Chambers v. Ogle

• Citation: 174 S.W. 532,117 Ark. 242
• Decision Date: 01 March 1915
• Docket Number: 214
• Parties: CHAMBERS v. OGLE
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

174 S.W. 532

117 Ark. 242

CHAMBERS v. OGLE

No. 214

Supreme Court of Arkansas

March 1, 1915

Appeal from Madison Chancery Court, T. H. Humphreys, Chancellor reversed.

Decree reversed.

J W. Grabiel, for appellant.

1. Appellee, Flora Ogle, is not entitled to any part of the reward. Where a reward is offered for the capture and conviction, or for the capture, of an offender, the mere giving of information which enables others, acting independently of the informer, to make the arrest, is not sufficient to entitle the informer to share in the reward. 28 N.E. 1022; 122 Pa.St. 115. See, also, 50 Cal. 218; 191 Ill 610, 61 N.E. 456, 85 Am. St. Rep. 278; 24 Wis. 278.

2. The intervener, Seaton, in what he did was acting as the agent of appellant in the capture of Moore, and is not entitled to share in the reward. 92 U.S. 73, 76; 85 Ill. 174; 78 S.W 194.

3. Berry, Vaughan and Shuster, are not entitled to share in the reward, because (1) their participation in the events preceding the capture, etc., was inadequate and insufficient as concerns the capture, and was the exercise of only the ordinary duties which devolved upon them as officers of Madison County, as concerns the conviction. (2) They are precluded by considerations of public policy from receiving the reward.

As to the capture, these parties did nothing that would entitle them to any part of the reward. Chambers was acting alone and independently and for the reward.

The reward was offered for the capture and conviction. A substantial compliance was all that was required. 88 Kan. 538, 129 P. 168, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 133; 86 Kan. 305, 120 P. 542. The burglars entered a plea of guilty. There was no trial resulting in a conviction although appellant was ready with the evidence he had gathered together. The capture was the proximate cause of the conviction, entitling appellant to the reward. 24 Am. & Eng. of L. 956.

The sheriff and deputies are not entitled under the law, to receive any reward other than that provided by law for the performance of their duty. 34 Cyc. 1753; 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1170; 81 N.E. 641; 66 Misc. 85, 120 N.Y.S. 686; 173 U.S. 381; 112 Va. 28, 70 S.E. 515; 51 Ark. 504.

The decisions are conflicting on the question here presented, but we think that the decision in Gregg v. Pierce, 63 Barb. 387, holding that a sheriff pursuing a fugitive into another State and causing his arrest there and return, was entitled to the reward offered, and the line of decisions following that, are in conflict with the better reasoning on the subject. See, also, Sergeant Hawkins, P. C. Ch. 68, § 4; 188 Mo. 501; 87 S.W. 949; 107 Am. St. Rep. 324; 150 Ky. 805; 150 S.W. 1020; 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 131; 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. of L. 455; 32 Cyc. 1251, and notes; 164 Pa.St. 266-271; 81 Ark. 599; 95 Ark. 552; 85 Ark. 106; 155 Pa.St. 514.

4. Appellant is not excluded on the grounds of public policy from participation in the reward. No consideration of public policy operates to disqualify a police officer of a State foreign to the jurisdiction where the offense was committed from accepting a reward offered for the capture of the offender 188 Mo. 501, 87 S.W. 949, 107 Am. St. Rep. 324; 88 Kan. 538, 129 P. 168, 43 L. R. A. 133; 35 Ala. 544; 24 Am. & Eng. Enc. of L. 953; 130 N.W. 1025, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 924.

Wade H. James, for appellee, Ogle.

The rule of law applicable here is stated as follows: "When the reward is offered for the arrest or apprehension of a criminal, most cases hold that the person who causes the arrest to be made by an officer, or other person, or who furnishes the information which leads directly to the arrest, has complied with the terms of the offer and is entitled to the reward." 34 Cyc. 1745.

It is not necessary that an informer, in order to entitle him to a reward, should act as a prosecutor, or be called as a witness. It is enough that the result is in fact reached primarily through his instrumentality. I Low 284, and eases cited; 42 L. R. A. 155; 91 Me. 488.

OPINION

MCCULLOCH, C. J.

This action is one to recover the amount of a reward offered for the arrest and conviction of certain criminals. It was instituted by Mrs. Flora Ogle, one of the appellees, against the First National Bank of Huntsville, Arkansas, and certain parties to whom the bank had paid the reward. Appellant, who was a police officer in the State of Oklahoma, and G. W. Seaton, a police officer in the State of Missouri, separately intervened claiming the amount of the reward or a portion thereof.

