Chappell v. Board of Directors of Independent School Dist. of City of Keokuk, Lee County

• Decision Date: 15 November 1949
• Docket Number: 47459.
• Parties: CHAPPELL v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. OF CITY OF KEOKUK, LEE COUNTY.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

39 N.W.2d 628

241 Iowa 230

CHAPPELL v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. OF CITY OF KEOKUK, LEE COUNTY.

No. 47459.

Supreme Court of Iowa

November 15, 1949

Rehearing Denied Jan. 13, 1950.

Boyd & Huiskamp, of Keokuk, for appellant.

R Buell Smith, of Keokuk, for appellee.

OLIVER Justice.

The voters of the Independent School District of Keokuk voted a schoolhouse tax for a term of ten years. After two years plaintiff brought this action to enjoin the further annual certification and levy of the tax. The trial court granted the injunction as prayed and defendant, Board of Directors has appealed.

Chapter 278, Code of Iowa 1946, I.C.A. (except as otherwise stated all references herein are to the 1946 Code) is entitled 'Powers of Electors.' Section 278.1 provides in part:

'Enumeration. The voters at the regular election shall have power to:

'* * *.

'7. Vote a schoolhouse tax, not exceeding two and one-half mills on the dollar in any one year, for the purchase of grounds construction of schoolhouses, the payment of debts contracted for the erection of schoolhouses, not including interest on bonds, procuring libraries for and opening roads to schoolhouses.'

Code section 277.2 permits this to be done at a special election also.

Under Code section 278.1 the voters of the Independent School District of Keokuk adopted the following proposition:

'Shall the board of directors of the Independent School District of the City of Keokuk, Lee County, Iowa be authorized to levy not to exceed two and one-half mills on the dollar in any one year for the purchase of grounds, construction of school houses, the payment of debts contracted for the erection of schoolhouses, not including interest on bonds, procuring libraries for and opening roads to schoolhouses, for a period of ten years.'

It will be noted this authority is permissive * * * the directors areauthorized. This authority empowers the directors, at their discretion to levy an amount not exceeding two and one half mills in any one year. The authorization is limited to a period of ten years. If in any year within this period, the directors decide to levy (certify) a tax under this authority, the same must be set up in their budget and certified to the County Auditor. The Local Budget Act, I.C.A. § 24.1 et seq., requires such budgets to be subjected to a hearing thereunder. The record shows the Board of Directors each year adopted and certified a resolution to levy a schoolhouse tax amounting to two and one half mills and the Board of Supervisors levied the two and one half mill tax accordingly. The question here is whether section 278.1 empowers the voters to vote a schoolhouse tax for more than one year.

I. Omitting some words and parts not here essential the language of the statute is: 'voters * * * vote * * * tax, not exceeding two and one-half mills on the dollar in any one year, for * * *.' The phrase 'in any one year' modifies 'exceeding' and is a part of the larger phrase, 'not exceeding two and one-half mills on the dollar in any one year', with which it is enclosed by commas. The entire larger phrase modifies 'tax'. The only limitation the language of the statute places upon this tax is that it must not exceed two and one half mills in any one year. There is no express or implied limitation in the number of years. Moreover, the phrase, 'in any one year', negatives such a limitation. Had it been the legislative intent that the tax could be voted for one year only, there would have been no necessity for the phrase, 'in any one year.' With this phrase omitted the statute would read: 'voters * * * vote * * * tax, not exceeding two and one-half mills * * *,' and would be open to the interpretation that only one such tax, not exceeding two and one half mills, could be voted at an election. That is precisely the interpretation plaintiff would give the statute with the phrase included. Under such interpretation the phrase, 'in any one year', would be of no effect and thus would be read out of the statute. It is well settled that, if reasonably possible, a statute should be construed to give effect to every part of it. In re Guardianship of Wiley, 239 Iowa 1225, 34 N.W.2d 593; Moulton v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, 239 Iowa 1161, 34 N.W.2d 211. Considering all the language of the statute in its ordinary meaning we conclude it should be interpreted as not limiting the power of the voters to voting a tax for one year only.

