Chartrand v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles

• Decision Date: 08 January 1963
• Citation: 345 Mass. 321,187 N.E.2d 135
• Parties: Real J. CHARTRAND v. REGISTRAR OF MOTOR VEHICLES.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 135

187 N.E.2d 135

345 Mass. 321

Real J. CHARTRAND v. REGISTRAR OF MOTOR VEHICLES.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 5, 1962.

Decided Jan. 8, 1963.

George Michaels, Boston, for petitioner.

William F. Long, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, KIRK and SPIEGEL, JJ.

CUTTER, Justice.

Chartrand, a civil service employee, seeks by a petition for a writ of mandamus brought on May 31, 1961, to compel the registrar to reinstate him as examiner, and other relief. Chartrand became an examiner in the registry of motor vehicles in 1950. The registrar on January 11, 1960, sent Chartrand a letter stating certain charges, suspending him, and notifying him of a hearing on January 15, 1960, 'as to whether you shall be discharged, removed, transferred, or lowered in rank.' On January 15, following the hearing, Chartrand 'was notified [in writing] of the [registrar's] decision * * * to discharge' him upon certain of the charges. Chartrand received the notice on January 18, 1960.

Chartrand on January 18 talked with a lawyer. He saw the lawyer dial a number on the telephone and heard 'Registrar Riley's voice.' Upon objection Chartrand's testimony about the conversation was excluded. Chartrand claimed an exception and made an offer of proof (1) 'that he had heard the registrar's voice approximately 100 times and had heard the registrar's voice on the telephone more than half a dozen times,' and (2) that he 'heard him [the registrar] say that it was a mistake, that the discharge is of no effect, that he did not notify the department or the division of civil service' and that Chartrand 'should return to work.' Chartrand also offered to prove that the registrar in the conversation asked Chartrand to 'return the notice of discharge to * * * [the] counsel for the [r]egistry * * * so that the discharge would have no effect.' Later on January 18, Chartrand went to the registry and talked with his immediate supervisor. The latter had approved Chartrand's annual vacation for February, 1960. Chartrand told the supervisor 'that the discharge letter was a mistake and had been rescinded.' The supervisor told Chartrand that there was 'no assignment for him, and that * * * [Chartrand] could use the * * * time remaining before * * * [his] vacation * * * to start to effectuate a transfer,' and that the registrar and the supervisor 'would sign the transfer.'

Chartrand's records and his testimony indicated that he was ill on certain days in January. February was his vacation period. Chartrand voluntarily reported to the registry every month after the vacation period in February.

The trial judge made the following findings, among others. 'A personnel service requisition dated April 1, 1960, was signed by the registrar and by the director of the department of administration and finance, which * * * indicated that the department * * * desired to appoint * * * [Chartrand] to a position. The document, after the inquiry 'Department where employed,' stated 'Registry of Motor Vehicles,' and stated in answer to another question that * * * [Chartrand] was at present in the State service. On May 19 the registrar * * * wrote to the director of civil service attaching a copy of the notice of discharge sent to' Chartrand. Chartrand 'did not, within five days after receiving the registrar's notice of discharge, nor thereafter, request in writing a hearing before a member of the civil service commission or some disinterested person designated by the * * * commission * * * and accordingly no hearing was granted.' No proceedings for review of Chartrand's discharge were taken other than this petition for a writ of mandamus. See G.L. c. 31, § 43 (as amended through St.1959, c. 569, §§ 1, 2), and § 45 (as amended through St.1955, c. 407, § 2). The trial judge found that various State records or documents tended to indicate that Chartrand remained an employee after January 15, 1960. These findings are quoted in the margin. ¹ The trial judge ruled that Chartrand 'was legally discharged and his employment terminated on January 11, 1960,' that his 'discharge * * * was not rescinded,' that he 'was not reinstated,' 'that the facts * * * found * * * have not served to maintain * * * [Chartrand's] status as an employee of the registry * * *and that * * * he has not been such an employee since his discharge on January 15, 1960.' Chartrand duly excepted to the judge's rulings and to the denial of certain requests for rulings, summarized below so far as necessary. The case is before us upon Chartrand's bill of exceptions.

