Charlton v. Charlton
| Decision Date | 13 February 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 19763,19763 |
| Citation | 413 S.E.2d 911,186 W.Va. 670 |
| Parties | Estaline CHARLTON, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. Howard S. CHARLTON, Jr., Defendant Below, Appellant. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
of Justice Neely Jan. 6, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 13, 1992.
Syllabus by the Court
1. In enacting our equitable distribution statute, the Legislature did not intend fault to be considered as a factor in determining the division of marital property. However, the Legislature did designate marital fault as a factor to be considered in awarding alimony under the provisions of W.Va.Code, 48-2-15(i).
2. "Where, during the course of the marriage, one spouse transfers title to his or her separate property into the joint names of both spouses, a presumption that the transferring spouse intended to make a gift of the property to the marital estate is consistent with the principles underlying our equitable distribution statute." Syllabus Point 4, Whiting v. Whiting, 183 W.Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d 413 (1990).
3. "One who receives property from another with whom he has a confidential relationship has the burden of showing that the transfer was fair and made with utmost good faith." Syllabus Point 1, Marshall v. Marshall, 166 W.Va. 304, 273 S.E.2d 360 (1980).
4. "The relationship between husband and wife is one of confidence and trust." Syllabus Point 2, Marshall v. Marshall, 166 W.Va. 304, 273 S.E.2d 360 (1980).
5. Where a spouse inherits property and entrusts the investment of that property to the other spouse, who is more financially knowledgeable, and the property itself is not used for marital purposes, the fact that the property is titled in the joint names of the spouses will not convert it to marital property.
6. "The purpose of W.Va.Code, 48-2-13(a)(4) (1986), is to enable a spouse who does not have financial resources to obtain reimbursement for costs and attorney's fees during the course of the litigation." Syllabus Point 14, Bettinger v. Bettinger, 183 W.Va. 528, 396 S.E.2d 709 (1990).
7. "Reimbursement for reasonable expert witness fees is permissible under similar financial considerations as those used in awarding attorney's fees." Syllabus Point 15, Bettinger v. Bettinger, 183 W.Va. 528, 396 S.E.2d 709 (1990).
8. Syllabus Point 2, Duquesne Light Co. v. State Tax Dept., 174 W.Va. 506, 327 S.E.2d 683 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029, 105 S.Ct. 2040, 85 L.Ed.2d 322 (1985).
G. Patrick Stanton, Jr., Stanton & Stanton, Fairmont, for appellee.
David R. Janes, Tharp, Liotta & Janes, Fairmont, for appellant.
This is an appeal from a final order of the Circuit Court of Marion County which granted the parties, Howard S. Charlton, Jr., and Estaline Charlton, a divorce. The primary question on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in ruling that funds inherited by each of the parties during the marriage and placed in jointly titled investments were the separate property of the respective parties. We conclude that the funds were not marital property, and we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
The facts are not in any substantial dispute. The parties were married on November 23, 1956, and thereafter lived in Fairmont, Marion County. It appears Mr. Charlton was employed as a teacher and/or school administrator, while Mrs. Charlton did not work outside the home. The parties had two children, both of whom were emancipated at the time of the proceedings below.
During the marriage, Mrs. Charlton inherited $139,331 from her mother and an additional $21,000 from her husband's aunt. Mr. Charlton inherited $40,000 from his parents and an additional $7,000 from his aunt. All of these funds were placed in investment accounts in the joint names of the parties and were managed by Mr. Charlton. It does not appear that the corpus of these investments was used for marital purposes, but some of the income from the investment accounts was used for marital living expenses.
On February 4, 1988, the parties separated. Mrs. Charlton subsequently instituted divorce proceedings on grounds of adultery, cruelty, and desertion in the Circuit Court of Marion County. The matter was referred to a family law master.
On June 29, 1988, the family law master issued his decision recommending that Mrs. Charlton be granted a divorce on the ground of adultery. The law master apparently concluded that treating the investment accounts as marital property would unjustly enrich Mr. Charlton. The law master found Mr. Charlton to be the party solely at fault for the dissolution of the marriage. He recommended that each party withdraw from the joint investment accounts the amount he or she inherited during the marriage.
