Molera v. Hobbs

• Citation: 250 Ariz. 13,474 P.3d 667
• Decision Date: 26 October 2020
• Docket Number: No. CV-20-0213-AP/EL,CV-20-0213-AP/EL
• Parties: Jaime A. MOLERA, an individual and qualified elector; Arizonans For Great Schools And A Strong Economy, a political action committee, Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. Katie HOBBS, in her official capacity as Arizona Secretary of State; Invest In Education (Sponsored By AEA And Stand For Children), a political action committee, Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees
• Court: Supreme Court of Arizona

250 Ariz. 13

474 P.3d 667

Jaime A. MOLERA, an individual and qualified elector; Arizonans For Great Schools And A Strong Economy, a political action committee, Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants,

v.Katie HOBBS, in her official capacity as Arizona Secretary of State; Invest In Education (Sponsored By AEA And Stand For Children), a political action committee, Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees

No. CV-20-0213-AP/EL

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed October 26, 2020

Brett W. Johnson, Eric H. Spencer, Colin P. Ahler, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Phoenix; Dominic E. Draye, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys for Jaime A. Molera, et al.

Roopali H. Desai, D. Andrew Gaona, Marvin C. Ruth, Kristen Yost, Coppersmith Brockelman PLC, Phoenix, Attorneys for Invest in Education (Sponsored by AEA and Stand for Children)

Grant Woods, Michael Riikola, Gallagher & Kennedy, P.A., Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Wes Oswald and Kelley Fisher, et al.

Rhonda L. Barnes, Jane Ahern, Arizona House of Representatives, Phoenix; Lisette Flores, Arizona Senate, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici Legislative Democrats

Oscar S. Lizardi, Rebecca K. O'Brien, Rusing Lopez & Lizardi, P.L.L.C., Tucson; Isaac S. Crum, Rusing Lopez & Lizardi, P.L.L.C., Scottsdale, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae The Arizona Business Community

Erin Adele Scharff, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Phoenix, Attorney for Amici Curiae Tax Scholars

Roy Herrera, Daniel A. Arellano, Jillian L. Andrews, Ballard Spahr LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Ballot Initiative Strategy Center, et al.

Shawn K. Aiken, Shawn Aiken, PLLC, Phoenix, Attorney for Amici Curiae Changing Hands Bookstore, Inc., et al.

Paul F. Eckstein, Daniel C. Barr, Austin C. Yost, Margo R. Casselman, Perkins Coie LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Kathy Hoffman, et al.

Daniel J. Adelman, Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Save Our Schools Arizona, et al.

Timothy Sandefur, Christina Sandefur, Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation at the Goldwater Institute, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Goldwater Institute, et al.

Mary R. O'Grady, Joshua D. Bendor, Emma J. Cone-Roddy, Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Arizona Non-Profit Organizations, et al.

Lisa T. Hauser, Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint, PC, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Lisa T. Hauser

Kory Langhofer, Statecraft, Phoenix, Attorney for Amicus Curiae Rich Crandall

Kraig J. Marton, Jeffrey A. Silence, Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., Phoenix; Patricia Ronan, Patricia E. Ronan Law, LLC, Phoenix; Christopher Houk, Houk Law Firm, PLLC, Tempe, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Employment Lawyers Association

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, and JUSTICES BOLICK, GOULD, LOPEZ, BEENE, and MONTGOMERY joined.

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, opinion of the Court:

¶1 In Molera v. Reagan , 245 Ariz. 291, 293 ¶ 1, 428 P.3d 490, 492 (2018), we disqualified an "Invest in Education Act" initiative from the 2018 ballot because proponents failed to comply with A.R.S. § 19-102(A), which requires that petition sheets used to gather signatures contain a short description of the initiative's principal provisions (the "100-word description"). Now, we are asked to decide whether the 100-word description for the currently proposed "Invest in Education Act" initiative complied with § 19-102(A). We also address whether petition circulators were paid in accordance with A.R.S. § 19-118.01(A), which prohibits payments "based on the number of signatures collected." We hold that the initiative proponents complied with § 19-102(A) and gathered enough signatures under § 19-118.01(A) to qualify for the November 3, 2020 General Election ballot.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Defendant is a political action committee (the "Committee") seeking to place the "Invest in Education Act" initiative ("Initiative") on the 2020 ballot. To qualify, the Committee was required to obtain 237,645 valid petition signatures demonstrating support for the measure. See Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1 (2); 2020 Initiative & Referendum Quick Reference Guide, Ariz. Sec'y of State , https://azsos.gov/sites/default/files/2020_Initiative%20_Referendum_Guide.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2020). On July 2, 2020, the Committee filed petition sheets containing 435,669 signatures with the Secretary of State. The Secretary reviewed the sheets for statutory compliance pursuant to A.R.S. § 19-121.01(A) and determined that 377,456 signatures were eligible for verification by county recorders. See § 19-121.01(B).

