Chaney v. State

Decision Date25 May 2007
Docket NumberNo. 27931.,27931.
Citation223 S.W.3d 200
PartiesMarvin CHANEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Susan L. Hogan, Kansas City, for Appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen. & Joan E. Reed, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Respondent.

ROBERT S. BARNEY, Judge.

Marvin Chaney ("Movant") appeals from the motion court's denial of his Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence and Judgment brought pursuant to Rule 24.035.1 On April 8, 1997, Movant entered a negotiated Alford2 plea to one count of the class A felony of first degree murder, a violation of section 565.020, and one count of the class B felony of kidnapping, a violation of section 565.110. Movant was sentenced to life without parole on the first degree murder charge and fifteen years on the kidnapping charge with the sentences to run consecutively. In Movant's amended Rule 24.035 motion and in his sole point on appeal, he contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel "pressur[ed] [Movant] to plead guilty in order to avoid the death penalty, even though [Movant] did not believe that he was responsible for the offenses charged against him." Accordingly, Movant asserts he was "prejudiced because his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily." Following an evidentiary hearing, the motion court denied relief. We affirm the judgment of the motion court.

The record reveals that on May 1, 1995, Movant was charged by complaint with one count of first degree murder and one count of kidnapping. On April 8, 1997, the day of trial, Movant entered into a plea agreement with the State under which he agreed to enter an Alford plea, as already stated, and the State agreed to stop pursuing the death penalty in his case. The State agreed it would request a sentence on the murder charge of life imprisonment without parole and a sentence of fifteen years on the kidnapping charge.

At the guilty plea hearing, Movant testified that the State recited the plea agreement as he understood it; he was instructed that he had the right to a jury trial and he decided to proceed with the plea agreement as opposed to going to trial. Movant stated he understood the proceedings and plea agreement; was entering his plea freely and voluntarily; was able to recite the details of the plea agreement; understood the range of punishment for his crimes; and understood the rights he was giving up by waiving his right to a jury trial. Movant testified that no one had threatened him in order to induce his guilty plea; no one had promised him anything in exchange for pleading guilty; and no one had placed "any type of outward pressure . . ." on him to accept the plea agreement.

Movant testified he had received information about his case from his counsel, including 900 pages of police reports, transcribed interviews with witnesses, copies of numerous depositions as well as legal documents and pleadings. Movant stated he knew there were witnesses who would testify he admitted to them that he committed the crimes at issue and he knew there were taped recordings of his incriminating statements to police. He also stated he knew that at the time of the crimes he was possibly suffering from alcoholism and he understood he could raise alcoholism as a defense at trial. Movant stated he had discussed the plea agreement with his counsel. When asked about his discussions with counsel, Movant stated he did not "recall ever doing this [crime] or having any part in it, but according to the evidence [he would] get convicted if [he went] to trial." He stated he understood that if he went to trial "there's a substantial likelihood that [he would] be convicted of first degree murder" and, in that situation, he would be eligible for the death penalty. As a result, he decided to enter an Alford plea as opposed to "risk being convicted and possibly getting the death penalty."

Following the State's recitation of facts and evidence, Movant informed the plea court he understood those were the facts which would be offered against him at trial and he had considered the aforementioned evidence in deciding to enter his plea. Movant stated he had no complaints about his counsel's representations "[e]xcept for missing a couple of meetings . . . ." Movant stated his attorneys missed approximately twenty meetings with him in the two years they represented him, but he acknowledged the missed meetings were the result of "scheduling problems." Movant testified he did not feel he was prejudiced by the missed meetings, because they were re-scheduled. He stated he was satisfied with his counsels' representation; they did all of the things he asked them to do; had counseled him about the plea agreement and other aspects of the case; and they were always available to him.

Movant then withdrew his pleas of not guilty and entered Alford pleas to both counts. The plea court accepted Movant's pleas and found they were "entered voluntarily, understandingly and knowingly . . . ." The trial court thereafter accepted the recommended sentence of the State and sentenced Movant as stated above.

On June 16, 1997, Movant filed his pro se Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief. Thereafter, Movant was appointed counsel and a "First Amended Application for Postconviction Relief" was filed on March 9, 1998.

