Marshall v. Marshall, 14788
| Decision Date | 19 December 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 14788,14788 |
| Citation | 273 S.E.2d 360,166 W.Va. 304 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Edmund G. MARSHALL v. Jean A. MARSHALL (Hamilton). |
Syllabus by the Court
1. One who receives property from another with whom he has a confidential relationship has the burden of showing that the transfer was fair and made with utmost good faith.
2. The relationship between husband and wife is one of confidence and trust.
3. Where persons occupy a fiduciary or confidential relationship the lack of independent advice on the part of the person who claims to be disadvantaged by the transaction may be a significant factor in a court's evaluation of the overall bona fides of the transaction.
Leo Catsonis, Morton I. Taber and Michael T. Clifford, Charleston, for appellant.
J. W. St. Clair and W. Merton Prunty, Huntington, for appellee.
This appeal involves the validity of a real estate and stock transfer between a husband and wife. The transfer was part of an alleged oral reconciliation agreement made between the parties in September of 1970. The trial court found that the husband, the appellee, had met his burden of proof in showing that his former wife, the appellant, had voluntarily conveyed the property to him. The wife urges that the ruling is erroneous in that the record shows that the husband violated his fiduciary duty to her and did not meet the statutory burden of showing the transfer lawful. W.Va.Code, 48-3-7. * We agree and reverse.
The parties were married in 1954 and during most of their marriage they resided in Huntington, West Virginia, where the husband practiced law. The couple had three children before they finally separated in December of 1971. During their marriage, they accumulated some real property in and around Huntington, which consisted of the family residence and a 40-acre farm. They also owned several hundred shares of stock. Most of the property was jointly owned by the parties but some shares of stock were owned by the wife only.
Around 1969, the parties began experiencing some problems with their marriage. Each accused the other of engaging in marital misconduct and in May of 1970 the parties began to see a psychiatrist, a Dr Hibbard, in hopes of improving their relationship. According to Dr. Hibbard's testimony, the appellant was experiencing a period of emotional distress. He advised her not to make any major decisions; and, he prescribed Sinequan, an anti-depressant, for her. At one point, he recommended to her husband that she be hospitalized.
After a period of separation, the parties attempted to reconcile in August of 1970. The husband would not agree to a reconciliation with his wife, however, unless she conveyed all her interest in the real property and stocks, to him. While there was some discussion of this transaction, the extent of any negotiations is not clear. The wife says her husband just presented the deeds he had prepared and the stock certificates and said, "Sign them right now or that's it." The husband says that he gave his wife between ten days and a month to consider the transaction and he introduced evidence that the appellant discussed the transfer with her sister. Both parties do agree that she never saw an attorney before the transaction was completed in September of 1970.
After this transfer of property, the parties resumed marital relations for an undisclosed period. From the record, it appears that the couple had not achieved a reconciliation as they continued to fight and periodically live separately. The couple separated for the last time in December of 1971 and the husband filed for a divorce in January of 1972. Shortly thereafter, his wife filed a counterclaim for divorce. The wife was awarded a divorce on her counterclaim and she was granted custody of the three children. After a later hearing, the court ordered that the property transaction be set aside as null and void and all property was ordered reconveyed to the wife. The transcript for this hearing was lost so a new hearing was held in order that an appeal could be taken. A second evidentiary hearing was held but no decision was rendered by Judge Ray, before he retired from office. Instead, this case was ultimately decided by another judge based upon the evidentiary transcript taken before Judge Ray.
The wife argues that the trial court erred in finding that her husband had met his burden of proof created by W.Va.Code, 48-3-7, a part of our Married Women's Act. This statute places the burden on the spouse who receives property from another spouse to show that the transaction was lawful and valid. The husband admits that the only consideration given for the transaction was the promise to reconcile and forbear suing her for divorce and points to law which indicates that the giving up of a well-founded divorce action may be sufficient consideration for a property transfer between husband and wife. Moayon v. Moayon, 114 Ky. 855, 72 S.W. 33 (1903); Polson v. Stewart, 167 Mass. 211, 45 N.E. 737 (1897); Mack v. Mack, 87 Neb. 819, 128 N.W. 527 (1910).