¶3 Plaintiffs are a qualified elector and a political action committee ("Challengers") who oppose the Initiative. On July 10, before completion of the signature verification process, they filed a verified complaint asking the superior court to enjoin the Secretary from placing the Initiative on the ballot because (1) the 100-word description on petition sheets violated § 19-102(A), and (2) after removing signatures gathered by petition circulators who were paid in violation of § 19-118.01(A), the measure lacked enough signatures.

¶4 After conducting a bench trial, the superior court rejected the Challengers’ signature-based objection. But it found that the 100-word description on the petition signature sheets failed to comply with § 19-102(A). The court therefore enjoined the Secretary from certifying and placing the Initiative on the 2020 ballot.

¶5 This expedited appeal and cross-appeal followed. After considering the briefs and authorities filed by the parties and amici, this Court issued an order reversing in part and affirming in part the superior court's judgment and directing the Secretary to include the Initiative in the general election publicity pamphlet and to place it on the general election ballot. This opinion explains our reasoning.

DISCUSSION

I. The 100-word description

A. General principles

¶6 Section 19-102(A) requires initiative sponsors to insert on petition signature sheets "a description of no more than one hundred words of the principal provisions of the proposed measure." The description must be followed by this language:

Notice: This is only a description of the proposed measure (or constitutional amendment) prepared by the sponsor of the measure. It may not include every provision contained in the measure. Before signing, make sure the title and text of the measure are attached. You have the right to read or examine the title and text before signing.

§ 19-102(A).

¶7 Increasingly, sponsors, opponents, and courts have struggled both to identify "principal provisions" in measures and to determine whether their descriptions satisfy § 19-102(A), particularly when the proposed measures are lengthy or complex. There is also confusion about whether omission of a principal provision alone disqualifies a measure from the ballot or whether the omission also must make the description misleading or confusing. Further guidance on what § 19-102(A) does and does not require is warranted before addressing the superior court's ruling here.

¶8 There are two grounds on which to challenge a measure's 100-word description under § 19-102(A). The first is that the sponsor omitted a "principal provision" of the measure from the description. If the court agrees, it should disqualify the measure from the ballot without further inquiry. Whether the omission made the description misleading, confusing, or unfair is irrelevant. We did not intend to suggest otherwise in Molera , where we observed that omitting a principal provision concerning the elimination of tax indexing also "create[d] a significant risk of confusion or unfairness and could certainly materially impact whether a person would sign the petition." 245 Ariz. at 297 ¶ 25, 428 P.3d at 496. Section 19-102(A) requires a sponsor to describe all principal provisions of a measure.

¶9 What are "principal provisions"? They are the "most important," "consequential," and "primary" features of the initiative. Id. ¶ 24 (quoting Sklar v. Town of Fountain Hills , 220 Ariz. 449, 453 ¶ 13, 207 P.3d 702, 706 (App. 2008) ). They are not all provisions. The 100-word description serves as the "elevator pitch" that alerts prospective signatories to the measure's key operative provisions, enabling them to decide in short order whether to sign the petition, refuse to do so, or make further inquiry about the measure. See id. at 297 ¶27, 428 P.3d at 496 (stating that the purpose of the description is to enable prospective signatories to determine whether to endorse the measure for the ballot); see also Kromko v. Superior Court , 168 Ariz. 51, 60, 811 P.2d 12, 21 (1991) (observing that "rare is the elector who stops long enough in the summer heat to read or listen to a complete description of the entire nature and scope of a proposed measure").

¶10 The second ground on which to challenge a 100-word description focuses on the manner of describing the measure's principal provisions. Section 19-102(A) does not require the description to be impartial. Save Our Vote, Opposing C-03-2012 v. Bennett , 231 Ariz. 145, 152 ¶ 28, 291 P.3d 342, 349 (2013). But to comply, the description must describe the principal provisions to accurately communicate their general objectives. In light of the 100-word limit, and the constitutional right to propose initiatives of any length, the sponsor may cast the description in broad terms, and more complex or multi-faceted initiatives may be unavoidably less detailed than shorter measures. See Quality Educ. & Jobs Supporting I-16-2012 v. Bennett , 231 Ariz. 206, 208 ¶ 9, 292 P.3d 192, 194 (2013) (providing that "[t]he length and complexity of the initiative" and the fifty-word limit for the Secretary of State's ballot summary are "factors in assessing compliance" with the statute requiring that summary). If necessary, a sponsor may refer potential signatories to the measure's text for more detail when explaining technical terms or difficult-to-grasp...