Chaput v. State
| Citation | 487 P.3d 366,168 Idaho 774 |
| Decision Date | 10 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 47459 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Idaho |
| Parties | Thomas Buck CHAPUT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent. |
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Brian R. Dickson, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kale D. Gans, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Thomas Buck Chaput appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
In Chaput's underlying criminal case, he pled guilty to grand theft. According to the terms of the parties’ plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend a unified sentence of ten years with five years determinate to run concurrently with Chaput's prior sentence of ten years determinate for aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. At the change of plea hearing, Chaput made the following statements about his plea agreement:
Thereafter, the district court held a sentencing hearing. Because the grand theft conviction, among other things, violated Chaput's probation in the aggravated assault case, the court held a combined sentencing hearing addressing the sentences in both cases. At that hearing, the court followed the State's recommendation in the grand theft case and sentenced Chaput to a unified sentence of ten years with five years determinate to run concurrently with Chaput's aggravated assault sentence. The court also executed the sentence in the aggravated assault case but modified it to a unified sentence of ten years with five years determinate. Chaput appealed these sentences, and this Court affirmed. State v. Chaput , Docket Nos. 46747 and 46826, 2019 WL 8129561 (Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2019) (unpublished).
During the pendency of Chaput's sentencing appeal, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief challenging his conviction for grand theft and alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Chaput filed a supporting affidavit, which the district court construed to allege that Chaput's counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to timely provide the State's discovery responses to Chaput, (2) lying to him in an effort to get him to waive the preliminary hearing, (3) misrepresenting that if he pled guilty he would be sentenced to a rider or at most receive a two-year fixed sentence, and (4) lying to him about not being able to apply to mental health court.
Chaput also filed a motion for the appointment of post-conviction counsel.
The district court entered a notice of intent to dismiss Chaput's post-conviction petition. In this notice, the district court took "judicial notice of the registrar of actions and content of the files in [the grand theft case] and [the aggravated assault case]." The district court found Chaput's claim that his counsel purportedly misrepresented the sentence Chaput would receive if he pled guilty to be frivolous and unsupported by the record. Further, the court found that each of Chaput's other claims failed to allege any facts providing a reasonable probability of a different outcome and to identify any potential prejudice.
In response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss his petition, Chaput filed an unsworn statement and submitted numerous documents, including a letter to the court about his aggravated assault conviction, correspondence with the Idaho State Bar about his trial counsel's performance, and correspondence from his trial counsel. Chaput's response did not challenge or otherwise mention the court's judicial notice of the underlying case or of the aggravated assault case.
After receiving Chaput's response, the district court entered an order summarily dismissing his petition, stating the response "rehashes the arguments raised in the [petition] without providing any substantive information pertaining to the deficiencies identified" in the court's notice of intent to dismiss. Additionally, the court denied Chaput's request for appointment of counsel, concluding that his "claims are frivolous and without merit." Chaput timely appeals.
Chaput asserts the district court erred by taking judicial notice of "the entire record" in his underlying grand theft case and in his prior aggravated assault case.1 A court's decision to take judicial notice under Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 is an evidentiary ruling, which we review for an abuse of discretion. Rome v. State , 164 Idaho 407, 413, 431 P.3d 242, 248 (2018). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life , 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).
Rule 201 is limited to judicial notice of adjudicative facts not subject to reasonable dispute. I.R.E. 201(a), (b). A court may sua sponte take judicial notice on its own. I.R.E. 201(c). "When a court takes judicial notice of records, exhibits, or transcripts from the court file in the same or a separate case, the court must identify the specific documents or items so noticed." I.R.E. 201(c)(2). This rule does not require the court to specifically identify each statement or fact of which it takes notice. Nicholson v. Bennett , 166 Idaho 720, 726, 462 P.3d 1184, 1190 (2020). Rather, a court must only identify the items of which it is taking notice. Id.
On appeal, Chaput argues the district court abused its discretion by taking judicial notice of the entire record in his criminal cases and violated Rule 201 by failing to identify the specific documents upon which the court relied. The State responds that Chaput failed to preserve this issue for appeal by objecting to the judicial notice. In support, the State cites McKinney v. State , 162 Idaho 286, 396 P.3d 1168 (2017). McKinney states in dicta in a footnote that the petitioner in that case waived any objection to the district court's failure to specify the documents of which it took judicial notice by not objecting to that notice. Id. at 290 n.2, 396 P.3d at 1172 n.2. In reply, Chaput asserts the issue is preserved because the district court actually decided the issue. In support, Chaput cites State v. Jeske , 164 Idaho 862, 868, 436 P.3d 683, 689 (2019), which ruled that if the district court decided an issue, then that decision "can form the basis for review."
The language of Rule 201 resolves whether Chaput was required to challenge the district court's judicial notice to preserve that challenge for appeal. Specifically, Rule 201(e) provides that:
On timely request, a party is entitled to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice and the nature of the fact to be noticed. If the court takes judicial notice before notifying a party, the party on request , is still entitled to be heard.
I.R.E. 201(e) (emphasis added). Interpretation of a court rule always begins with the plain, ordinary meaning of the rule's language tempered by its purpose. State v. Chambers , 166 Idaho 837, 842, 465 P.3d 1076, 1081 (2020). The Court construes the Idaho Rules of Evidence "to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of the evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination." Id. (quoting I.R.E. 102 ).
Under the plain language of Rule 201(e), a party challenging the propriety of a court's judicial notice and the nature of the facts the court noticed is required to request to be heard on the matter. Such a request gives the court the opportunity to decide the party's challenge. This decision in turn forms the basis for an appellate review. Absent a request to be heard on a challenge, the party fails to preserve the issue for appeal. See, e.g., Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery , 836 F.2d 1292, 1304 (11th Cir. 1988) ().
Because Chaput never challenged the district court's judicial notice, he failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Regardless, the error was harmless. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 61 provides in relevant part that unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting evidence is grounds for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order. "At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights." Id. In this case, the district court's error in failing to specifically identify the documents of which it took judicial notice was harmless for two reasons.
First, the documents upon which the court relied in its notice of intent to dismiss can be easily determined from that notice. Second, Chaput's argument that the error adversely affected his substantial rights because "the district court summarily dismissed [his] claim [based] solely upon facts it derived from the underlying case files" is unpersuasive. Contrary to Chaput's assertion, the court's reliance on a few limited documents from Chaput's criminal cases would not have...
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