Charles v. State

• Decision Date: 12 July 2017
• Docket Number: No. 4D15–658,4D15–658
• Citation: 223 So.3d 318
• Parties: Kerven CHARLES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

223 So.3d 318

Kerven CHARLES, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D15–658

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[ July 12, 2017 ]

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Tara A. Finnigan, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kimberly T. Acuña, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Taylor, J.

Kerven Charles appeals his convictions and sentences for robbery with a weapon (Count I), false imprisonment of a victim under 13 while in possession of a weapon (Count II), burglary with assault while in possession of a weapon (Count IV), two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Counts V and VI), and petit theft (a lesser included offense of Count VII). These charges, filed in the same information, stemmed from three criminal episodes that constituted a crime spree.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to sever Counts I–III, as those offenses were part of the same crime spree as Counts IV–VII. Further, although the trial court severed Count VIII, burglary while armed, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence related to that offense, as it was inextricably intertwined with the charged crimes and was relevant evidence of flight and concealment. Finally, we hold that the trial court conducted a sufficient competency hearing and made an independent finding that appellant was competent to proceed. We remand, however, for entry of a written competency order.

The Francois Incident (Counts I–III)

At around noon on February 4, 2013, Dieunata Francois returned home with her four-year-old son and parked the church van she was driving. Appellant approached Ms. Francois outside, set down a black duffle bag, and demanded money. Ms. Francois asked appellant what he was talking about. Appellant then pulled a machete out of the duffle bag and told Ms. Francois, "[I]f you don't give me your money, I will chop you up." Ms. Francois replied that she did not have any money.

While still holding the machete, appellant grabbed Ms. Francois's son by the collar and again threatened to hurt her if she did not give him money. The child began screaming and crying. Ms. Francois spoke with appellant for about 15 to 35 minutes, trying to persuade him to stop what he was doing. Ms. Francois gave appellant her wallets and showed him that she did not have any money. Appellant returned the wallets. Ms. Francois promised not to call the police if appellant let them go. Appellant released Ms. Francois's son and walked away with the black duffle bag.

The Spector Incident (Counts IV–VII)

At 12:30 p.m. that same day, not far from Ms. Francois's house, Gregory Guzzo had an appointment with Harold and Janice Spector to provide an estimate on the cost of repairing fire damage to their home. While Mr. Guzzo was parked in front of the Spectors' home waiting for them to arrive, appellant approached Mr. Guzzo and told him that he needed some work done on property he had purchased in the neighborhood. Mr. Guzzo informed appellant that he had an appointment at that time, but could look at appellant's home later.

The Spectors then arrived and Mr. Guzzo began speaking with them in the driveway. Appellant walked up the driveway and continued to ask Mr. Guzzo about performing repairs on his house. Mr. Guzzo told appellant that he was with clients. Mr. Guzzo handed appellant his business card and asked appellant to give him a call in about an hour. Appellant walked back down the driveway and left. During these encounters outside the Spectors' home, appellant carried a black bag.

Mr. Guzzo and the Spectors went inside the home to view the damage. Shortly thereafter, appellant came to the front door and said he had a few more questions about the neighborhood. Mrs. Spector met appellant at the front door and told him, "I really can't talk to you because my house just burnt down."

Appellant then reached into his duffle bag, pulled out a machete, held it against Mrs. Spector's throat, and told her to give him money or else he would kill her. Mrs. Spector ran back inside towards her husband, screaming that appellant had a knife and was going to kill her. Mr. Spector pushed his wife into the bathroom and closed the door.

Appellant approached Mr. Guzzo and Mr. Spector, demanding money from them. Appellant held the machete close to Mr. Spector's stomach and said, "[G]ive me money or I'll f'ing kill you." Mr. Guzzo threw his wallet to appellant. Appellant picked up the wallet and ran out of the house.

Mr. and Mrs. Spector both called 911. The police arrived and set up a perimeter in the Spectors' neighborhood.

The Jean Incident (Count VIII)

Ismith Jean, who lived in the same neighborhood as the Spectors, got a ride home from his boss at around 2 p.m. that day. They could not drive all the way to Mr. Jean's home due to the police presence in the neighborhood, so Mr. Jean's boss dropped him off a short distance from his home.

