Chambers v. Peach County, Ga.
| Decision Date | 14 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. S97A0648,S97A0648 |
| Citation | 268 Ga. 672,492 S.E.2d 191 |
| Parties | CHAMBERS v. PEACH COUNTY et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Hillard J. Quint, Alan I. Begner, Atlanta, Steven M. Youngelson, for Veeda Chambers.
Charles E. Cox, Jr., Cox & Cox, Macon, for Peach County, Georgia, et al. BENHAM, Chief Justice.
Appellant Veeda Chambers is the owner of the "Neon Cowboy," a lounge which provides adult entertainment and serves alcohol in Peach County. From 1993, Peach County annually issued a business license and a license to serve beer and wine to Neon Cowboy. The county passed an adult entertainment ordinance in 1993, which required among other things, a license for adult entertainment, and thereafter Neon Cowboy presented unlicensed adult entertainment. The county filed an action to abate the nuisance of unlicensed adult entertainment in 1994, which action resulted in the declaration that the adult entertainment ordinance was unconstitutional. Chambers v. Peach County, 266 Ga. 318, 467 S.E.2d 519 (1996). Thereafter, the county enacted another adult entertainment ordinance which, among other things, provided that "[n]o adult entertainment establishment licensee shall serve, sell, distribute or suffer the consumption or possession of any alcoholic beverages, malt beverages or wine or controlled substance upon the premises of the licensee." Ms. Chambers filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the county's enforcement of the new ordinance, and sought a writ of mandamus ordering the county to issue her a permanent adult entertainment license. By consent order, the county delayed enforcement of the new adult entertainment ordinance for 45 days, in which time the trial court held a hearing on appellant's request for an interlocutory injunction. Concluding that the new ordinance was constitutional and that appellant had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, the trial court denied Ms. Chambers' motion for an interlocutory injunction. This appeal followed. 1
1. An interlocutory injunction Price v. Empire Land Co., 218 Ga. 80, 85, 126 S.E.2d 626 (1962). The trial court has broad discretion to decide whether to grant or deny a request for an interlocutory injunction (OCGA § 9-5-8; Avnet, Inc. v. Wyle Laboratories, 263 Ga. 615(1), 437 S.E.2d 302 (1993)), and the appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's exercise of its discretion unless a manifest abuse of discretion is shown or there was no evidence on which to base the ruling. Kennedy v. W.M. Sheppard Lumber Co., 261 Ga. 145(1), 401 S.E.2d 515 (1991).
2. The new ordinance is designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of sexually explicit businesses. In enacting the new ordinance, the county commission considered and relied upon evidence reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem: they heard testimony interpreting studies of other cities' experience with adult entertainment, which studies showed that areas near adult entertainment establishments suffered a decrease in residential property values and an increase in crime, especially sex-related activity. A GBI drug and vice investigator testified that the number of illegal drug and vice complaints at the two Peach County clubs offering adult entertainment far exceeded the number of complaints received from any other business in 33 middle-Georgia counties, and the Peach County sheriff testified to increased criminal activity at the two clubs and at businesses located near them. Compare Chambers v. Peach County, supra, 266 Ga. 318(1-3), 467 S.E.2d 519.
Since the new ordinance is designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of sexually explicit businesses, it is content-neutral and is put to the three-pronged test enunciated in Paramount Pictures v. Busbee, 250 Ga. 252(1), 297 S.E.2d 250 (1982), for content-neutral legislation. Chambers v. Peach County, supra, 266 Ga. at 319, 467 S.E.2d 519. The ordinance in question meets the Paramount criteria in that it furthers important governmental interests (the reduction of crime and the protection of property values) which interests are unrelated to the suppression of speech, and the incidental restriction of speech is no greater than necessary to further the governmental interests. Quetgles v. City of Columbus, 268 Ga. 619 (2), 491 S.E.2d 778 (1997).
3. Appellant next asserts that the 1996 ordinance cannot be applied constitutionally to Neon Cowboy because the club provided adult entertainment and alcoholic beverages prior to passage of the ordinance. We recently addressed a similar assertion in Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 267...
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