Charter Tp. of Pittsfield v. City of Saline

• Decision Date: 22 January 1981
• Docket Number: Docket No. 50369
• Citation: 302 N.W.2d 608,103 Mich.App. 99
• Parties: CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF PITTSFIELD, a Michigan Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SALINE, a Michigan Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. 103 Mich.App. 99, 302 N.W.2d 608
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 608

302 N.W.2d 608

CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF PITTSFIELD, a Michigan Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SALINE, a Michigan Municipal Corporation Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 50369.

103 Mich.App. 99, 302 N.W.2d 608

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Jan. 22, 1981.

Released for Publication March 10, 1981.

[103 MICHAPP 101] Douglas K. Reading, Ann Arbor, for appellant.

Allan W. Grossman, Saline, for appellee.

Before KELLY, P. J., and ALLEN and HORN, ^* JJ.

KELLY, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff, Charter Township of Pittsfield, appeals of right a March 3, 1980, decision of the Washtenaw County Circuit Court which dissolved a preliminary injunction and dismissed plaintiff's complaint requesting the Court to declare null and void a resolution of defendant's City Council annexing certain property located in the township. On March 26, 1980, we granted the plaintiff's motions for immediate consideration and to reinstate the preliminary injunction barring defendant's use of the property, pending disposition of the instant appeal.

[103 MICHAPP 102] The facts as stipulated by the parties disclose the following series of events. By a land contract dated May 12, 1978, the City of Saline purchased from Robert F. Tefft a certain parcel of land contiguous to the city with the intention of developing the parcel as an industrial park. The uninhabited parcel was located in the Charter Township of Pittsfield and was zoned for agricultural use. The parcel had no buildings located within its boundaries and was used primarily for the production of crops. After purchasing the property, the city attempted to annex the land by a resolution of its city council under M.C.L. § 117.9(8); M.S.A. § 5.2088(8). ¹ Pittsfield filed its complaint in Washtenaw County Circuit Court, seeking to void the annexation on the grounds that the city was not the owner of the land at the time of the resolution and that the parcel was not vacant. The lower court entered a preliminary injunction on September 22, 1978, enjoining the city from exercising any governmental authority over the parcel.

I

Plaintiff alleges as reversible error the lower court's finding that the subject parcel was "owned by" the annexing city. In support of this argument, plaintiff asserts that a city seeking to unilaterally annex contiguous parcels of land must, prior to passage of its annexation resolution, hold all legal and equitable interests in the property. Absent exclusive and indefeasible possessory rights, it is said, the prerequisite of "ownership" by the [103 MICHAPP 103] annexing municipality is not sustained. We disagree and hold that the disputed parcel herein was "owned by" the defendant as required by M.C.L. § 117.9(8); M.S.A. § 5.2088(8).

The land contract entered into by the City of Saline and Robert Tefft included the City's $30,000 down payment on the contested parcel against a total purchase price of $271,909.20. A vendee in a land contract is vested with the equitable title in the land, and the legal title remains in the vendor as security for the payment of the purchase price. Gilford v. Watkins, 342 Mich. 632, 70 N.W.2d 695 (1955), Barker v. Klingler, 302 Mich. 282, 4 N.W.2d 596 (1942), 25 Callaghan's Michigan Civil Jurisprudence, Vendors and Purchasers, § 13, p. 14. The effect of vesting such equitable interests in the vendee was summarized in 77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser, § 317, pp. 478-479:

"A contract for the sale of land operates as an equitable conversion; the vendee's interest under the contract becomes realty and the vendor's interest under the contract constitutes personalty. In equity the purchaser is regarded as the owner subject to liability for the unpaid price and the vendor as holding the legal title in trust for him from the time a valid agreement for the purchase of land is entered into. This view of the estate of the purchaser is based on the maxim that 'equity regards and treats as done what, in good conscience, ought to be done.' Accordingly, in equity a contract for the sale of land is treated, for most purposes, precisely as if it had been specifically performed. Thus, as a vendee makes payments on a land contract the vendor becomes trustee for him of the legal estate, and he becomes in equity the owner of the land to the extent of payments made. A contract for the sale of land, part of the purchase price being paid and possession taken, vests in the vendee an equitable title in fee. The vendor is a trustee of the legal title for the vendee to the extent of his payment." (Footnotes omitted.)

[103 MICHAPP 104] Thus, the defendant is the equitable owner of the property sought to be annexed.

In Goodwin v. Orson E. Coe Pontiac, Inc., 392 Mich. 195, 212-213, 220 N.W.2d 664 (1974), the Supreme Court reversed a decision of this Court finding the contractual phrase "owned by" to have a "clear and definite meaning" or "denoting an absolute and unqualified title". The Supreme Court held:

"We agree with the able trial judge that the phrase 'owned by' is susceptible of ambiguity. Most of us would say we 'owned' our home even if, as the saying goes, we 'owned' it with the bank.

"The simple phrase 'owned by' as the able trial judge suggested is subject to qualification as to time, type, status of title, etc. The wisdom of this belief is sustained by the actual facts. Contrary to the definition of the learned appellate judges, the ownership was actually neither 'present' nor 'absolute or unqualified'. Full payment on the land contract had not been made and the title was subject to an easement and dirt removal rights.

"In short, there might well be an ambiguity in the term 'owned by'.

"It is clear that ambiguity 'may' exist in the phrase 'owned by'."

In construing this statute, we are governed by traditional rules of construction. Thus, if the statute is unambiguous on its face, we will avoid further interpretation or construction of its terms. Detroit v. Redford Twp., 253 Mich. 453, 235 N.W. 217 (1931). However, if ambiguity exists, it is our duty to give effect to the intention of the Legislature in enacting the statute. Melia v. Employment Security Comm., 346 Mich. 544, 78 N.W.2d 273 (1956). To resolve a perceived ambiguity, a court will look to [103 MICHAPP 105] the object of the statute, the evil or mischief which it is designed to remedy, and will apply a reasonable construction which best accomplishes the statute's purpose. Bennetts v. State Employees Retirement Board, 95 Mich.App. 616, 291 N.W.2d 147 (1980), Stover v. Retirement Board of St. Clair Shores, 78 Mich.App. 409, 260 N.W.2d 112 (1977). Also, ambiguous statutes will be interpreted as a whole and construed as to give effect to each provision and to produce a harmonious and consistent result. In re Petition of State Highway Comm., 383 Mich. 709, 178 N.W.2d 923 (1970), People v. Miller, 78 Mich.App. 336, 259 N.W.2d 877 (1977). Further, specific words in a given statute will be assigned their ordinary meaning unless a different interpretation is indicated. Oshtemo Twp. v. Kalamazoo, 77 Mich.App. 33, 39, 257 N.W.2d 260 (1977), M.C.L. § 8.3a; M.S.A. § 2.212(1).

As in Goodwin, we necessarily find the statutory term "owned by" susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. However, we perceive no intent in the present statute to require a city to acquire all legal and equitable rights in a parcel of land prior to seeking its unilateral annexation. A pertinent definition has been applied to the similar term "owner" which was held to include "all parties who had a claim or interest in the property, although the same might be an undivided one or fall short of an absolute ownership". Barnes v. Detroit, 379 Mich. 169, 177, 150 N.W.2d 740 (1967). To require that cities have all legal and equitable rights to the property they seek to annex would, we believe, impede the statutory intent of expediting the annexation of vacant property. It is unlikely that many cities could make cash purchases of land to effect...