Charity Hospital of Louisiana v. Axford

• Citation: 14 La. App. 535,131 So. 770
• Decision Date: 13 January 1930
• Docket Number: 11,658
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana (US)
• Parties: CHARITY HOSPITAL OF LOUISIANA v. AXFORD ET AL

131 So. 770

14 La. App. 535

CHARITY HOSPITAL OF LOUISIANA v. AXFORD ET AL

No. 11,658

Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Orleans

January 13, 1930

Rehearing Refused February 17, 1930.

Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, Division "C." Hon. E. K. Skinner, Judge.

Action by Charity Hospital of Louisiana against George Axford et al.

There was judgment for plaintiff and defendants appealed.

Judgment affirmed.

Emmet Alpha, of New Orleans, attorney for plaintiff, appellee.

Henry &amp Cooper and A. M. Suthon, of New Orleans, attorneys for defendants, appellants.

OPINION

JANVIER, J.

Plaintiff seeks a solidary judgment against the three defendants in the sum of $ 250, alleging that to be the value of hospital, surgical and radiographical services rendered defendant, Axford, when he was injured while in the employ of defendant, Mrs. George Thoele.

The proceeding is brought under Act 126 of 1924, as amended by Act 29 of 1928.

In accordance with the provisions of the statute, the injured party, the employer, and the employers' liability insurance company are made parties defendant.

The defense was at first threefold: First, that there is no such corporation as "Charity Hospital of Louisiana," which is the name under which plaintiff sues. Second, that the statute under which recovery is sought is violative of the provisions of section 16, article III, of the Constitution of 1921 in that it contains more than one object. Third, that there is not sufficient proof in the record that the services charged for were rendered, nor that the charges are reasonable and correct.

After the oral argument, defendant, through an exception of no cause of action filed in this court, set up a fourth defense based on the contention that the statutes to which we have referred, to-wit, Act 126 of 1924 and Act 29 of 1928, are violative of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that they make an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination against employes, employers and insurers of employers, where the injuries were sustained under circumstances which bring the matter within the state compensation laws.

In support of the first ground of defense it is contended that the correct legal title of the plaintiff corporation is "Board of Commissioners of the Charity Hospital," and that that was recognized to be its title by Act 145 of 1890.

We find that in that act the governing board of the hospital is referred to as "Board of Administrators," but the name of the institution itself is mentioned as "Charity Hospital of New Orleans." Plaintiff sues as "Charity Hospital of Louisiana" instead of "Charity Hospital of New Orleans." It is evident that no harm can come to any of the parties as a result of the slight error, and that on this point the case is within the doctrine announced by this court in Humphreys v. Cousin, No. 7997 of the docket, decided April 18, 1921 (unreported), in which it was said:

"Where a suit is brought for the use of the real parties in interest by a plaintiff duly authorized to bring it, and where the defendant is not deprived of any of his means of defense and will be protected by the judgment, the action will be maintained notwithstanding that technically the party before the court may not be strictly the proper plaintiff in the case."

See also Rigaud v. Garvey, 8 La. App. 731.

Nor do we agree with defendant in its contention that the statute of 1924, as amended by the Act of 1928, is unconstitutional in that it contains two objects. This contention is based on the fact that section 1 authorizes charity hospitals to collect charges in certain cases and that section 2 requires the board of administrators of charity hospitals to study abuses and to take necessary steps to discourage such abuses.

As we view the statute it embraces one general object: to discourage abuses resulting from the use of the hospital by those able to pay. If the statute be interpreted in this way, then that part of it which authorizes the charity hospitals to collect for services rendered to patients coming "within the provisions of the employers' liability law" is merely one means provided by the legislature itself for the correction of certain of the abuses. The legislature recognized the fact that it had not before it sufficient information to determine what other abuses were being practiced and therefore gave to the institution general authority to investigate these abuses, but at the same time gave to the institution specific authority to put an end to the particular abuse mentioned. The case seems to us to fall within the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Louisiana State Board of Agriculture & Immigration v. Tanzmann, 140 La. 756, 73 So. 854, in which the court said:

"The attack upon the constitutionality of the act under which plaintiff is proceeding as based upon the ground of multifariousness of objects is without merit. The act has but one object within the meaning of the Constitution, which is to provide measures of prevention and protection against fruit and crop pests and diseases, and that object is declared in its title. All else, whether in the title or the body of the act, are but means to the end so declared. State v. J. Foto & Bro., 134 La. 154, 63 So. 859; City of Shreveport v. Kahn, 136 La. 371, 67 So. 35; Thomas v. Board of School Directors, 136 La. 499, 67 So. 345; State v. Doremus, 137 La. 266, 68 So. 605."

To the same effect see Bemis Bag Co. of La. v. Tax Commission, 158 La. 1, 103 So. 337. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that these provisions of the constitution with respect to dual objects and with reference to subject matter should be interpreted in a liberal sense. State ex rel. Mouton v. Read, Judge, 49 La. Ann. 1535, 22 So. 761. As this court said in City of New Orleans v. Cotonio, 1 Orleans App. 156:

"The requirement of singleness of subject is not intended to embarrass honest legislation, but only to prevent as we have said the vicious practice of joining in one act incongruous and unrelated matters; hence, if all the parts of a statute have a natural connection and reasonably relate, directly or indirectly, to one general and legitimate subject of legislation, the act is not open to the objection of plurality, no matter how extensively or minutely it deals with the details looking to the accomplishment of the main legislative purpose. 124 U.S. 656; 111 U.S. 1; 105 U.S. 278; 22 Wall. 351; 118 F. R. 549; 97 F. R. 435; 88 F. R. 449; 54 F. R. 456; State v. De Hart, 109 La. 570, 33 So. 605; Suc. of Bienvenu, 106 La. 595, 31 So. 193; Hope et al. v. City of N. O., 106 La. 345, 30 So. 842; State v. Logan et al, 104 La. 254, 28 So. 912; State v. Ackerman, 51 La. Ann. 1213, 26 So. 80; Allopathic State Board, etc., v. Fowler, 50 La. Ann. 1358, 24 So. 809; Police Jury of Lafourche v. Police Jury of Terrebonne, 49 La. Ann. 1331, 22 So. 376; State v. Rushing, 49 La. Ann. 1530, 22 So. 798; St. Charles St. R. Co. v. Fairex, 46 La. Ann. 1022; Macready v. Schenck, 41 La. Ann. 456; Succession of Dejan v. Schaeffer, 40 La. Ann. 437; State of La. v. Henderson, 32 La. Ann. 779; State v. Pilsbury, 31 La. Ann. 1; Garthwaite, Wheeler & Co. v. Wentz et al., 19 La. Ann. 196."

The third contention, that the rendering of the services is not fully proven, and that the value thereof was not shown by a preponderance of the evidence, is without merit. Dr. Bradburn testified as to what services were rendered and Mr. Matthews, the secretary of the institution, stated that the charges made by the institution were based upon those of similar first-class hospitals. Indeed, for the services rendered, 54 days' attention, x-ray photographs, etc., the charge of $ 250 is manifestly most reasonable.

Let us now consider the...