Chase v. Roy
| Decision Date | 02 April 1973 |
| Citation | 294 N.E.2d 336,363 Mass. 402 |
| Parties | Sandra R. CHASE et al. v. Gerard E. ROY (and two companion cases 1 ). |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Joseph J. Hurley, Boston, for defendant Gerard E. Roy.
Robert W. Duquet, Braintree (Robert N. Gross, Wollaston, with him), for plaintiffs Sandra R. Chase and another.
Before TAURO, C.J., and REARDON, QUIRICO, BRAUCHER and KAPLAN, JJ.
These three actions of tort for negligence are before us on the defendant's exceptions to the denial of his motions (a) for directed verdicts, (b) for the entry of verdicts under leave reserved, and (c) for a new trial. Additional exceptions to the denial of motions for a mistrial are expressly waived by the defendant in his brief.
By agreement of all parties the cases were first tried on the issue of liability and were submitted to the jury on special questions relating to the liability of each defendant to the plaintiffs. The jury thereupon returned with affirmative answers to the questions whether the defendant Roy was liable to the plaintiffs. Thereafter, the plaintiffs intorduced their evidence relating to damages on the basis of which the jury returned the following verdicts, all of which were received under leave reserved (G.L. c. 231, § 120): $7,500 for Sandra R. Chase, $800 for Richard H. Chase, $72,000 for Crystal A. Marshall, $5,000 for Victoria M. Marshall, and $6,500 for George E. Brodie, Jr. At the close of the evidence on liability the defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict in his favor on each count, and after the verdicts for the plaintiffs were recorded he seasonably filed a motion in each case for a verdict in his favor under leave reserved. All of the motions were denied.
The defendant's exceptions to the denial of his motions for directed verdicts and of his motions for entry of verdicts under leave reserved raise the issue whether the evidence on liability, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, would support their causes of action. If, upon any reasonable view of the evidence, there is found a combination of facts from which a rational inference may be drawn in favor of the plaintiffs, there was an issue for decision by the jury and the motions were properly denied. Kelly v. Railway Exp. Agency, Inc., 315 Mass. 301, 302, 52 N.E.2d 411; Mazzaferro v. Dupuis, 321 Mass. 718, 719, 75 N.E.2d 503; Howes v. Kelman,326 Mass. 696, 697, 96 N.E.2d 394. Stewart v. Roy Bors., Inc., 358 Mass. 446, 448, 265 N.E.2d 357.
We summarize the evidence relating to the defendant's liability in its light most favorable to the plaintiffs. At about 7:30 A.M. on November 22, 1963, the plaintiff Brodie was operating a Volkswagen southerly on Route 138, also known as Broadway, in Taunton. About one-half mile before the scene of the accident in question he encountered fog. He slowed down turned on his lights and proceeded to a point where he saw another car eight to ten feet in front of him. He stopped his car, the car in front of him moved forward, and while he was still stopped his car was hit from behind by a car driven by one Mrs. Miller. He was then unable to start his car so he pushed if off to the right side of the road except for its left rear wheel and fender. The Miller car was driven completely off the road to a point about eight feet behind his car. He and Mrs. Miller exchanged identification information. He returned to the right rear fender of his car. While there, he heard the squealing of tires and saw a black Karmann Chia coming toward his car. It struck the left rear fender of his car. He in turn was struck by the right rear fender of his car and was thrown to the ground down a depression, thereby sustaining injuries.
The Karmann Ghia was driven by the plaintiff Sandra R. Chase, with the plaintiff Crystal M. Marshall as her passenger. Miss Chase was driving southerly on Route 138. She slowed down to about fifteen to twenty miles an hour, with her dimmer lights on, as she approached the fog bank. On entering the fog bank she slowed down further to about ten to fifteen miles an hour and put on her headlights. She saw the Miller car ahead and a little to her right. When she realized that it was stopped, she came to a stop three to four feet from it. The fog at that point was intense and visibility was close to zero. After she had been stopped about ten to twelve seconds, another car hit her car from behind, pushing it into the Brodie car. The next thing she remembered after the first crash was that she was bleeding and her windshield was smashed. She then felt two more bumps involving her car. After the accident her car was stopped in her lane of travel, to the rear of the Brodie car but not touching, it, and facing to her right side of the road. She and her passenger were injured in the accident. The identity of the car which struck the Chase car and pushed it forward was one of the principal factual issues at the trial.
The defendant Roy was driving DeSoto southerly on Route 138 with no lights on. He approached the fog bank at forty to forty-five miles an hour, entered it at about thirty to thrity-five miles an hour, and had slowed down to twenty-five miles an hour, had turned a little to the left because he anticipated a turn in the road, and was traveling with his foot on the brake when he collided with a car in front of him. Although he was looking straight ahead at the time of the collision, he did not see the car ahead of him until he got out of his car. As he got out of his car, it was struck in the rear by a Dodge driven by one Fournier. After that crash, the cars were in the following positions. The positions of the Brodie Volkswagen and the Chase Karmann Ghia have already been described above. The right front corner of the Roy DeSoto was to the right of the center line of the highway and the remainder of the car was to the left of the line. The right front corner was at or near the right rear corner of the Chase Karmann Ghia. There was considerable damage to the right front of the DeSoto and to the rear of the Karmann Ghia. The Fournier Dodge was entirely to the right of the center line, at an angle facing the center line, with its front against the right front fender of the DeSoto. The two cars formed an approximate right angle to each other. The DeSoto was about parallel to the Karmann Chia but the two cars faced in opposite directions and there was some space between them.
On the basis of the evidence summarized above, the jury could find that the Roy car struck the rear of the Chase car when the latter was stopped and pushed it into the Brodie car which was then stopped at the side of the road, which in turn resulted in the Brodie car being moved to its right thus striking Brodie, all of which resulted in injuries to Miss Chase, to her passenger Miss Marshall and to Brodie. The jury could also find that the conduct of Roy was negligent, based particularly on his...
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