That construction was given a like provision in Ruff v. Womack, 174 Ark. 971, 298 S.W. 222, 224. An amendment to the Constitution of Arkansas, Amendment No. 11, stated in part: '* * * Provided, that the General Assembly may, by general law, authorize school districts to levy by a vote of the qualified electors of such districts a tax not to exceed eighteen mills on the dollar in any one year for the maintenance of schools, the erection and equipment of school buildings and the retirement of existing indebtedness for buildings.'

The court answered the contention that this 'contemplates an annual vote and tax levy' as follows: 'We find no prohibition in the amendment against the Legislature authorizing the electors in school districts to vote a continuing levy. The prohibition is that the tax shall not exceed 18 mills on the dollar in any one year.'

II. Plaintiff asserts the legislative intent must be determined as of the time of the original passage of the act, when the state 'was comparatively primitive--there were no substantial schools and very few large cities'; that in recent years, school districts in the greater populated areas of the state have resorted to a use of this statute not contemplated by the legislature originally enacting it--that of asking for authority to certify the tax for more than one year without approval by the voters at the election of each year of certification; that it is evident the bonding powers of such districts are claimed to be not large enough for their evident desires and by this means they hope to build up a reserve to be added to the total limit of bonded indebtedness. Plaintiff then poses the question: 'Can this be construed as the intent of that original legislature?'

The 'act' is Code section 278.1 which enumerates the powers of the voters. By 'its original passage' plaintiff evidently refers to the section of an act of the 2nd G.A., c. 80, § 39, subsequently codified as section 1115, Code of 1851. It empowered the qualified electors of the district when assembled, among other things, (5) to lay such tax as the meeting shall deem sufficient for schoolhouse purposes, libraries and contingent expenses, 'provided, however, that said tax shall not exceed one and one-half per cent. on the taxable property aforesaid in any one year.' These and other provisions relative to the powers of the electors since then have been repeatedly modified, repealed and replaced with new and different enactments. Related statutes also have been repealed and supplanted with new and, frequently, substantially different statutes.

Under the Code of 1851 the school district meetings (then held regularly twice per year) were in the nature of town meetings. The electors assembled at the meeting place and there transacted and directed much of the business of the school district. The only notice required was a general notice of the regular or special meeting. School districts were not authorized to issue bonds. There was already a tax of from one half to one and one half mills levied by the county judge for the support of the schools, § 1152, Code of 1851, and the electors at each meeting were empowered to 'lay such (schoolhouse) tax * * * as the meeting shall deem sufficient.' Among other things they were empowered also 'to transact such business generally as may tend to promote the cause of education', under the statute.

With population increases this direct method of operation later became impractical and the town meeting method was generally discarded, and was supplanted by the election method at which the electors vote by ballot or by voting machine upon such propositions only, if any, as have been previously ordered submitted. Today each school district in the larger centers operates numerous schools. Many districts spend millions of dollars per year. In some districts building and improvement operations are in progress much of the time. It should not be presumed that the changes in the statutes were not made, at least in part, to meet changed conditions.

We do not agree that the intent of the various legislatures in making the drastic procedural changes and other substantial changes in statutes concerning the powers of school electors and in related statutes should be measured by the intent of an earlier legisalture. In re Guardianship of Wiley, 239 Iowa 1225, 34 N.W.2d 593, cited by plaintiff as so holding, merely holds the recital in the preamble of an amendatory act, claimed to show the intent of the former legislature, is not binding on the courts. The rule here applicable is that quoted in Benschoter v. Hakes, 232 Iowa 1354, 1359, 8 N.W.2d 481, 485: "An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute had been repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form had been adopted in its stead; * * *."

Hence, the legislative intent in making the subsequent enactments should be considered in the light of the circumstances attendant at the times of the new enactments and not as of 1851.

On that account the dicta in early decisions cited by the parties are of little assistance. The only decision of this court which refers to the question presented by this case is Kirchner v Board of Directors, 141 Iowa 43, 49, 118 N.W. 51, in which the court refused to hold the vote...