Moulton v. Iowa Employment Sec. Commission

• Decision Date: 19 October 1948
• Docket Number: 47284.
• Citation: 34 N.W.2d 211,239 Iowa 1161
• Parties: MOULTON v. IOWA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

34 N.W.2d 211

239 Iowa 1161

MOULTON v. IOWA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION et al.

No. 47284.

Supreme Court of Iowa

October 19, 1948

James R. Barkley, of Moulton, and B. J. Powers, of Des Moines, for appellant.

F D. Riley, of Des Moines, for the Commission, appellee.

Gibson Stewart & Garrett and Matthew J. Heartney, Jr., all of Des Moines, for the Insurance Association, defendant.

BLISS Justice.

The claimant-plaintiff is a married woman whose husband was employed by a railroad company operating between Des Moines and the town of Moulton, the home of claimant. From September 9, 1943, until February 24, 1945, claimant was employed as a key-punch operator by the defendant, State Automobile Insurance Association, at its office in Des Moines, Iowa. Because of sickness and discomfort due to her pregnancy, she first quit work on January 13, 1945, and after returning for two weeks of work she ceased working for defendant on February 24, 1945. Her baby was born on July 24, 1945. The record clearly establishes that she quit her work because of pregnancy. She so testified at two or three hearings, and in her claim for compensation, which she filed on December 22, 1945, she stated: 'My reason for leaving the firm was because of pregnancy and my inability to continue work.' She was not discharged or dismissed. Her sister was a supervisor for defendant. She had no authority to discharge employees, or to give them leave of absence, but when the claimant told her of her disability she advised claimant to discontinue work. Robert McKee was defendant's manager. Claimant did not talk with him before quitting, but he learned from her sister that she quit work because of her pregnancy. He testified: 'She said her health was bad; and we couldn't blame her for leaving. One time after she left she stopped in and said her husband was working on the railroad from Des Moines to Moulton and they might as well live in Des Moines if they had a place to live and wondered if she could come back to work. I said she could. We would have been glad to have her back at any time and probably paid her a little more money. * * * There was no scheduled leave of absence but it was when her health got better she could come back.' Because of housing conditions, care of the baby, and difficulty of transportation, claimant never accepted defendant's offer of reemployment.

In a hearing upon her claim the Commission's deputy, on January 25 1946, determined that she left her employment with defendant voluntarily, without good cause attributable to the employer and thus disqualified herself from receiving unemployment benefits based on wage credits accrued prior to said date. The Appeal Tribunal affirmed this decision on July 19, 1946. On hearings before the Commission on August 27 and September 10, 1946, that tribunal, with two members concurring, and one dissenting, modified and affirmed the decision of the Appeal Tribunal, by holding that she had not met the requirements of section 96.5, subd. 1, Code, 1946, by establishing that her quitting work was not voluntary, and that she was able, and available, for work, as required by Code section 96.4, subd. 3.

The first of these sections provides that: 'An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: 1. Voluntary quitting. If he has left his work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his employer, if so found by the commission. * * *.'

The second section provides: 'An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the commission finds that: * * *. 3. He is able to work, and is available for work.'

As authorized by section 96.6, subds. 8-11, Code of 1946, section 1551.12, subds. H, I, J, K, Code 1939, claimant appealed from the decision of the Commission to the district court. Subsection 9 of the sect. provides that: The appellate review shall be on the certified record of the hearing before the Commission, without additional evidence; in the absence of fraud any finding of fact by the Commission shall be binding upon the court on appeal, when supported by substantial and competent evidence; such action shall be heard in a summary manner; and subsection 10, 'any order or decision of the commission may be modified, reversed, or set aside on one or more of the following grounds and on no other: 1. * * *. 2. * * *. 3. If the facts found by the commission do not support the order or decree. 4. If there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order or decision.'

