Chapple v. National Starch and Chemical Co. and Oil

• Decision Date: 24 May 1999
• Docket Number: No. 7-706,Nos. 98-2876,D,98-2879,AFL-CIO,7-706,s. 98-2876
• Parties: 161 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2321 Bryan CHAPPLE, Robert Hughes, Danny Wimbleduff, and Paul Miller, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NATIONAL STARCH & CHEMICAL COMPANY AND OIL, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union,and its Affiliated Localefendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

178 F.3d 501

161 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2321

Bryan CHAPPLE, Robert Hughes, Danny Wimbleduff, and Paul Miller, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NATIONAL STARCH & CHEMICAL COMPANY AND OIL, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO and its Affiliated Local No. 7-706 Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 98-2876, 98-2879.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Feb. 16, 1999.

Decided May 24, 1999.

J. Clifford Greene, Jr. (argued), Chicago, IL, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Hudnall A. Pfeiffer (argued), Baker & Daniels, William R. Groth (argued), Fillenwarth, Dennerline, Groth & Towe, Indianapolis, IN, for defendant-appellee.

Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and ROVNER Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from summary judgment against workers claiming that they had been wrongfully discharged by their employer and inadequately represented by their union. The district court determined that all claims against the defendants were either time barred or preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. sec.185(a). We now affirm the district court's decision.

Background

The plaintiffs, Bryan Chapple, Robert Hughes, Danny Wimbleduff and Paul Miller, were employed by National Starch and Chemical Company ("National Starch") in its Indianapolis plant. In the spring of 1995, National Starch instituted an undercover investigation in response to allegations of illegal drug use by its employees. The investigation identified twenty-one employees, including the plaintiffs, as either users or dealers of illegal substances. On November 15, 1995 the company discharged the plaintiffs and ten others.

Claiming that the firings were improper, the plaintiffs submitted their grievances to binding arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement then in effect between National Starch and plaintiffs' union, Local 706 of the Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers International ("Local 706"). In addition to the arbitration procedure, the bargaining agreement contained a management rights clause reserving to National Starch the right to discharge employees for cause and to manage the plant in accordance with the terms of the agreement and in a manner consistent with state and federal law.

Local 706 appointed attorney Robert Rifkin to represent the discharged employees in the arbitration procedure. On February 15, 1996, Rifkin wrote to National Starch's attorney, Hudnall A. Pfeiffer, asserting that the company had missed a reply deadline set out in the arbitration procedures. Rifkin indicated that the union considered this a default entitling the discharged workers to immediate reinstatement with full back pay and benefits. The following day, Pfeiffer faxed a letter to Rifkin explaining that the union's Unit Chairman Willie Williams and Chief Steward Bob Westerfield had granted National Starch an oral extension of time to respond, something the Local 706 had routinely done in the past. The plaintiffs maintain, however, that no extension was ever granted and that the union should have insisted on reinstatement. The events surrounding Rifkin's letter form the basis of the plaintiffs' federal claims against the union and National Starch.

During the grievance procedure, the union decided that the claims of Hughes and Wimbleduff were without merit and, on August 6, 1996, notified each that their grievances would not be pursued any further. The union then submitted the grievances of Miller and Chapple to arbitration. On January 31, 1997, the arbitrator ruled that National Starch had properly terminated Miller for violating the company's rule against drug abuse, and Chapple for refusing to submit to a drug test.

In September, 1997, the four plaintiffs filed related suits against Local 706 for failure to represent their interests and against National Starch for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. ¹ After a series of motions, including the defendants' motion to dismiss, the parties agreed to stay discovery on May 22, 1998.

On June 25, 1998, Judge Hamilton granted summary judgment ² in favor of both defendants, holding that the failure to represent and the breach of collective bargaining agreement claims were time barred by the six-month statute of limitations applicable to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. sec.185(a). The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the limitations period applicable to their federal claims should have been either tolled based on the plaintiffs' inability to discover the existence of their claim until more than six months after it accrued or disregarded due to the defendants' failure to disclose important information. The judge also dismissed the plaintiffs' state law claims as preempted by Section 301 because they depended on an interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement between the union and National Starch.

