Chapman v. Walton Cnty. Jail
| Docket Number | 3:23-CV-0056-CDL-CHW |
| Decision Date | 09 August 2023 |
| Parties | JOHN CHAPMAN, Plaintiff, v. WALTON COUNTY JAIL, Deputy Sheriff THOMAS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
PROCEEDINGS UNDER 42 U.S.C. §1983 BEFORE THE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
This case is currently before the Court for screening as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Pro se Plaintiff John Chapman, a pretrial detainee at the Walton County Jail in Monroe, Georgia, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. ECF No. 1. He also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) which was granted with the statutory provision that Plaintiff pay a partial initial filing fee (ECF No. 6). Plaintiff has now paid that fee. Upon preliminary review, Plaintiff may proceed with his excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment against Defendant Thomas for further factual development, but it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claim of harassment by Defendant Thomas and Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Walton County Jail be DISMISSED without prejudice.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) obligates the district courts to conduct a preliminary screening of every complaint filed by a prisoner who seeks redress from a government entity, official, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Screening is also required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when the plaintiff is proceeding IFP. Both statutes apply in this case, and the standard of review is the same. When conducting preliminary screening, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) abrogated in part on other grounds by Wilkins v Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010); Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003). Pro se pleadings, like the one in this case, are “‘held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.'” Hughes, 350 F.3d at 1160 (citation omitted). Still, the Court must dismiss a prisoner complaint if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if it “‘lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.'” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The Court may dismiss claims that are based on “‘indisputably meritless legal'” theories and “‘claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.'” Id. (citation omitted). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations in a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and cannot “‘merely create[] a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). In other words, the complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Id. at 556. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff's complaint arises from his incarceration as a pre-trial detainee in the Walton County Jail. ECF No. 1 at 2 and 4. He claims that on October 5, 2022, “Sheriff Thomas assaulted me by punching in the mouth and ribs using unlawful force and causing cruel and unusual punishment there after”. Id. at 5. Plaintiff complains that the assault caused a “deep cut to the inside my mouth and sore side and ribs and back”. Id. at 6. Plaintiff further complains that Defendant Thomas then “harassed” the Plaintiff, “tried to intimidate me into not filing a report” and that “Officer Thomas never filed a incident report”. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff seeks damages and to have his “charges dropped a clean record with all my rights given back”.[1]Id. at 6.
“[I]n deciding whether force deliberately used against a pretrial detainee is constitutionally excessive in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, ‘the pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.'” Shuford v. Conway, 666 Fed.Appx. 811, 816-17 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015)). “The objective-reasonableness determination must be made ‘from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.'” Id. In determining whether the amount of force used was objectively reasonable, the Court must consider “the facts and circumstances of [the] particular case,” including “the relationship between the need for use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2473.
Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by Defendant Thomas and that the assault was a use of “unlawful force”. ECF No. 1 at 4-6. Liberally construed for purposes of this review, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against this Defendant for use of excessive force on a pretrial detainee can proceed for further factual development.
Plaintiff generally and vaguely complains that Defendant Thomas “harassed” him and “tried to intimidate [him] into not filing a report”. ECF No 1 at 4-5. Because Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, his allegations are governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jackson v. West, 787 F.3d 1345, 1352 (11th Cir. 2015). Nevertheless, the minimum standard allowed by the Due Process Clause for pretrial detainees is the same as that allowed by the Eighth Amendment for prisoners. Id. Plaintiff's nebulous allegations about “harassment” and “intimidation” do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation necessary for a §1983 civil action. The Constitution does not generally protect inmates against “[f]ear or emotional injury which results solely from verbal harassment or idle threats”. Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1991).
Thus, an allegation of “verbal abuse alone is insufficient to state a constitutional claim”. Hernandez v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 281 Fed.Appx. 862, 866 (11th Cir.2008); see also Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1274 n.1 (11th Cir.1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“In addition, we note that a petitioner must allege more than that he has been subjected to verbal taunts . . . [h]owever distressing in order to make a claim that jailers have violated their duty of protection or deprived the petitioner of his constitutional rights.”); McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1983) (). In other words, harassing and otherwise intimidating conduct by a corrections officer is not independently actionable under § 1983. See Edwards, 867 F.2d at 1274 n. 1; Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1311 n. 11 (10th Cir.1998). Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claims under § 1983 regarding harassment and intimidation by Defendant Thomas be DISMISSED without prejudice.
The Plaintiff has named the Walton County Jail as a Defendant. ECF No. 1 at 1, 2-3. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b), the “capacity to sue or be sued” is determined “by the law of the state where the court is located.” Therefore, Georgia law controls this issue. In this regard, the Georgia Supreme Court has explained that there are only three classes of legal entities “‘(1) natural persons; (2) an artificial person (a corporation); and (3) such quasi-artificial persons as the law recognizes as being capable to sue.'” Ga. Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert Cty., 368 S.E.2d 500, 502 (Ga. 1998) (quoting Cravey v. SE Underwriters Ass 'n, 105 S.E.2d 497 (Ga. 1958)). A court is not subject to suit in its own name absent express statutory authority, and there is none in Georgia.” Howard v. Brown, 738 F.Supp. 508, 510 (S. D. Ga. 1988). Furthermore, courts have also recognized that county detention facilities, police departments, and sheriff's departments are not legal entities subject to suit or liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (); Bunyon v. Burke County, 285 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1328 (S. D. Ga. 2003) (...
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