Chambers v. Owens
| Citation | 525 P.2d 306,22 Ariz.App. 175 |
| Decision Date | 27 August 1974 |
| Docket Number | CA-CIV,No. 1,1 |
| Parties | Paul J. CHAMBERS and Terry Chambers, his wife, Appellants, v. Hal B. OWENS and Kathy Owens, his wife, New York Life Insurance Co., a New York corporation; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, a corporation, Appellees. 2110. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Arizona |
This appeal involves the extent of coverage afforded to a person under Arizona's uninsured motorist statute--A.R.S. § 20--259.01. 1 The primary question to be decided is whether an insurance company which insures several vehicles of an insured is exposed to liability under § 20--259.01 for those vehicles which are owned by the insured but not declared or paid for in an existing policy.
On August 3, 1971 appellant-plaintiff Paul Chambers, while riding a motorcycle, was involved in an accident. The other vehicle was driven by appellee-defendant Hal B. Owens, an uninsured motorist.
At the time of the accident Chambers held three separate insurance policies; two policies were with State Farm Insurance Company and each carried uninsured motorist coverage. Chambers elected to insure the motorcycle with Arrow Insurance Company (Summit Insurance Company is the successor of Arrow). In the application provided by Summit, a waiver of uninsured motorist coverage was made a available to the applicant. The insured could refuse the uninsured coverage only by signing a distinct portion of the application. Chambers signed the waiver, accordingly refusing uninsured motorist coverage and obtaining the policy at a reduced cost.
Chambers now seeks recovery against State Farm Insurance Company claiming the the uninsured motorist coverage afforded in his auto policies extends to injuries sustained while on his motorcycle, even though the motorcycle was not listed in either State Farm policy. He also seeks recovery from Summit, claiming there was no valid rejection of the uninsured motorist coverage.
At the trial court level Summit moved for summary judgment, basing its motion on the contention that Chambers validly rejected uninsured motorist coverage, thereby releasing Summit from liability. The trial court granted the motion. State Farm also moved for summary judgment, presenting the argument that the motorcycle was not covered by the policies held by Chambers. The trial court granted State Farm's motion. In our opinion the trial court properly granted the motions for summary judgment.
The language of the State Farm policy is clear. Section III of the policy excludes certain occurrences from coverage:
'THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY:
(b) TO BODILY INJURY TO AN INSURED WHILE OCCUPYING OR THROUGH BEING STRUCK BY A LAND MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY THE NAMED INSURED OR ANY RESIDENT OF THE SAME HOUSEHOLD, IF SUCH VEHICLE IS NOT AN OWNED MOTOR VEHIELE.'
An 'owned motor vehicle' is defined by Section I of the State Farm policy as a:
'. . . motor vehicle or trailer Described in the declarations . . .' (Emphasis added)
Chambers did not declare the motorcycle in either of his insurance policies with State Farm and consequently the explicit terms of the policies do not cover Chambers' accident which on the motorcycle.
Chambers attempts to escape the exclusion by his contention that it is void as against Arizona's uninsured motorist statute. Several foreign jurisdictions have considered identical exclusionary clauses against statutes similar to Arizona's. See State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. v. Reaves, 292 So.2d 95 (Sup.Ct.Ala.1974); Touchette v. Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co., 80 Wash.2d 327, 494 P.2d 479 (1972). Those jurisdictions have found the exclusionary clauses to be void. They reason that the intent of the legislation is to protect persons from accidents which may not be compensible because of financially irresponsible defendants. We agree with the stated intent of the statute; however we cannot ascribe to the breadth attributed it by some jurisdictions.
Insurance premiums are adduced by an actuarial allocation of risks. Ascription to the Alabama or Washington theory would force the insurance company to render uninsured motorist coverage to all vehicles owned by the insured as long as one vehicle was properly covered by the initial policy. An insurance company is not a gratuitous guarantor. We...
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Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona, 17675-PR
...... We find these cases highly persuasive. Farmers relies on a Court of Appeals decision, Owens v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company, 15 Ariz.App. 181, 487 P.2d 402 (1971), which found an "other vehicle" exclusion clause to be reasonable. We find ...§ 20-259.01. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is vacated. The Owens, Chambers and Rodriguez cases are overruled. This case is reversed and remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. ......
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Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona
...... the question raised in this declaratory judgment action has been answered adversely to his position by Division One of the Court of Appeals in Owens v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company, 15 Ariz.App. 181, 487 P.2d 402 (1971), but suggests that Owens is incorrect and should not be followed. We agree ... Division One adhered to the same public policy view expressed in Chambers" v. Owen, 22 Ariz.App. 175, 525 P.2d 306 (1975), and in Rodriguez v. Maryland Indemnity Insurance Company, 24 Ariz.App. 392, 539 P.2d 196 (1975). \xC2"......
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...... See Rodriquez v. Maryland Indem. Ins. Co., 24 Ariz.App. 392, 539 P.2d 196 (1975); Chambers v. Owens, 22 Ariz.App. 175, 525 P.2d 306 (1974); Holcomb v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 254 Ark. 514, 495 S.W.2d 155 (1973); Barton v. American Family Mut. ......
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