Chance v. State, 406
| Decision Date | 08 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 406,1995,406 |
| Citation | 685 A.2d 351 |
| Parties | James CHANCE, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. . Submitted: |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
Upon appeal from Superior Court. AFFIRMED.
Court Below--Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Kent County Cr.A. No. IK94-08-0329.
Joseph M. Bernstein, Wilmington, for Appellant.
John Williams (argued), and Daniel R. Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, Department of Justice, Dover, for Appellee.
Before VEASEY, C.J., WALSH, HOLLAND, HARTNETT and BERGER, JJ., constituting the Court en Banc.
This criminal proceeding originated from the beating death of Michael Keesser ("Keesser"). After a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant-appellant, James A. Chance ("Chance"), was convicted of Murder in the Second Degree. Chance was sentenced to sixteen years of incarceration, followed by four years of probation. This is Chance's direct appeal.
There are two issues before this Court. According to Chance, the Superior Court committed plain error. First, Chance alleges that the Superior Court erred when it gave the jury an instruction with regard to Chance's liability for a consequential crime in furtherance of an agreed upon unlawful act. Chance argues this instruction was incorrect because this case does not involve a felony murder. Second, Chance argues that the Superior Court erred when it failed to include in its jury instructions on accomplice liability an explicit statement requiring the jury to consider Chance's individual mental culpability in determining his degree of guilt for Keesser's death. See 11 Del.C. § 274.
This Court has concluded that the Superior Court's instruction with regard to Chance's liability as an accomplice for consequential crimes was correct. Thus, Chance's first contention is without merit. This Court has also concluded that the Superior Court's omission of an instruction in accordance with 11 Del.C. § 274 ("Section 274") in the initial charge to the jury, and in the supplemental response to the jury's accomplice liability question during deliberations, did not constitute plain error. Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed.
On August 19, 1994, Chance attended a party hosted by his friend, Paul Lunsford ("Lunsford"). Prior to arriving at the party, Chance had spent the day drinking heavily. He described himself as "crazy."
Keesser came to the party with a group of friends. Keesser remained with them, rather than mixing with the other guests. This apparently angered Chance, who told several people that there would be a fight with the Keesser group.
Chance began to provoke fights with other guests at the party. Chance eventually accosted one of Keesser's friends at the party. When a general fight ensued inside of Lunsford's house, Keesser decided to leave the party. Keesser left the backyard and walked toward his car with his keys in hand.
Keesser was accosted before he reached his vehicle. Keesser was then beaten by James Mayhall ("Mayhall"), Joshua Holder ("Holder"), James Bonds ("Bonds"), and Chance. Lunsford and other party guests witnessed Chance repeatedly kicking Keesser in the head. Keesser was left motionless in the street. Attempts to resuscitate Keesser failed. He died a short time later.
Chance and the other assailants were each charged separately with Murder in the Second Degree. 2 In November, 1995, Bonds entered a guilty plea to Manslaughter. In March, 1996, Holder was convicted of Manslaughter. Although the charges against Mayhall were pending at the time of Chance's trial, Chance was tried alone.
Before instructing the jury at the conclusion of Chance's trial, the Superior Court held a prayer conference with the attorneys. During the prayer conference, Chance's attorney requested lesser-included jury instructions on Assault in the First, Second, and Third Degree. The State objected to any lesser-included assault instructions. The Superior Court decided to instruct the jury as to Assault in the First and Second Degree. The Superior Court reasoned that if the jury concluded Chance was acting alone, rather than as an accomplice, and that he did not cause the death of Keesser, Chance would be guilty only of a felonious assault.
After the Superior Court's ruling, Chance withdrew his prior request for an instruction on Assault in the Third Degree. Chance made no other request and noted no other objection to the proposed jury charge at the prayer conference. In particular, Chance neither requested a jury instruction incorporating the language of Section 274, nor noted any objection to the absence of such an instruction.
At the conclusion of the trial, the Superior Court charged the jury to determine whether Chance was guilty, as indicted, as a principal of Murder in the Second Degree, or of any of the four lesser-included crimes of Manslaughter, Criminally Negligent Homicide, Assault in the First Degree, and Assault in the Second Degree. At the State's request, the Superior Court also charged the jury on the State's alternative theory that Chance could be held liable as an accomplice. The Superior Court instructed Chance's jury on accomplice liability as to the charge of Murder in the Second Degree and the same four lesser-included crimes. Chance's trial attorney did not make any objection to the original jury instructions.
During the second day of jury deliberations, the Superior Court received two questions from the jury. The first question asked if Chance could be charged, as a principal, with Murder in the Second Degree if his actions alone did not cause the death. The second question asked if Chance could be guilty of Murder in the Second Degree, as an accomplice, if his actions alone did not cause the death.
After conferring with the attorneys, the Superior Court responded to the jury as follows:
Question number two deals with the liability of a person for an offense committed by another person. I have already instructed you on this subject and will amplify the instruction as follows.
A person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when intending to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense he aids, counsels or agrees or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it. Where there is a crime committed and there are two, three or four people involved, if a person is present at or near the scene of the crime aiding or counseling the other or others in committing the offense, then under the law of this state he is equally guilty with the person or persons who actually commit the crime. Furthermore, aiding as used in the statute refers to assisting in helping with the actual commission of the crime.
Before the Superior Court gave the foregoing response to the jury's question, Chance's attorney did not request any instruction incorporating the statutory language of Section 274 or object to the absence of such an instruction.
Chance's first contention is that the Superior Court committed plain error in instructing the jury that, if it found a principal-accomplice relationship existed between the participants with respect to a particular unlawful act, the jury was not required thereafter to find that he specifically intended the result of a consequential crime which occurs. In this case, that portion of the charge to the Chance jury stated:
It is the law that all persons who join together with a common intent and purpose to commit an unlawful act which, in itself, makes it foreseeable that a crime not specifically agreed upon in advance might be committed, are responsible equally as principals for the commission of such an incidental or consequential crime, whenever the second crime is one in furtherance of or in aid to the originally contemplated unlawful act.
Chance acknowledges that the foregoing instruction is appropriate where there is both an underlying crime and a consequential crime, such as a felony-murder scenario. See Claudio v. State, Del.Supr., 585 A.2d 1278, 1281-82 (1991). Chance argues, however, that this instruction is inappropriate in his case because the assault would merge into the homicide.
Chance's second contention is that the Superior Court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it must determine Chance's personal mental culpability pursuant to Section 274. Section 274 provides:
§ 274. Offenses involving
2 or
more persons; convictions
for different degrees of offense.
When, pursuant to § 271 of this title, 2 or more persons are criminally liable for an offense which is divided into degrees, each person is guilty of an offense of such degree as is compatible with that person's own culpable mental state and with that person's own accountability for an aggravating fact or circumstance.
Chance argues that the jury should have been focused on his mental culpability, not that of any principal or accomplice, in deciding whether he was guilty, as an accomplice, of Murder in the Second Degree or one of the lesser-included crimes. According to Chance, this omission constituted plain error.
Chance's trial attorney did not make any objections to the original or supplemental instructions given to the jury by the Superior Court. This Court will generally decline to review contentions neither raised nor fairly presented to the trial court for decision. Probst v. State, Del.Supr., 547 A.2d 114, 119 (1988). Accordingly, the failure to object at trial usually constitutes a waiver of a defendant's right to raise the issue on appeal unless the error is plain. Id. Under that standard of appellate review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process. Wainwright v. State, Del.Supr., 504 A.2d...
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