1. Chartrand first contends that State records, including records executed by officials of the registry of motor vehicles, indicate that he remained an employee of the registry during 1960. The trial judge's findings (see fn. 1, supra) with respect to these records were warranted. We assume, without deciding, that at least the report of the division of personnel and standarization listing Chartrand as on leave as of June 30, 1960, was a public record (see G.L. c. 7, § 30, as amended through St.1952, c. 144) admissible in evidence.

Although the State records tended to show that Chartrand was a State employee, at the registry, after January 11, 1960 (see Barrett v. Brooks Hosp., Inc., 338 Mass. 754, 757-759, 157 N.E.2d 638), the judge reasonably could have found that the statements in these records were inaccurate in the light of the direct evidence of the hearing on January 15, 1960, and of Chartrand's purported discharge on that day. Counsel for Chartrand had 'stated for the record that there was no question that there was a suspension, a hearing, and a letter of discharge * * * all * * * done in accordance with statute.'. Similarly, the trial judge could have relied upon the 'personal service requisition' seeking Chartrand's transfer to another State agency and upon Chartrand's testimony that he reported for work at this agency, as showing the inaccuracy of documents indicating that Chartrand was an employee at the registry after April, 1960.

The delay until May 19, 1960, in notifying the director of civil service of Chartrand's discharge may have been part of a kindly intended effort to arrange Chartrand's transfer to another State position. The evidence does not definitely disclose its purpose. Failure to send notice 'forthwith' to the director of civil service of Chartrand's suspension and discharge was, of course, in direct violation of the applicable statute (see G.L. c. 31, § 18, as amended through St.1947, c. 22). We are of opinion, however, that, under the statute, the delay did not invalidate the discharge. See Thibeault v. New Bedford, 342 Mass. 552, 558, 174 N.E.2d 444. See also Ferrante v. Higgiston, 296 Mass. 208, 209, 5 N.E.2d 49. If the Legislature had intended such a consequence, a more explicit provision to that effect would probably have been made.

The trial judge did not err in denying Chartrand's requests for rulings in effect that the State records and documents in evidence required him to find that Chartrand remained an employee at the registry.

2. Despite whatever latitude may be given to a trial judge in passing upon the authentication of telephone conversations (see McCormick, Evidence, § 194), we think that the trial judge should have admitted Chartrand's testimony about his attorney's alleged telephone talk with the registrar on January 18, 1960. The preliminary questions and offer of proof established that Chartrand knew the registrar's voice adequately, that he identified the voice, and that he overheard the conversation himself. See Bond Pharmacy, Inc. v. Cambridge, 338 Mass. 488, 490-491, 156 N.E.2d 34; McCormick, Evidence, § 193; Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) §§ 222, 413, 660, 2155. The circumstance that neither the attorney who made the call nor the registrar was called as a witness is a matter going only to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility.

The telephone conversation, if believed, tended to establish an oral withdrawal of the discharge by the registrar. It would have been possible, even if such an inference was unlikely, to infer from the conversation that there was unequivocal withdrawal of the notice. If the judge had drawn this inference, his conclusions, which appear to have been based in large part upon the discharge notice, might have been different. If the registrar had treated the whole discharge proceeding as cancelled, there was evidential basis for concluding that he thereafter had prevented Chartrand from performing services, which the latter was ready and willing to perform, by failing to give him assignments. In the circumstances, on a confused record, we cannot say that failure to admit the telephone conversation was not prejudicial.

3. Because the exception to the exclusion of the telephone conversation must be sustained, we consider various questions which have been somewhat discussed in the briefs and which may arise in further proceedings.

(a) Other evidence gives little support for the view that the telephone conversation (if the testimony about it should be believed) completely nullified the discharge notice. Significant facts are (1) that Chartrand's supervisor on January 18, 1960, 'had no assignment for him' and suggested that he 'start to effectuate a transfer'; (2) that the registrar himself approved a 'personal service requisition' (a request for transfer to another State agency, dated April 1, 1960, under G.L. c. 31, § 16A, as amended through St.1958, c. 55), of which Chartrand himself knew and which he s...