By order entered September 11, 1989, the circuit court adopted the family law master's findings and conclusions. The court awarded Mrs. Charlton $160,331 from the investment accounts as her separate property and awarded Mr. Charlton $47,000 as his separate property from the same source. The remainder of the parties' assets were ordered equally distributed between them. By order dated November 9, 1990, the circuit court refused Mr. Charlton's motion for reconsideration.
In reaching his conclusion that Mrs. Charlton's inheritance was her separate property, the family law master relied upon the principles of unjust enrichment, which we outlined in Patterson v. Patterson, 167 W.Va. 1, 277 S.E.2d 709 (1981), overruled on other grounds, LaRue v. LaRue, 172 W.Va. 158, 304 S.E.2d 312, 41 A.L.R.4th 445 (1983). The factual basis for the claim of unjust enrichment was that the husband was at fault for the breakup of the marriage. In Patterson we impressed a constructive trust in favor of the wife on property acquired during the marriage partially by the wife's contributions, but titled solely in the name of the husband. In the course of our discussion, we recognized that the presumption of gift between husband and wife under W.Va.Code, 48-3-10 (1931), would not defeat such a constructive trust where the husband would be unjustly enriched. 1
We note, however, that Patterson was decided before the adoption in 1984 of our equitable distribution statute, W.Va.Code, 48-2-32. W.Va.Code, 48-2-32(c), states:
"In the absence of a valid agreement, the court shall presume that all marital property is to be divided equally between the parties, but may alter this distribution, without regard to any attribution of fault to either party which may be alleged or proved in the course of the action, after a consideration of the following [factors]...." (Emphasis added.)
This provision goes on to identify a number of economic factors, including homemaker and child care services, that can be considered in determining whether an unequal distribution of the marital property is warranted. W.Va.Code, 48-2-32(c)(1)-(3). The factors listed in W.Va.Code, 48-2-32(c)(4), also permit an unequal distribution to the extent one of the parties has been found to have dissipated or depreciated the value of marital assets. This section specifies that "except for a consideration of the economic consequences [of such dissipation or depreciation of assets], fault or marital misconduct shall not be considered by the court in determining the proper distribution of marital property." 2
These statutory provisions remove fault in the conduct of the parties as a factor in determining the appropriate division of marital property. This is consistent with the overall statutory structure regarding the equitable distribution of marital property between husband and wife. The purpose of the equitable distribution statute is to achieve a proper economic distribution of marital assets. Consequently, the Legislature chose to focus solely on economic factors, excluding consideration of fault as a factor in altering the distribution.
We are reinforced in this conclusion by the contrasting language in W.Va.Code, 48-2-15(i) (1986), which specifically authorized a court making an award of alimony to consider the fault of either party:
"In determining whether alimony is to be awarded, or in determining the amount of alimony, if any, to be awarded under the provisions of this section, the court shall consider and compare the fault or misconduct of either or both of the parties and the effect of such fault or misconduct as a contributing factor to the deterioration of the marital relationship." 3 (Emphasis added).
Even before the adoption of this provision, we had indicated that fault or misconduct could be considered in awarding alimony. In those instances where there were traditional fault grounds for the divorce, we awarded alimony to the wife if she was the innocent party. See State ex rel. Cecil v. Knapp, 143 W.Va. 896, 105 S.E.2d 569 (1958). With the advent of no-fault grounds for divorce, we have held, based on statutory language, that inequitable conduct which caused the dissolution of the marriage can be considered as a factor in the alimony consideration. Under W.Va.Code, 48-2-4(a)(7) (1981), which recognizes living separate and apart without cohabitation for a year as a ground for divorce, "the court may inquire into the question of who is the party at fault and may award alimony according to the right of the matter[.]" Based on this language, we held in Syllabus Point 1 of Peremba v. Peremba, 172 W.Va. 293, 304 S.E.2d 880 (1983):
Likewise, W.Va.Code, 48-2-4...
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