Chaparro v. Shinn
| Decision Date | 05 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-19-0205-CQ,CV-19-0205-CQ |
| Citation | 248 Ariz. 138,459 P.3d 50 |
| Parties | Abelardo CHAPARRO Plaintiff, v. David C. SHINN, Defendant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Oramel H. Skinner, Solicitor General, Drew C. Ensign (argued), Deputy Solicitor General, Rusty D. Crandell, Deputy Solicitor General, Brunn (Beau) W. Roysden III, Division Chief Appeals & Constitutional Litigation Division, Robert J. Makar, Anthony R. Napolitano, Assistant Attorneys General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Defendant David C. Shinn, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections
Lindsay Herf, Robert J. Dormady, Katherine Puzauskas, Arizona Justice Project, Phoenix; Howard R. Cabot, Randal B. McDonald (argued), Austin C. Yost, Perkins Coie LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys for Abelardo Chaparro
¶1 The United States District Court for the District of Arizona certified the following question to this Court: Whether, in light of A.R.S. § 41-1604.09, a person convicted of first degree murder following a jury trial for actions that took place on or after January 1, 1994, is parole eligible after 25 years when the sentencing order states that he is sentenced to "life without possibility of parole for 25 years."
¶2 We hold that a sentence imposing "life without possibility of parole for 25 years" means the convicted defendant is eligible for parole after serving 25 years’ imprisonment despite § 41-1604.09 ’s prohibition of parole for persons convicted of offenses occurring on or after January 1, 1994. Additionally, we hold that a court lacks jurisdiction to correct an illegally lenient sentence absent timely correction or appeal. State v. Dawson , 164 Ariz. 278, 286, 792 P.2d 741 (1990).
¶3 In 1993, the Arizona Legislature amended § 41-1604.09 to eliminate parole for all offenses committed on or after January 1, 1994. On July 25, 1996, a jury found Abelardo Chaparro guilty of first degree murder committed on May 21, 1995. At the sentencing hearing and in the ensuing minute entry, the trial court sentenced Chaparro to prison for "the rest of [his] natural life without the possibility of parole for 25 years, followed by a consecutive term of community supervision equal to one day for every seven days of sentence imposed." On December 6, 1996, however, the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc order ("December Order") clarifying that Chaparro’s sentence was "Life without possibility of parole for 25 years." The December Order did not amend the term of community supervision. The State did not appeal.
¶4 In April 2017, the Arizona Department of Corrections ("ADOC") informed Chaparro he would not be parole eligible and that his only avenue for release would be to apply for commutation of his prison sentence after serving 25 years. Subsequently, Chaparro repeatedly requested parole eligibility with ADOC officials, who denied those requests. In February 2018, Chaparro received a letter from ADOC informing him that he "would not be parole certified."
¶5 Chaparro has served 24 years of his sentence. Accordingly, if Chaparro is parole eligible, ADOC would have been required under § 41-1604.09(D) to initiate parole proceedings in January 2020. Asserting his entitlement to parole eligibility after serving 25 years, Chaparro sued ADOC in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The State filed a Motion for Certification or Dismissal in the district court to determine if Chaparro’s sentence entitles him to parole eligibility. The district court granted the State’s certification request and issued a Certification Order.
¶6 We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(6) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-1861.
¶7 The trial court sentenced Chaparro to "[l]ife without possibility of parole for 25 years." The State contends this sentence does not make Chaparro eligible for parole. It argues the sentence is ambiguous because it is unclear as to what happens after Chaparro serves 25 years of the sentence and whether "parole" could mean another form of release. Finally, the State asserts that even if the sentence does provide for parole, a court cannot enforce the illegally lenient sentence. Chaparro argues his illegally lenient parole eligible sentence is unambiguous and final under Arizona law.
¶8 We first address whether Chaparro’s sentence provides the possibility of parole. We conclude that although the trial court’s use of "parole" and "community supervision" is ambiguous, the December Order and the sentencing transcript demonstrate that the trial court intended for Chaparro to be eligible for parole after 25 years’ imprisonment. See State v. Ovante , 231 Ariz. 180, 188 ¶¶ 38–39, 291 P.3d 974 (2013) ().
