Charles v. Seigfried, s. 76617

• Decision Date: 30 March 1995
• Docket Number: Nos. 76617,77438,s. 76617
• Citation: 651 N.E.2d 154,165 Ill.2d 482,209 Ill.Dec. 226
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: , 209 Ill.Dec. 226, 54 A.L.R.5th 793 Robert CHARLES, Adm'r of the Estate of Lynn Sue Charles, Deceased, Appellee, v. Alan SEIGFRIED, Appellant. Paula L. BZDEK, a Minor, By Her Father and Next Friend, Robert J. BZDEK, Appellee, v. Susan M. TOWNSLEY et al., Appellants.

Page 154

651 N.E.2d 154

165 Ill.2d 482, 209 Ill.Dec. 226, 54

A.L.R.5th 793

Robert CHARLES, Adm'r of the Estate of Lynn Sue Charles, Deceased, Appellee, v. Alan SEIGFRIED, Appellant.

Paula L. BZDEK, a Minor, By Her Father and Next Friend, Robert J. BZDEK, Appellee, v. Susan M. TOWNSLEY et al., Appellants.

Nos. 76617, 77438.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 30, 1995.

Rehearing Denied May 30, 1995.

Herbolsheimer, Lannon, Henson, Duncan & Reagan (Michael T. Reagan, and Michael C. Jansz, of counsel), Ottawa, for appellant in No. 76617.

Stephen B. Morris, Hamilton, for appellee, in No. 76617.

Steven L. Larson, John W. Barbian and Linda E. Spring, of Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, Waukegan, for appellants, in No. 77438.

Baskin, Server, Berke & Weinstein, & Spiro, Chicago (John R. Malkinson, of counsel), for appellee, in No. 77438.

Chief Justice BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:

In these two, consolidated appeals, the plaintiffs ask this court to recognize a cause of action against social hosts for serving alcoholic beverages to minors who are subsequently injured. Both appeals arise from a circuit court dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. The circuit courts held that, according to long-established precedent, social host liability does not exist in Illinois. For the reasons stated below, we now confirm this precedent and decline to give birth to any form of social host liability.

FACTS

In cause number 76617, the plaintiff, Robert Charles, as administrator of the estate of Lynn Sue Charles, brought an action against the defendant, Alan Seigfried, in the circuit court of Hancock County. Lynn Sue Charles was killed in an automobile accident in the early morning hours of February 16, 1991. Charles sought recovery for her death.

Charles' second-amended complaint alleged that Seigfried hosted a social gathering at his rural home on the evening of February 15, 1991. Lynn Sue, 16 years of age, attended the party. The complaint charged that Seigfried served alcoholic beverages to Lynn Sue and to other underage persons at the Charles' second-amended complaint was premised on theories of social host liability. Count I claimed that Seigfried breached his common law duty of reasonable care. Count II alleged that a civil action arose from Seigfried's violation of section 6-16(c) of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 43, par. 131(c) (now 235 ILCS 5/6-16(c) (West 1992))). The circuit court dismissed the complaint under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1992)) for failure to state a cause of action. The appellate court reversed the dismissal and created a cause of action against social hosts who knowingly serve alcoholic beverages to minors. (251 Ill.App.3d 1059, 191 Ill.Dec. 431, 623 N.E.2d 1021.) In doing so, the appellate court acknowledged that it was departing from precedent. (251 Ill.App.3d at 1063, 191 Ill.Dec. 431, 623 N.E.2d 1021.) We allowed Seigfried's petition for leave to appeal (145 Ill.2d R. 315(a)).

[209 Ill.Dec. 228] party. Lynn Sue became intoxicated. She then departed Seigfried's home by driving her own automobile. Lynn Sue had a blood-alcohol content of 0.299 at the time of her death.

In cause number 77438, the plaintiff, Paula L. Bzdek, a minor, by her father and next friend, Robert J. Bzdek, filed suit against the defendants, Susan M. Townsley and Nicki Townsley, in the circuit court of Lake County. Bzdek was injured in an accident while she was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by David Duff, 18 years of age. Bzdek sought recovery for permanent injuries that she sustained.

Bzdek's second-amended complaint alleged that, on or about September 15, 1990, the Townsleys hosted a social gathering at their home in Wildwood, Illinois. Bzdek, age 15, attended the party, as did Duff. The complaint charged that the Townsleys furnished alcoholic beverages to Bzdek, Duff, and to several other underage persons. Bzdek and Duff became intoxicated. Bzdek left the Townsley home in the vehicle driven by Duff while he was still drunk. According to the complaint, Bzdek allowed herself to be transported by Duff due to her own inebriation. Duff lost control of the vehicle and crashed into oncoming traffic.