After an able discussion of the case the court made its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on July 12, 1947, entered its judgment and decree 'that the determination of the Commission that the appellant quit her work voluntarily without good cause attributable to her employer is supported in the record by substantial competent evidence and that such finding and determination * * * must be affirmed. On the second issue, the Court finds that the undisputed evidence shows that appellant was available for work.' On the first issue, the court denied claimant all benefits based on wage credits prior to February 24, 1945, the date of separation.

Since the decision of the court is based solely on the first question--whether claimant voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to her employer--and there is no challenge by anyone to the decision of the court that she was available for work, we do not consider or determine that issue.

I. On the first issue we fully agree with the decision of the majority of the Commission, and the judgment and decree of the trial court. That issue may be divided into two parts: first, whether her quitting was voluntary on her part, and, second, was it without good cause attributable to her employer.

The first part narrows down to the single question whether the physical disability of the claimant due to her pregnancy made her quitting work voluntary or involuntary. Under any accepted or reasonable definition of the words 'voluntary' or 'voluntarily,' we think it must be said that her quitting was of her own volition or choice. No doubt she would have preferred continuing her work for defendant had her physical condition permitted. But her condition was due to her own deliberate, voluntary act, and choice. The fact that she could not work because of her physical disability did not make her quitting involuntary, under the facts, or under a reasonable construction of said section 96.4, subd. 3, or of the legislative act as a whole. See Margoris v. United States Railroad Administration, 187 Iowa 605, 608, 174 N.W. 371. Claimant's case has some analogy to that of one who deliberately maimed himself to unfit himself for work. Numerous courts have held that one, if not the main, purpose of such legislation is to relieve hardship caused byinvoluntary unemployment. Fash v. Gordon, 398 Ill. 210, 75 N.E.2d 294; Kontner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 148 Ohio St. 614, 76 N.E.2d 611; W. T. Grant Co. v. Board of Review of the Unemp. Comp. Comm., 129 N.J.L. 402, 29 A.2d 858; Ex parte Alabama Textile Products Corporation, 242 Ala. 609, 7 So.2d 303, 141 A.L.R. 87 (Anno. 101).

In Department of Labor & Industry v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 133 Pa.Super. 518, 3 A.2d 211, 213 (Bush claim), the court said: 'The word, 'voluntarily', may be used in a number of different senses, but, in our opinion, having regard to the purpose and intent of the act, * * * but with special reference to its declaration of public policy, * * *, and its fourth article, * * *, which prescribes the qualifications required to secure compensation and enumerates the causes which will make an employe ineligible for compensation, the most appropriate meaning or definition is, 'of one's own motion' (Century Dictionary); 'of one's own accord' (Oxford Dictionary); 'acting of one's self' (Webster's New International Dictionary). When we say, 'He left work voluntarily', we commonly mean, he left of his own motion; he was not discharged. It is the opposite of a discharge, dismissal or lay-off by the employer or other action by the employer severing relations with his employes, to provide against which the act was mainly designed.'

The claimant cites no decision or authority that a discontinuance of work because of pregnancy is an involuntary quitting within the contemplation of such legislation as is involved herein, and we have found none. In John Morrell & Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 69 S.D. 618, 13 N.W.2d 498, 499, the Commission found as follows: 'Claimant is a married woman whose employment with John Morrell and Company began July 11, 1938 and continued until March 26, 1941. On that date claimant resigned due to her advanced pregnancy. The birth of her child occurred on July 19, 1941. After fully recovering from her confinement claimant made such arrangements for the care of the child during her working hours to permit her to return to work, applied for reinstatement to her former position or for other suitable work. Upon her failure to be reinstated to her former position or any other, she registered for employment * * * and simultaneously applied for benefits. At the time of her separation, March 26, 1941, claimant's physical condition, due to pregnancy, was such that continuing to work endangered her health, and the separation was necessitated by her approaching confinement.' The deputy commissioner, the appeal tribunal, and the commission, each, sustained the allowance of benefits. On the employer's appeal the circuit court, in reversing the decision, said: 'Without giving the word 'voluntarily' in section 17.0830(1), supra, and exact definition, we think that it would do violence to the intent and purpose of the statute to...