The bank was burglarized on the night of June 13, 1912, and a large sum of money was taken. The bank published an offer of payment of a reward of the sum of $ 500 for the capture and conviction of each of the parties who committed the crime, and also a reward of 25 per cent of all of the stolen money recovered. Two of the criminals were arrested, brought back to Arkansas, and convicted, both of them entering pleas of guilty. One was arrested in Oklahoma by appellant Chambers, and the other in the State of Missouri by appellee Seaton. A small amount of money was returned, and the reward for the two men and for the amount of money recovered aggregated the sum of $ 1,047.93, which was paid over by the bank to appellees Shuster, Berry and Vaughan, who were officers of Madison County, where the crime was committed, and who brought the prisoners back and put them in jail. Shuster was sheriff of the county and Berry and Vaughan were his deputies.

They got a trace of the criminals and followed it to Fairland, Oklahoma, where one of them named Monroe was arrested; and a telegram was sent to appellee Seaton, by an officer in Oklahoma acting at the instance of appellant and the Arkansas officers and Seaton arrested the other one of the criminals named Moore. The first trace of the criminals discovered by the Madison County officers was through Mrs. Ogle, who kept a boarding house at Eureka Springs. Three men stayed at her house about the time of the bank robbery, and after they left she found in a cuspidor a mutilated envelope bearing the name of one Brook Moore of Fairland, Oklahoma. She gave the torn envelope to the Madison County officers, who concluded that it would lead to the arrest of the criminals, and when they got to Fairland they called in consultation appellant Chambers, who was the marshal of the town. Appellant knew Brock Moore, but informed them that he did not answer the description of either of the three men as given, but he expressed the view that other parties, particularly the man who went by the name of Monroe, were implicated in the commission of the crime. He based his suspicion on the fact that Monroe appeared to be associated in some way with Brock Moore, and that he had been absent about the time the bank robbery was committed. They found that the two suspected men, Monroe and Moore, had left town that day in vehicles hired from local livery stables. They went around to one of the livery stables, where Monroe got his team, and watched the place until Monroe's return; and when he drove back to the barn, appellant arrested him. Shuster and Vaughan were present at the time, but Berry had left the stable a short time before. Monroe was turned over to the three Madison County officers and they brought him back to Arkansas. It was found on inquiry that the other man, Moore, had driven over to Afton, a neighboring town, and appellant and Berry got a team and drove over there the same day. When they got there, they found that Moore had driven another team over to Vinita, another neighboring town. Appellant called over the phone one Ridenhour, a deputy U.S. marshal, and got him to hire a team and drive over to the railroad and attempt to intercept Moore. Riden-hour did this at the request of appellant, and when he found that Moore had probably taken a train which carried him through Nevada, Mo., he telegraphed to Seaton, the police officer at that place, requesting him to board the train and arrest Moore. Seaton, upon receipt of the telegram, complied with the request and made the arrest and held Moore until the Arkansas officers could go up and get him, which they did, in company with appellant Chambers.

This, in brief, is a statement of the facts of the case as established by a preponderance of the testimony. There is some conflict as to the method of the arrest of these men, but the chancellor found the facts, as we understand, about as stated above.

The chancellor found that the efforts of all of the parties contributed equally to the arrest of the criminals, and that they were entitled to share equally in the amount of the reward, after deducting the expenses. The net amount paid over by the bank to the Madison County officers, after deducting expenses paid out by them, was $ 853.32, and the chancellor found that appellant also expended $ 10.45 and that Seaton had expended $ 2.40. The chancellor deducted these amounts, and also the sum of $ 38.20, the costs of this action, leaving a net mount of $ 802.27. He divided this and apportioned half as the net amount realized of the reward for the arrest of Monroe, and the other half as the amount of the reward for the arrest of Moore. The first half was divided equally between appellant and Mrs. Ogle, Shuster, Berry and Vaughan, giving them the sum of $ 80.22 each; and the other half was equally divided between appellant and Mrs. Ogle, Shuster, Berry, Vaughan and Seaton, giving them $ 66.85 each.

Appellant Chambers is the only one who appealed from the decree. Appellant contends that he is entitled to the whole of the reward for the arrest of both of the criminals. His contention is that Search, in making the arrest of Moore acted merely as his (appellant's) agent, and for that reason is not entitled to the reward; and that he...