Charbonneau v. State
| Decision Date | 01 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 254, 2004.,No. 253, 2004.,253, 2004.,254, 2004. |
| Citation | 904 A.2d 295 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
| Parties | Linda L. CHARBONNEAU, Defendant Below Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below Appellee. |
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Sussex County, CR. ID No. 0207003810 CR A. Nos. IS02-07-0308 through IS02-07-0312.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.
REVERSED
Craig A. Karsnitz (argued), Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, Georgetown, Delaware and Thomas A. Pederson, Georgetown, Delaware, for appellant.
Kim E. Ayvazian (argued), Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware and John Williams, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for appellee.
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the court en banc.
The State indicted Linda Charbonneau, her daughter, Mellisa Rucinski, and Willie Tony Brown for criminal offenses arising out of the murders of John Charbonneau and William Sproates.1 The State entered into plea agreements with Mellisa and Brown contingent on their providing truthful proffers and truthful testimony at Linda's trial.
Twelve days before opening statements at Linda's trial, the prosecutors produced a potential witness list for voir dire that included both Brown and Mellisa. The prosecutors knew that there were inconsistencies in Mellisa's and Brown's proffered versions of the critical events at least six months before Linda's trial. Despite that knowledge the prosecutors waited until four days into jury selection and four days before scheduled opening statements to notify the trial judge and the defense that they would not be calling Brown as a witness because they believed Mellisa's proffered version of the facts, but not Brown's. Linda's counsel, however, had extensively prepared their defense at trial on the assumption that Brown would be called as a witness to testify. Because the state's thirteenth hour decision not to call Brown would essentially eviscerate their defense strategies, defense counsel sought two forms of relief: (i) a "missing witness" instruction, and (ii) an in limine order admitting Brown's plea and proffer into evidence for the purposes of impeaching Mellisa and creating reasonable doubt about the State's case. The trial judge denied the missing witness instruction, ruling that it was "not natural" for the State to call Brown so long as the State "believed" that Brown was lying. In addition, the trial judged ruled that the fact that Brown had pleaded guilty to first degree murder and the facts stated in Brown's proffer that formed the basis of Brown's plea bargain were inadmissible as evidence at the trial because they were irrelevant and because any probative value that evidence might have was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury. By so ruling, the trial judge essentially determined as fact the State's unilateral determination about Brown's and Mellisa's respective credibility, and removed that credibility issue from the ultimate fact finder.
The defendant has appealed, asserting six claims of error, including these two rulings. We determine that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying Linda's motion in limine because the exclusion of evidence relevant to the credibility of one of the State's two primary fact witnesses removed from the jury, as ultimate finder of fact, the opportunity to consider and decide which of the two State's witnesses was more credible.2 The result was to undermine confidence that the defendant received a fair trial. Therefore, although we uphold the trial judge's other rulings challenged on this appeal, we reverse the conviction on the ground that the trial judge's denial of the motion in limine fatally undermined the fairness of the trial. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
The facts of this case are complex. We summarize at this point the facts that are relevant to our holding. Other sections of this Opinion addressing the specific issues on appeal discuss those facts, where relevant, in more detail.
Linda was married to John, and later, to Sproates. Linda remained romantically involved with both men in varying degrees and had moved between the residences of John and Sproates several times.3 In the fall of 2001, John and Sproates were reported missing. Sproates's body was eventually found in John's backyard. A murder investigation ensued. Linda became a primary suspect. The investigation ultimately suggested that Linda, Mellisa, and Mellisa's boyfriend, Brown, participated in John's and Sproates's murders. All three were eventually indicted and the State began to prepare for trial.