The primary purpose of W.Va.Code, 48-3-7, is to place the burden of proof on the spouse who profits by the transfer if the other spouse attacks the bona fides of the transfer. The statute requires a showing that the "transfer was in all respects lawful and valid." Young v. Young, 139 W.Va. 290, 82 S.E.2d 54 (1954). It is analogous to the burden-shifting rule where the parties are in a confidential relationship. In such situations, the law requires that one who receives property from another with whom he has a confidential relationship has the burden of showing that the transfer was fair and made with the utmost good faith. Kanawha Valley Bank v. Friend, W.Va., 253 S.E.2d 528 (1979); Work v. Rogerson, 152 W.Va. 169, 160 S.E.2d 159 (1968); Summers v. Ort, 112 W.Va. 129, 163 S.E. 854 (1932).
Independent of this statute we have held that the relationship between husband and wife is one of confidence and trust. Gieseler v. Remke, 117 W.Va. 430, 185 S.E. 847 (1936); Williamson v. First National Bank, 111 W.Va. 720, 164 S.E. 777 (1931); Morris v. Westerman, 79 W.Va. 502, 92 S.E. 567 (1917). This recognition of the confidential relationship between married persons is a rather universal rule. Francois v. Francois, 599 F.2d 1286 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1021, 100 S.Ct. 679, 62 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980); Kulchar v. Kulchar, 1 Cal.3d 467, 462 P.2d 17, 82 Cal.Rptr. 489 (1969); Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968); Putnam v. Putnam, 274 Ala. 472, 150 So.2d 209 (1963); Bohn v. Bohn, 420 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.Civ.App.1967); 41 Am.Jur.2d Husband & Wife § 270 (1968); 41 C.J.S. Husband & Wife § 120 (1944).
Consequently, the issue in this case cannot be resolved merely on the basis of determining whether there was adequate...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Burnside v. Burnside
...where the disparity in the relationship has been abused to the benefit of the more powerful spouse. In Marshall v. Marshall, 166 W.Va. 304, 308, 273 S.E.2d 360, 363 (1980), we stated:"The general rule is that where persons occupy a fiduciary or confidential relationship the lack of independ......
-
LaRue v. LaRue
...an incident to the award of custody of minor children. Murredu v. Murredu, 160 W.Va. 610, 236 S.E.2d 452 (1977). In Marshall v. Marshall, 166 W.Va. 304, 273 S.E.2d 360 (1981), we recognized that a fiduciary relationship existed between husband and wife in regard to their property transactio......
-
In re Marriage of Tabassum and Younis
...was consideration to support their reconciliation agreement); Chew v. Chew, 38 Iowa 405 (1874). But cf. Marshall, v. Marshall, 166 W.Va. 304, 308-09, 273 S.E.2d 360, 363 (1981) (husband's giving up a meritorious claim for divorce and reconciling was not consideration for his wife's transfer......
-
Pajak v. Pajak
...for homemaker services); Garska v. McCoy, 167 W.Va. 59, 278 S.E.2d 357 (1981) (primary caretaker rule); Marshall v. Marshall, 166 W.Va. 304, 273 S.E.2d 360 (1980) (confidential relationship between husband and wife through marriage requires dealing in good faith); Sparks v. Sparks, 165 W.Va......
-
§ 11.01 Transmutation by Title
...App. Div. 2007). Cf. N. 25 infra.[23] See: Alaska: Burgess v. Burgess, 710 P.2d 417 (Alaska 1985). West Virginia: Marshall v. Marshall, 166 W.Va. 304, 273 S.E.2d 360 (1980). But see, Mathis v. Mathis, 52 Ark. App. 155, 916 S.W.2d 131 (1996). [24] See Charlton v. Charlton, 186 W.Va. 670, 413......