementioned, "for the uses and purposes, and subject to the condition, reversion, and provisions set forth and contained in said act of Congress and this act." The act contains the following section:
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