¶9 Generally, language is deemed ambiguous "when it is open to multiple reasonable interpretations." Glazer v. State , 244 Ariz. 612, 614 ¶ 12, 423 P.3d 993 (2018). If the language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, we will resolve the ambiguity by examining other factors, including the surrounding circumstances. See Ryan v. Napier , 245 Ariz. 54, 64 ¶ 41, 425 P.3d 230 (2018).
¶10 Chaparro’s sentence is ambiguous because it refers both to "parole," which was abrogated before the conduct that resulted in his conviction, and to "community supervision," which applied to all qualifying offenses committed on or after January 1, 1994. See § 41-1604.09 ; compare A.R.S. § 41-1604.07 (1993), with § 41-1604.07 (1994). Because the trial court’s sentencing language is ambiguous, we look to the surrounding circumstances. See Ryan , 245 Ariz. at 64 ¶ 41, 425 P.3d 230.
¶11 The trial court’s December Order illustrates that it intended Chaparro to have the possibility of parole after 25 years. Chaparro’s original sentence stated "natural life," which would contradict the "possibility of parole." See A.R.S. § 13-703(A) (1993) (). But the December Order removed "natural," clarifying that Chaparro’s sentence was "[l]ife without possibility of parole for 25 years." If the reference to "parole" was also incorrect or unintended, the trial court could have similarly corrected that aspect of Chaparro’s sentence. Because it did not, the only reasonable inference is that the trial court intended "[l]ife without possibility of parole for 25 years" to indicate that after 25 years Chaparro would be eligible for parole. See State v. Cruz-Mata , 138 Ariz. 370, 374, 376, 674 P.2d 1368 (1983) ().
¶12 Similarly, the transcript of the sentencing hearing clarifies that the trial court believed parole was an available sentencing option regardless of the reference to community supervision. During the sentencing hearing the trial court explained the sentencing options:
Do you understand one of them is death, one of them is life imprisonment for the rest of your natural life, and the other one is life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years? ... Those are the only three things I can do.
The trial court did not mention release or commutation as an option. Therefore, although community supervision does not apply to a parole eligible inmate, the sentencing hearing and December Order manifest the trial court’s intent for Chaparro to be parole eligible.
¶13 We are also unpersuaded by the State’s argument that "parole" is shorthand for "release" in the form of commutation. At the time of sentencing, Arizona laws differentiated the terms "parole" and "commutation." See § 13-703(A) (1993) (). Section 13-703(A) also specified other types of release. Id. (). Nothing indicates the trial court intended its repeated references to "parole" to mean "commutation" or any alternate type of "release."
¶14 Dictionary definitions, Arizona law, and federal law all distinguish parole and other forms of release like commutation. "Absent statutory definitions, courts apply common meanings and may look to dictionaries." State v. Pena , 235 Ariz. 277, 279 ¶ 6, 331 P.3d 412 (2014) (internal citations omitted). "Parole" has a distinct meaning from "commutation" in the dictionary. Compare Parole , Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("[C]onditional release of a prisoner from imprisonment before the full sentence has been served."), with Commutation , Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("[E]xecutive’s substitution in a particular case of a less severe punishment for a more severe one that has already been judicially imposed on the defendant.").
¶15 Similarly, Arizona statutory law distinguishes parole and forms of executive clemency like commutation. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 31-412(A), an inmate certified as parole eligible must only show "a substantial probability that the applicant will remain at liberty without violating the law and that the release is in the best interests of the state." But an inmate applying for commutation must show "by clear and convincing evidence that the sentence imposed is clearly excessive ... and that there is a substantial probability that when released the offender will conform the offender’s conduct to the requirements of the law." A.R.S. § 31-402(C)(2). The Board of Executive Clemency may grant parole by a majority or unanimous vote, whereas it may only recommend commutation to the Governor for approval. §§ 31-402(A), -412(C). Individuals not...
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