Both counts of Bzdek's second-amended complaint were based on theories of social host liability. Count I charged that the Townsleys negligently served intoxicants to Duff, a driver under the legal drinking age of 21. Count II alleged that they negligently served alcoholic beverages to Bzdek, a minor whose own drunkenness caused her to allow herself to be a passenger in Duff's vehicle. The circuit court dismissed the complaint under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1992)) for failure to state a cause of action. The appellate court reversed, finding that social hosts can be held liable under the facts alleged in Bzdek's complaint. (262 Ill.App.3d 238, 199 Ill.Dec. 550, 634 N.E.2d 389.) The appellate court extended social host liability beyond the negligent service of alcoholic beverages to minors. (262 Ill.App.3d at 244-46, 199 Ill.Dec. 550, 634 N.E.2d 389.) It reasoned that, where social hosts knowingly serve intoxicants to minors and to persons under the legal drinking age of 21, they can be held liable for injuries caused by the persons under age 21. (262 Ill.App.3d at 244-46, 199 Ill.Dec. 550, 634 N.E.2d 389.) We allowed the Townsleys' petition for leave to appeal (145 Ill.2d R. 315(a)).

ANALYSIS

The standard of review on appeal from a motion to dismiss a complaint under section 2-615 is whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts which, if proved, would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Urbaitis v. Commonwealth Edison (1991), 143 Ill.2d 458, 475, 159 Ill.Dec. 50, 575 N.E.2d 548.

For over one century, this court has spoken with a single voice to the effect that no social host liability exists in Illinois. The discussion below demonstrates that it has been, and continues to be, well-established law that Illinois has no common law cause of action for injuries arising out of the sale or gift of alcoholic beverages; that the legislature has preempted the field of alcohol-related liability; and that any change in the law governing alcohol-related liability should be made by the General Assembly, or not at all. I

THE HISTORY OF ALCOHOL-RELATED LIABILITY

A. The Common Law Rule and the Dramshop Act

The historic common law rule, adhered to in this State, is that there is no cause of action for injuries arising out of the sale or gift of alcoholic beverages. The rationale underlying the rule is that the drinking of the intoxicant, not the furnishing of it, is the proximate cause of the intoxication and the resulting injury. (See Cunningham v. Brown (1961), 22 Ill.2d 23, 29-30, 174 N.E.2d 153.) As a matter of public policy, the furnishing of alcoholic beverages is considered as too remote to serve as the proximate cause of the injury.

As set forth later in this opinion, our courts have consistently adhered to the rule that there is no common law cause of action against any provider of alcoholic beverages for injuries arising out of the sale or gift of such beverages. The Illinois legislature, however, created a limited statutory cause of action when it enacted the original Dramshop Act of 1872 in response to a great wave of temperance reform that swept the nation. (Cunningham, 22 Ill.2d at 27, 174 N.E.2d 153, quoting 4 Bogart & Thompson, A Centennial History of Illinois 42-44 (1920).) The original act imposed liability upon dramshops for selling or giving intoxicating liquors to persons who subsequently injure third parties. (Laws of 1871-72, at 552-56.) The present act, titled the Liquor Control Act of 1934 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 43, par. 93.9 et seq. (now 235 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 1992))) grants a similar cause of action to injured third parties (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 43, par. 135 (now 235 ILCS 5/6-21 (West 1992))). (Section 6-21 is commonly known as the Dramshop Act and will hereinafter be referred to as such.) The Dramshop Act has never imposed liability predicated on negligence or fault; rather, it imposes a form of "no-fault" liability. (Nelson v. Araiza (1978), 69 Ill.2d 534, 538-39, 14 Ill.Dec. 441, 372 N.E.2d 637.) This court has interpreted the Dramshop Act as not imposing liability upon social hosts.

Cruse v. Aden (1889), 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73, is the seminal decision regarding both the common law rule and the absence of social host liability under the Dramshop Act. There, a wife filed suit against a friend of her husband. The friend had given her husband two drinks of intoxicating liquor while he was a guest at the friend's home. The husband, upon returning home on horseback, was thrown from the horse and died.

The wife argued that a common law right of action existed before the Dramshop Act of 1872 was enacted, and that the Dramshop Act simply saved and even enlarged the remedies already available. The Cruse court expressly rejected these notions, stating:

"It was not a tort, at common law, to either sell or give intoxicating liquor to 'a strong and able-bodied man,' and it can be said safely, that it is not anywhere laid down in the books that such act was ever held, at common law, to be culpable negligence, that would impose legal liability for damages upon the vendor or donor of such liquor. The present suit can in no sense be regarded as an action of tort at common law." Cruse, 127 Ill. at 234, 20 N.E. 73.

The Cruse court therefore concluded that any cause of action the wife had was purely statutory, wholly dependent upon the proper construction of the Dramshop Act. (Cruse, 127 Ill. at 234, 20 N.E. 73.) The court held that the Dramshop Act only created a cause of action against those engaged in the liquor trade. (Cruse, 127 Ill. at 239, 20 N.E. 73.) No cause of action was "intended to be given against a person who, in his own house, or elsewhere, gives a glass of...