In April of 2003, the State began to discuss a plea bargain with Brown. On April 10, 2003, the State sent a letter to Brown discussing the terms under which it would allow Brown to plead guilty. The State offered Brown a plea of guilty to two counts of First Degree Murder. Brown would be required to provide the State with a truthful written proffer, a truthful formal videotaped statement, and truthful testimony at Linda's and Mellisa's trials. In return for Brown's cooperation, the State promised to recommend life in prison at his sentencing.4 Brown accepted the State's offer and sent a written proffer to the State on April 22, 2003 outlining his version of how the murders took place. Brown's proffer implicated himself, Linda, and Mellisa in the murders. In his proffer, Brown suggested that the motive to kill John resulted from pornographic pictures of Mellisa's oldest daughter found on John's computer. Brown further proffered that Mellisa had actively participated in Sproates's murder: Mellisa stabbed Sproates while Brown beat him with a homemade weapon. The State and Brown agreed to the deal and Brown pleaded guilty to two counts of Murder in the First Degree on April 24, 2003. Under the terms of the agreement, sentencing was deferred until his codefendants' cases were resolved.
On October 8, 2003, approximately six months after Brown's plea, the State began plea discussions with Mellisa. Armed with Brown's proffer implicating Mellisa in the murders, the State offered Mellisa a plea to Second Degree Murder for John's death, and to Conspiracy in the First Degree for Sproates's murder. The terms of the plea agreement required Mellisa to provide a truthful written proffer and truthful testimony at her codefendants' trials. Mellisa accepted the State's offer and sent the State a proffer outlining her version of the murders. Mellisa's account of the murders differed substantially from Brown's.
The two proffers differed in the following ways:
• Brown suggested in his proffer that Mellisa was actively involved in Sproates's murder. Mellisa, however, proffered that she was miles away when the murder occurred, and that Brown had committed the murder alone at Linda's request.
• Brown claimed that the motive behind killing John originated from pornographic pictures of Mellisa's oldest child found on John's computer. Mellisa proffered that the motive to kill John stemmed from constant battles between Linda and John over material possessions.
• Brown proffered that Linda killed John and that all he (Brown) did was bury John's body. Mellisa, however, proffered that she witnessed Brown beating John. Mellisa also claimed that after the beating, while John was still alive, she drove Brown and John to a secluded area where Brown killed John with a blunt object and buried him.
Despite the obvious inconsistencies in the proffers (both plea agreements were predicated on each defendant telling the truth), the State permitted Mellisa to plead guilty to Second-Degree Murder and First Degree Conspiracy. Mellisa's agreement, like Brown's, deferred sentencing until her codefendants' trials were completed.
Linda and the State never reached a plea agreement, and the Superior Court set her trial for March 8, 2004. On February 26, 2004, approximately a week before trial, the State provided the defense a "two and one-half inches thick" notebook of documents with "both exculpatory and potential inculpatory information." Within this voluminous set of documents was a handwritten statement by Mellisa taking issue with Brown's "truthful" proffer. This development compelled Linda's counsel, who had already cleared a four-week period from their calendars,5 to request a continuance. The trial judge granted the request and set a new trial date of March 22, 2004.
Twelve days before opening statements, the State filed a "potential" witness list which included both Brown and Mellisa as witnesses whom the State would call. Therefore, almost one year before the sole remaining codefendant's trial began, the State had openly and publicly represented to the Superior Court that Brown had agreed to plead guilty and to testify truthfully and consistently with a written proffer accepted by the State and disclosed to the Superior Court about the crimes for which Linda was to be tried. Six months before Linda's trial was to begin, the State had accepted Mellisa's plea, the proffer on which it was based, and her agreement to testify truthfully about the crimes for which Linda, the sole remaining codefendant, would be tried before a jury.
Although the State generally has no obligation to disclose its trial witnesses, its plea agreements with Brown and Mellisa renders that point irrelevant as to them, because a key condition of the pleas was that both witnesses would: (a) testify; and, (b) testify truthfully. The State so represented to the Superior Court in open court at the time of their pleas — one year before and six months before, Linda's trial was to begin. Defense counsel knew the terms of the pleas and, therefore, reasonably could expect, in the absence of State action to the...
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