Chase Home Fin. LLC. v. Medina
| Decision Date | 29 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:11-CV-1095-L |
| Parties | CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC., Plaintiff, v. JUANA MEDINA, and all occupants of 2115 Austin Dr., Carrollton, Texas 75006, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the court are Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and Motion for Attorney's Fees, filed June 22, 2011. After carefully reviewing the motions, index, briefs, objection (response), record, and applicable law, the court grants Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and denies Plaintiffs Motion for Attorney's Fees.
This action arises out of a foreclosure sale of real property held by Juana Medina ("Defendant" or "Medina") and located at 2115 Austin Drive, Carrollton, Texas (the "Property"). Chase Home Finance, LLC ("Plaintiff' or "CHF") purchased the Property on March 1, 2011. Pl.'s Index, Ex. 2. On March 31, 2011, CHF sued Defendant for Forcible Detainer in the Justice of the Peace Court of Dallas County, Texas, Precinct 3, Place 3. Id. Defendant was served on April 14, 2011, and CHF received a Judgment granting it entitlement to possession on April 20, 2011. On April 25, 2011, Defendant appealed the judgment. The case was set for trial on May 26, 2011 in the County Court at Law, Number 1, Dallas County, Texas, when Defendant, proceeding pro se, removed the case to this court on May 25, 2011.
In her notice of removal, Defendant contends this court has jurisdiction over the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because Plaintiff's complaint alleges a cause of action under the laws of the United States; and 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in that diversity of citizenship exists between the parties and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. Defendant further contends that removal was timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) because she was not served with Plaintiffs Original Petition for Forcible Detainer ("Plaintiffs Petition") until May 11, 2011, which is within thirty days of Defendant's Notice of Removal, filed May 25, 2011. Plaintiff seeks to remand this action, contending that Defendant has failed to establish the existence of diversity jurisdiction and that Defendant's removal was untimely. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks attorney's fees incurred as a result of removal of this case.
A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over civil cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," or over civil cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and in which diversity of citizenship exists between the parties. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must have statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a claim. See Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). Absent jurisdiction conferred by statute or the Constitution, they lack the power to adjudicate claims and must dismiss an action if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. Id.
A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This provision for federal questionjurisdiction is generally invoked by plaintiffs pleading a cause of action created by federal law (such as claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or by defendants removing to federal court because the plaintiff's claim arises under federal law).
The existence of a cause of action created by federal law, however, is not always a prerequisite to establish federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or removal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). In deciding whether a state law claim invokes federal jurisdiction, "the question is, does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities." Id. at 314. When a pleading only sets forth state law claims, a federal district court has federal question jurisdiction to entertain the action only if "(1) the state law claims necessarily raise a federal issue or (2) the state law claims are completely preempted by federal law." Bernhard v. Whitney Nat'l Bank, 523 F.3d 546, 551 (5th Cir. 2008).
Whether federal question jurisdiction exists over a case removed from state to federal court, or one originally filed in such court, ordinarily "must be determined by reference to the 'well-pleaded complaint.'" Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (citation omitted). In other words, the complaint must "raise[] issues of federal law sufficient to support federal question jurisdiction." Rodriguez v. Pacificare of Tex., Inc., 980 F.2d 1014, 1017 (5th Cir. 1993).
Diversity of citizenship exists between the parties only if each plaintiff has a different citizenship from each defendant. Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N.Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1258 (5th Cir.1988). Otherwise stated, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires complete diversity of citizenship; that is, a district court cannot exercise jurisdiction if any plaintiff shares the same citizenship as any defendant. See Corfield v. Dallas Glen Hills LP, 355 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 2 L. Ed. 435 (1806)), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1073 (2004). "[T]he basis on which jurisdiction depends must be alleged affirmatively and distinctly and cannot be established argumentatively or by mere inference." Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1259 (citing Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633, 636 n.2 (5th Cir. 1983)). Failure to allege adequately the basis of diversity "mandates remand or dismissal of the action." Stafford v. Mobil Oil Corp., 945 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir. 1991).
For diversity jurisdiction purposes, a corporation is a citizen of the state in which it was incorporated and the state in which it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). The citizenship of a limited liability company "is determined by the citizenship of all of its members." Harvey v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 2008). A national bank, for diversity purposes, "is a citizen of the State in which its main office, as set forth in its articles of association, is located." Wachovia Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 307, 126 S. Ct. 941, 945 (2006). A natural person is considered a citizen of the state where that person is domiciled, that is, where the person has a fixed residence with the intent to remain there indefinitely. See Freeman v. Northwest Acceptance Corp., 754 F.2d 553, 555-56 (5th Cir. 1985). But even if complete diversity does exist, the case may not be removed from state to federal court if any defendant is a citizen of the state in which the action is brought. 28 U.S.C. §1441(b).
For diversity purposes, the amount in controversy is determined by the amount sought on the face of the plaintiff's pleadings, so long as the plaintiff's claim is made in good faith. St. PaulReinsurance Co. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998); De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 865, 116 S. Ct. 180, 133 L. Ed.2d 119 (1995). Removal is thus proper if it is "facially apparent" from the complaint that the claim or claims asserted exceed the jurisdictional amount. Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 70 F.3d 26 (5th Cir. 1995). In a removal case, when the complaint does not state a specific amount of damages, the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that "the amount in controversy exceeds the [$75,000] jurisdictional amount." St. Paul Reinsurance, 134 F.3d at 1253. The test to be used by the district court is "whether it is more likely than not that the amount of the claim will exceed [the jurisdictional amount]." Allen, 63 F.3d at 1336. Any doubts as to the propriety of the removal should be construed strictly in favor of remand. Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002). "The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction in federal court rests on the party seeking to invoke it." St. Paul Reinsurance, 134 F.3d at 1253.
The court determines that Defendant's purported showing of federal question jurisdiction is deficient for several reasons. In Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs complaint alleges a cause of action under the laws of the United States, specifically the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. The Fair Credit Reporting Act is a federal statute concerning accuracy and fairness in consumer credit reporting. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681. Defendant's reliance on this statute is misplaced. Plaintiffs Petition contains no mention of 15 U.S.C. § 1681. Pl.'s Index, Ex. 2. "The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdictionis governed by the 'well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (citations omitted). "The rule makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law." Id. Furthermore, although Plaintiff's Petition stipulates that the written demand to vacate the premises was made upon Defendant "in accordance with the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009," this statement is also insufficient to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction. Pl.'s Index, ...
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