When Mr. Jean arrived at his house, he noticed that the front door was unlocked. Mr. Jean entered the house and heard some noise. He looked in his daughter's room and found appellant. Appellant had ransacked the room.

During the encounter, appellant told Mr. Jean to "shut up" and "be quiet." Mr. Jean told appellant to get out or he would call the police. Knowing that the police were already outside, Mr. Jean opened the front door and let appellant leave. Mr. Jean followed appellant out the door and pointed him out for the police, who immediately apprehended him.

Mr. Jean later found a black duffle bag on his back porch. The bag did not belong to Mr. Jean and he had never seen it before. Mr. Guzzo, Mrs. Spector, and Ms. Francois all testified that the bag recovered from Mr. Jean's home looked like the same bag that appellant was carrying during their encounters with him.

Motions to Sever and to Exclude the Contents of the Duffle Bag

While appellant was representing himself, he filed a pro se motion to sever Count VIII—i.e., the charge that appellant committed a burglary of the Jean residence. The trial court granted the motion to sever Count VIII, but ruled that evidence related to the Jean burglary would be admissible as evidence of flight, hiding from police, and consciousness of guilt.

Before appellant's second trial (the first ended in a mistrial), the defense moved to sever Counts I, II, and III—i.e., the charges related to the Francois incident. Defense counsel conceded that the charges were properly joined, but argued that the inquiry "doesn't end there" and that appellant was entitled to have separate trials to prevent prejudice. The trial court denied the motion to sever Counts I, II, and III, ruling that the charges were part of a crime spree and were connected by temporal proximity, location, and the nature and manner of criminal activity.

The defense later moved to exclude the contents of the black duffle bag, which included a knife, rope, duct tape, and condoms. The trial court ruled that the contents of the bag were admissible, except for the condoms, because they were relevant to the burglary charge. The court agreed to give a limiting instruction that the contents were relevant solely to that charge.

On appeal, appellant challenges two rulings of the trial court: (1) the denial of appellant's motion to sever Counts I–III, which related to the Francois incident; and (2) the admission of evidence regarding Count VIII, which had been severed and which related to the Jean incident. Appellant maintains that none of the criminal episodes were related, but rather were "random acts by a likely mentally ill person." He further argues that severance of Counts I–III was necessary for a fair determination of his guilt or innocence, and that the admission of evidence of the Jean incident was more prejudicial than probative.

The State responds that the trial court properly denied appellant's motion to sever Counts I–III, as the charges were part of a crime spree and were connected by temporal proximity, location, and the type and manner of criminal activity. The State further argues that the trial court properly admitted evidence relating to the Jean incident, such as appellant hiding in Mr. Jean's home and telling him to be quiet, as such evidence was evidence of flight and concealment and was relevant to show consciousness of guilt.

Standard of Review

"The decision to grant or deny a motion for severance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court." Smithers v. State , 826 So.2d 916, 923 (Fla. 2002). Likewise, a trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Thomas v. State , 748 So.2d 970, 982 (Fla. 1999).

Denial of Motion to Sever Counts I–III (the Francois Incident)

For offenses to be properly charged in a single indictment or information, they must meet the requirement for joinder set forth in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.150. Crossley v. State , 596 So.2d 447, 449 (Fla. 1992). "Two or more offenses that are triable in the same court may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense, when the offenses ... are based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more connected acts or transactions." Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.150(a).

The "connected acts or transactions" requirement in rule 3.150(a) calls for the charges joined for trial to be considered in an episodic sense. Garcia v. State , 568 So.2d 896, 899 (Fla. 1990). Furthermore, "for joinder to be appropriate the crimes in question must be linked in some significant way." Ellis v. State , 622 So.2d 991, 1000 (Fla. 1993). "This can include the fact that they occurred during a ‘spree’ interrupted by no significant period of respite, ... or the fact that one crime is causally related to the other, even though there may have been a significant lapse of time." Id.

"Courts may consider the temporal and geographical...