Discussion

Time Barred Claims

Summary judgment is only appropriate if, "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c); Salima v. Scherwood South, Inc., 38 F.3d 929, 932 (7th Cir.1994). This court reviews the award of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Drake v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 883 (7th Cir.1998). However, we are "not required to draw every conceivable inference from the record [in favor of the non-movant]--only those inferences that are reasonable." Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M. v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 236 (7th Cir.1991). Additionally, the non-moving party must be able to point to record evidence that would reasonably permit the fact finder to find in its favor on a material question. Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.1994). Therefore the non-moving party may not "rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings or upon conclusory statements in affidavits; [it] must go beyond the pleadings and support [its] contentions with proper documentary evidence." Chemsource Inc. v. Hub Group, Inc., 106 F.3d 1358, 1361 (7th Cir.1997). ³

Statute of Limitations

The district court correctly held that the plaintiffs' failure to represent and breach of collective bargaining claims had not been filed within the limitations period. Both were brought pursuant to Section 301 of the LMRA, and are therefore subject to its six month statute of limitations. See DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (statute of limitations applicable to hybrid 301 claims is the six month period borrowed from Section 10(b) of National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. sec.10(b)); Jones v. General Electric Co., 87 F.3d 209, 211-12 (7th Cir.1996). Contrary to the plaintiffs' suggestion, a Section 301 "cause of action accrues from the time a final decision on a plaintiff's grievance has been made or from the time the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, that no further action would be taken on his grievance." Richards v. Local 134, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 790 F.2d 633, 636 (7th Cir.1986) (citing DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 155, 172, 103 S.Ct. 2281); Beck v. Caterpillar, 50 F.3d 405, 408 (7th Cir.1995). Accordingly, the claims of Hughes and Wimbleduff accrued no later than August 6, 1996, the date they were notified that the union was not going to pursue their grievances, see Metz v. Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc., 715 F.2d 299, 304 (7th Cir.1983) (union's refusal to file grievance constitutes a final decision triggering limitations clock.); Sosbe v. Delco Electronics, 830 F.2d 83, 87 (7th Cir.1987) (same). Miller and Chapple's claims accrued no later than January 31, 1997, the date the arbitrator issued its decision against them. ⁴ DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 155, 103 S.Ct. 2281 (cause of action accrues when grievance committee's decision rendered); Ernst v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc., 717 F.2d 1036, 1038 (7th Cir.1983) (claim accrued at end of arbitration); Freeman v. Local Union No. 135, Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, 746 F.2d 1316, 1319 (7th Cir.1984) (same). Because the plaintiffs filed suit on September 19, 1997, more than six months after the accrual of any of their claims, all claims exceed the applicable statute of limitations. Thus absent some exception to the time bar, the court correctly awarded judgment in favor of the defendants on the Section 301 claims.

Equitable Tolling

The plaintiffs first argue that their late filing should be excused because they were unable to discover essential evidence necessary to establishing their claim until the limitations period had expired. Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir.1990). This argument attempts to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling, which "permits a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations if despite all due diligence he is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim." Id. at 451. However, if a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have been aware within the limitations period of the possibility that its rights have been violated, then equity does not toll the limitations period. Id.; Hentosh v. Herman M. Finch University of Health Sciences, 167 F.3d 1170, 1175 (7th Cir.1999). Although a plaintiff need not allege any wrongdoing on the part of the defendant, tolling requires a showing that the plaintiff exercised continuous diligence and brought the suit as soon as it was practicable. Hentosh, 167 F.3d at 1175; Wolin v. Smith Barney, 83 F.3d 847, 852 (7th Cir.1996).

The plaintiffs argue that because they did not actually obtain a copy of the Rifkin letter until August 1997, after the statute of limitations expired, their claims should be tolled. We are not persuaded by this...