An evidentiary hearing was held on November 1, 2001. At the evidentiary hearing Movant testified that his attorneys took his case shortly after he was charged with the underlying crimes. He stated they seemed "confidant" at the beginning "but as time went on . . . it kind of started sliding down." Movant testified that once things "started going downhill" his attorneys said he "would have a snowball [sic] chance in hell in winning if [he] took it to trial." He stated that they started out being confident about his chances and then "started dwindling down to basically nothing." He stated he was unhappy with his attorneys' representation due to "the way their demeanor changed from the beginning to the end . . . ." Movant admitted that his attorneys' confidence in the case began to lessen after the evidence uncovered by them and the evidence proffered by the State started to make it less likely Movant would "be found [any]thing other than guilty of first degree murder at trial."

Movant testified that at 10:30 p.m. on the night before trial his attorneys visited him in jail to tell him about the State's plea offer. He stated "they seemed to be ecstatic," "happy," and "excited" about the plea offer and they "discussed it [with him] for . . . an hour or hour and a half, because [Movant] was totally against it." His attorneys thought he should take the plea agreement and believed "taking any kind of a deal to avoid the death penalty was clearly in [his] best interest because the evidence was overwhelming." Movant stated he "didn't want to take the deal," because he "thought it was wrong to admit to something [he] didn't do." Movant stated his attorneys gave him the impression that the evidence against him "was virtually overwhelming" and that if he were convicted "there was a very good probability that [he] would receive the death penalty . . . ." Movant stated he "got to thinking about [his] family . . . [and] even though [he was] incarcerated [he could] still be some kind of use in their li[v]es, and so basically that's why [he agreed to the plea agreement], but [he] never really had time to reflect on the situation." Movant stated his attorneys told him that "even though [he] would be incarcerated [he] would still lead somewhat of a productive life." He stated the "[b]ottom line" for his decision to take the plea agreement was "[s]o [he] could be some kind of use to [his] family, [his] children." Movant admitted he was also inclined to accept the plea agreement based on the overwhelming amount of evidence against him and the probability that he would receive the death penalty if convicted.

Movant testified that his problems with his representation arose after he "had more time to think on it . . . ." He stated that at the time he accepted the plea offer he and his attorneys believed it was in his best interest and he had no reason to believe "that they informed [him] of something that was incorrect."

The deposition of one of Movant's attorneys, Patrick Berrigan ("Mr. Berrigan"), was entered into evidence at the evidentiary hearing. Mr. Berrigan testified that, prior to performing any discovery, he did not think he had "formed any definite impressions at the beginning of [Movant's] case . . . ." In the course of representing Movant, Mr. Berrigan stated he utilized investigators; "interviewed a lot of witnesses;" and took numerous depositions in order to fully investigate the charges against Movant. He stated there was evidence Movant had admitted to committing the underlying crimes to numerous people including several former cellmates as well as several relatives and he had given two incriminating recorded statements to police. Mr. Berrigan stated he and his co-counsel discussed with Movant the issue of whether to take the case to trial on numerous occasions as additional discoveries were made relating to the evidence against Movant. He stated "prospects seemed increasingly bleak as time went on because of statements made by [people] and evidence that was recovered, physical evidence recovered as a result of those statements that implicated [Movant] . . . in other murders." He testified that "the evidence [against Movant] certainly got worse over time; that is, whatever probabilities of the success [he] may have had at the beginning, they diminished gradually over the succeeding two years."

Mr. Berrigan also related that "several months before the scheduled trial date [he was] interested in trying to obtain a guilty plea to spare [Movant's] life." He stated he had discussed a guilty plea...

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  • Stacker v. Norman
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri
    • May 22, 2012
    ...claims, including a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, by a preponderance of the evidence." Chaney v. State, 223 S.W.3d 200, 206 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007).To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show counsel's representation fell below an objective stan......
  • Hill v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • January 8, 2010
    ...Fisher v. State, 192 S.W.3d 551, 554 (Mo.App.2006) (quoting Drew v. State, 436 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Mo.1969)); see Chaney v. State, 223 S.W.3d 200, 207 As a general rule, complaints a defendant might have about his trial counsel's failure to investigate his case are waived by a plea of guilty. ......
  • Yarberry v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • August 13, 2012
    ...banc 2005)). A movant “bears the burden of proving his post-conviction claims ... by a preponderance of the evidence.” Chaney v. State, 223 S.W.3d 200, 206 (Mo.App. S.D.2007). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show counsel's representation fell below ......
  • Barry v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • February 15, 2013
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