Chandler v. State
| Decision Date | 27 July 1982 |
| Docket Number | 5 Div. 624 |
| Parties | Ray CHANDLER, alias v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Dewey W. Teague and C.S. Whittelsey, Opelika, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and J. Anthony McLain and James F. Hampton, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.
First degree sodomy; sentence: life imprisonment without parole.
On November 11, 1980, appellant enticed two teenage brothers into entering an automobile with an offer to make money by helping to move furniture. After driving for nearly an hour, appellant stopped the vehicle and had the boys exit the vehicle. Appellant pulled a gun from under the seat and held it on the boys while he handcuffed them. After making the boys lower their pants, he ordered the younger thirteen-year-old brother to go act as a lookout. He then directed the older eighteen-year-old brother to lie down in the woods, where appellant proceeded to perform fellatio on him. After this act he drove the boys to Auburn High School, had them exit the vehicle, and told them he would return shortly with the key to the house to move the furniture. Appellant did not return and the boys walked home. They reported the incident two days later to their mother and the police.
Appellant argues the warrantless search of his vehicle violated his fourth and fourteenth amendment rights, and required the suppression of any evidence obtained thereby. The court's refusal to suppress such evidence, appellant insists, constituted error requiring reversal.
The police obtained a description of the vehicle appellant drove the day of the crime from the two teenage victims. After locating a vehicle which matched the description, police took the boys to view it on the night of November 18, 1980. The vehicle, which was parked outside appellant's mobile home, was identified by the boys as the same automobile. On December 4, 1980, officers again returned to the mobile home and took pictures of the appellant, with his permission. The victims were able to identify appellant from these pictures as the man who assaulted them. After failing to find the appellant at home on December 9, 1980, the officers returned and arrested appellant, with an arrest warrant, at his trailer in December, 1980. Appellant gave the officers the keys to the vehicle, and the automobile was impounded at police headquarters, where a warrantless routine inventory search was made. As a result of this search, police found a gun and a pair of handcuffs in the vehicle which the victims were able to identify as those used by appellant during the crime.
Appellant argues this case is virtually identical to the facts found in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), and is not an appropriate case to be decided under the inventory search exception created by South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). Although we believe appellant's substantive argument is without merit, we find it unnecessary to reach that question because, in our opinion, appellant lacks standing to raise this issue. See Reid v. State, 388 So.2d 208 (Ala.1980); Jones v. State, 407 So.2d 870 (Ala.Cr.App.1981).
At trial, appellant testified and denied ownership of both the automobile and the articles found therein. He presented further testimony which established ownership of both the vehicle and of its contents in persons other than himself. He also denied having been in that vehicle or having committed the assault on the day the crime occurred, and presented alibi evidence supporting his contention.
Appellant made no assertion of a property or possessory interest in the vehicle or the property seized at any time, and in fact specifically denied and refuted any assertion of the same. Therefore, he has no standing to contest the search.
The burden was upon appellant to establish that his own individual constitutional rights were violated by the challenged search and seizure. McCraney v. State, 381 So.2d 102 (Ala.Cr.App.1980); Brown v. State, 339 So.2d 125 (Ala.Cr.App.1976). Appellant not only failed to carry this burden, but specifically negated its establishment by his own in-court admissions. Collier v. State, 413 So.2d 403 (Ala.1982).
Appellant alleges that statements he made to police, after having previously invoked his right to counsel, and having subsequently stated he would not talk with police, were erroneously admitted at trial.
Although appellant's argument appears pursuasive at first blush, a close scrutiny of the underlying facts reveals it is without merit. Whether a waiver is voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made depends upon the particular underlying facts and circumstances surrounding each case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).
Appellant was initially arrested on this charge in December, 1980, at which time he was advised of his constitutional rights in Opelika, Alabama. Appellant informed Officer Gary Knight that he did not wish to make a statement and that he desired the assistance of an attorney. Officer Knight immediately ceased any further attempt to interrogate appellant. Appellant retained the present trial counsel to represent him and was subsequently released on bond. Three months later, on March 30, 1981, appellant was again taken into custody by Officer Knight and another officer in Saraland, Alabama, for transportation back to Opelika, Alabama, in relation to the instant charge. Upon seeing Officer Knight in Saraland, appellant immediately volunteered that he had given an alias name at the time of his initial arrest. Appellant was taken into custody and handcuffed with "Billy chains." Appellant was placed in the back seat of the patrol car, while the two officers sat in the front seat.
As the officers left Saraland headed towards Opelika, appellant was again advised of his constitutional rights. Appellant interrupted the officer and told him he knew his rights, and that he was not going to talk. The record reflects the following then occurred:
....
....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Peoples v. State
...prior notice to, and the consent of, his attorneys." Nelson v. State, 398 So.2d 421, 425 (Ala.Cr.App.1981). See also, Chandler v. State, 426 So.2d 477 (Ala.Cr.App.1982); Payne v. State, 424 So.2d 722 (Ala.Cr.App.1982); Thompson v. State, 347 So.2d 1371 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 347 So.2d......
-
Waldrop v. State
...135 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985), aff'd, 494 So.2d 154 (Ala.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S.Ct. 599, 93 L.Ed.2d 599 (1986); Chandler v. State, 426 So.2d 477 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)); Myers v. State, 401 So.2d 288 (Ala.Cr.......
-
Powell v. State
...135 (Ala.Cr.App.1985), aff'd, 494 So.2d 154 (Ala.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S.Ct. 599, 93 L.Ed.2d 599 (1986); Chandler v. State, 426 So.2d 477 (Ala.Cr.App.1982) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)); Myers v. State, 401 So.2d 288 (Ala.Cr.Ap......
-
Whitt v. State, CR-96-0349.
...the background, experience, and conduct of the accused—i.e., the totality of the circumstances. Lewis v. State; Chandler v. State, 426 So.2d 477, 478 (Ala.Crim. App.1982) (citing Edwards v. Arizona; Myers v. State, 401 So.2d 288 (Ala.Crim. App.1981)), and cases cited therein. An accused may......