Chambers v. State
| Decision Date | 21 May 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 282, 2006.,282, 2006. |
| Citation | 930 A.2d 904 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
| Parties | Joseph CHAMBERS, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. |
Court Below — Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County, Cr. I.D. 0305016220.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.
Joseph M. Bernstein, Esquire (argued) and Peter W. Veith, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.
Kevin M. Carroll, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee.
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices.
The defendant-appellant, Joseph L. Chambers ("Chambers"), was indicted on charges of Capital Murder in the First Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited. A jury trial was held in the Superior Court. Chambers was convicted on all charges.
Following a penalty hearing, the jury unanimously found the existence of one statutory aggravating circumstance and voted seven to five that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Chambers was sentenced on June 2, 2006. The trial judge declined to impose a death sentence. Chambers was sentenced to life imprisonment, without the possibility of probation or parole, on the Capital Murder in the First Degree conviction. He was sentenced to an additional fifteen years on the weapons convictions.
Chambers raises two arguments in this direct appeal. First, he contends the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying a defense request for a mistrial, after the trial judge allowed the chief investigating officer to speak with a witness for the State, during a recess and before the witness had concluded his direct testimony. Second, Chambers submits the Superior Court committed legal error when it refused to give a jury instruction concerning the testimony of accomplices or participants.1
We have concluded that both of Chambers' arguments are without merit. Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court must be affirmed.
On April 27, 2003, Gregory Graves, a resident of Simonds Gardens in New Castle, was shot multiple times. His body was found several hours later by William Butler. Butler discovered Graves' body in "the alley between Rosegate and Simonds [Gardens]," and called the police and emergency services through 911.
Butler told police investigators that both he and his wife had been sleeping when they heard gunshots in the early morning hours of April 27, 2003. They ignored them, however, and went back to sleep. During the course of the police investigation, officers spoke with another witness, Benita Evans. Evans told the police that she witnessed an argument between Chambers and Graves. Evans knew Graves and described him as a good friend, someone she could go to if she needed anything, including money or drugs. Evans also recognized Chambers from the neighborhood.
On the night Graves was shot, Evans had been "partying" with drugs and alcohol. She was on her way to a local liquor store when she saw Chambers and Graves arguing. Evans was approximately fifteen feet away. Although Graves and Chambers were not loud, she could tell they were arguing "[b]ecause of their hands, language [and] body movement." Both Chamber and Graves were gone by the time Evans left the liquor store.
After returning to her house, Evans heard Graves' voice. She looked out of a window and saw Graves in the common area outside her building. She remembers this being at approximately 3:00 a.m. Evans went outside and asked if he could get her some cocaine. He said no and indicated that he was waiting for someone. Evans then saw Graves walk towards "[t]he alley [ ] leading to the park." A few minutes later, Evans saw Chambers follow Graves into that same alley.
Officers also learned that Quinton Davis had been out during the general time of the shooting. Davis was a resident of 117 Rose Avenue in the Rosegate neighborhood in New Castle. Investigators spoke with Davis, who told several different stories about the night that Graves was shot. Initially, Davis told investigators that he was at a motel the night of the shooting. He later changed his story and told investigators that he was with Chambers, whom he knew as "Bookie," and Daniel Haye the night Graves was shot.
According to Davis, on April 27, 2003, at around 3:00 a.m., he was sitting with Chambers and Haye, in Haye's car, near Chambers' residence. Chambers left the car and walked past a few of the houses on the street. He then returned to the car and told Davis and Haye that he had something to do in one of the houses. Chambers instructed Davis and Haye to meet him in Simonds Gardens, by "the path." Davis did not know what Chambers had to do in the house. Before driving to Simonds Gardens, Davis got into the front passenger seat of Haye's car. The two then drove to wait for Chambers.
Several minutes later, Chambers met them at the car. He was "walking fast" and "breathing kind of heavy." Chambers got into the back seat of Haye's car. He told Davis and Haye and that they all needed to get out of the area because he had just shot Graves.
Haye drove to Philadelphia. On the way up to Philadelphia, Chambers rolled the rear window down and back up once. Haye told investigators that he "heard something thrown out of the window" and specifically indicated that a "gun was tossed out of the car in [Chambers'] black hooded sweatshirt along I95 near Philadelphia."
Chambers appeals the Superior Court's denial of his motion for a mistrial. Chambers asserts that it was reversible error for the chief investigating officer, Detective Armstrong, to speak with Quinton Davis during a brief recess in Davis' direct examination.2 Chambers contends that the sole purpose of the recess was to give the State time to "rehabilitate" Davis' direct testimony.
The trial court judge rejected Chambers' same argument and denied his motion for a mistrial, holding:
Essentially, the defense is asking me to craft a new rule of procedure that would prohibit communications between an attorney and anybody who's a witness while that witness is on direct examination. That plainly is not the rule that was stated in Webb v. State. There's some discussion of how counsel and witnesses interact, but it's basically descriptive and not a matter of a ruling.
For example, our Supreme court quotes the United States Supreme Court as follows: "It is a common practice for a judge to instruct a witness not to discuss his or testimony with third parties until the trial is completed." That's plainly at variance with the practice in this state. The rule in this state applies only to cross-examination. And I don't know of a rule that would prohibit the Court from allowing consultation during cross-examination for proper purposes.
That being the case, I allowed the consultation during trial for what it seemed to me was a proper purpose. And as a consequence, the motion for mistrial is denied.
The State asserts that the prosecutor's request for a recess was not aimed at "rehabilitating" Davis' testimony. In support of this contention, the State points to the fact that the prosecutor did not initiate contact with the witness. The record supports the State's position. It was the witness who requested to speak with Detective Armstrong.
Detective Armstrong spoke with Davis at a brief recess during Davis' direct examination. According to Detective Armstrong, his conversation with Davis was not aimed at "controlling or putting a better face on testimonial damage caused by Davis' testimony." Instead, the substance of the conversation, as recounted by Detective Armstrong, concerned the safety of Davis and his family.3 The State notes that there is support in the record concerning the validity of the perceived threat to Davis' safety. On March 18, 2005, the trial judge called counsel to sidebar and explained the presence of extra security within the courtroom. The basis for the increased security was due to information communicated to the Department of Justice that Davis "was a dead man walking."
In United States v. Calderin-Rodriguez,4 the Eighth Circuit addressed the argument that "the district court erred in refusing to strike the testimony of [a] witness ... because [he] discussed his testimony with the prosecutor and another witness during the evening recess midway through his direct testimony."5 In Calderin-Rodriguez, a witness corrected testimony given the day prior. On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned the witness about the correction and the witness admitted that "[w]ith [the prosecutor's] help I realized what I said was wrong."6 The Eighth Circuit found no error in the trial judge's denial of the codefendants' motion to strike the witness' testimony:7
... the meeting between [the witness] and the prosecutor violated neither Federal Rule of Evidence 615 nor the sequestration order in this case. Rule 615 ... does not by its terms forbid an attorney from conferring with witnesses during trial.... Nor is it inherently unethical for a lawyer to speak to a witness once the witness has begun to testify.... Assuredly, the district court, in exercise of its discretion in regulating the conduct of the trial, may impose restriction on an attorney's contact with witnesses during trial, not only to prevent unethical coaching, but also simply to preserve the status quo during breaks in testimony.8
The Eighth Circuit ruled further that, even if an improper conference is assumed, the defendants failed to show prejudice because, "even without the conference, the government would likely have been able to help [the witness] correct his earlier testimony by showing [him] the reports in court as prior inconsistent statements or to refresh his recollections."9
Like its federal counterpart that was addressed in Calderin-Rodriguez, Delaware...
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