Chastain v. Arndt
| Decision Date | 18 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. COA16-1151,COA16-1151 |
| Citation | 800 S.E.2d 68,253 N.C.App. 8 |
| Parties | Scotty CHASTAIN, Plaintiff, v. James D. ARNDT a/k/a Jimmy Arndt, in his official and individual capacity, Gaston College and Gaston College Board of Trustees, Defendants. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Roberts Law Firm, P.A., Gastonia, by Scott W. Roberts, for plaintiff-appellee.
Dean and Gibson, PLLC, Charlotte, by Jeremy S. Foster, for defendant-appellant Arndt.
James D. Arndt a/k/a Jimmy Arndt ("Defendant") appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion for summary judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Gaston County Sheriff's Deputy Scotty Chastain ("Plaintiff") was enrolled in the Basic Law Enforcement Training ("BLET") course at Gaston College, a two-year community college operating under the North Carolina Board of Community Colleges. Gaston College provides BLET to Gaston County law enforcement officers. Defendant, a certified Specialized Firearms Instructor and an active Gastonia police officer, was employed by Gaston College to instruct the firearms portion of BLET.
On 22 March 2013, Plaintiff's BLET class was training on the firing range located at Gaston College. At the conclusion of the shooting portion of the class, the students were instructed to return to the building to break down and clean their firearms. Plaintiff alleges all of the BLET instructors present, including Defendant, failed to ensure all of the students’ weapons had been unloaded and cleared of ammunition before leaving the shooting range.
Another BLET student in Plaintiff's class failed to empty her weapon prior to returning to the building and experienced difficulty in breaking down her weapon. Defendant assisted the student to break down her weapon. Plaintiff alleges Defendant pulled the trigger of the firearm while assisting the other student to break down her weapon. The firearm discharged. Plaintiff was wounded
by the discharge, but survived a bullet wound to his abdomen.
On 21 January 2016, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, in both his official and individual capacities, Gaston College, and Gaston College Board of Trustees ("the Board of Trustees") in superior court. Plaintiff alleged negligence, gross negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. He alleged Gaston College and the Board of Trustees were negligent for torts committed by Defendant under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Plaintiff has dismissed all his claims against Gaston College and the Board of Trustees, with prejudice. Both parties assert in their briefs that Plaintiff brought those dismissed claims before the Industrial Commission under the Tort Claims Act, and the action in the Industrial Commission has been stayed pending resolution of the superior court action.
Defendant filed a Rule 12 motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims. Defendant asserts the superior court lacks personal jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(1)) and subject matter jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(2)), and Plaintiff also fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), because Plaintiff's claims must be brought before the North Carolina Industrial Commission under the Tort Claims Act. Defendant also asserts Plaintiff improperly alleges claims against him in his individual capacity, and all Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity. On 26 August 2016, the trial court denied Defendant's motion. Defendant appeals.
"Typically, the denial of a motion to dismiss is not immediately appealable to this Court because it is interlocutory in nature." Reid v. Cole , 187 N.C.App. 261, 263, 652 S.E.2d 718, 719 (2007) (citation omitted). " ‘An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.’ "
Britt v. Cusick , 231 N.C.App. 528, 530-31, 753 S.E.2d 351, 353-54 (2014) (quoting Veazey v. City of Durham , 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950) ).
Defendant contends, however, that this appeal is properly before the Court because his motion to dismiss is grounded on sovereign immunity and affects a substantial right that would be lost in the absence of an immediate appeal. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(a) (2015) (); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(3) (2015) ().
"This Court has held that a denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity affects a substantial right and is immediately appealable." Green v. Kearney , 203 N.C.App. 260, 266, 690 S.E.2d 755, 761 (2010) (citation omitted), aff'd per curiam , 367 N.C. 113, 748 S.E.2d 143 (2013). Furthermore, "this Court has held that an appeal of a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity presents a question of personal jurisdiction rather than subject matter jurisdiction, and is therefore immediately appealable." Data Gen. Corp. v. Cty. of Durham , 143 N.C.App. 97, 100, 545 S.E.2d 243, 245-46 (2001) (citations omitted). Also, rulings "denying dispositive motions based on [a] public official's immunity affect a substantial right and are immediately appealable." Summey v. Barker , 142 N.C.App. 688, 689, 544 S.E.2d 262, 264 (2001) (citation omitted), aff'd in part and modified in part , 357 N.C. 492, 586 S.E.2d 247 (2003). This appeal is properly before us.
This Court reviews the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss de novo . White v. Trew , 366 N.C. 360, 363, 736 S.E.2d 166, 168 (2013). "When applying de novo review, we consider the case anew and may freely substitute our own ruling for the lower court's decision." Lanvale Props., LLC v. Cty. of Cabarrus , 366 N.C. 142, 149, 731 S.E.2d 800, 806-07 (2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The motion to dismiss under N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. In ruling on the motion the allegations of the complaint must be viewed as admitted, and on that basis the court must determine as a matter of law whether the allegations state a claim for which relief may be granted.
Robinson v. Wadford , 222 N.C.App. 694, 696, 731 S.E.2d 539, 541 (2012) (citation omitted). "The complaint must be liberally construed, and the court should not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff could not prove any set of facts to support his claim which would entitle him to relief." Sain v. Adams Auto Grp ., ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 781 S.E.2d 655, 659 (2016) (citation omitted).
"[W]hen neither party submits evidence [in support or opposition of the 12(b)(2) motion], the allegations of the complaint must disclose jurisdiction although the particulars of jurisdiction need not be alleged." Banc of Am. Secs. LLC v. Evergreen Int'l Aviation, Inc. , 169 N.C.App. 690, 693, 611 S.E.2d 179, 182 (2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "The trial judge must decide whether the complaint contains allegations that, if taken as true, set forth a sufficient basis for the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction." Id .
"When this Court reviews a decision as to personal jurisdiction, it considers only whether the findings of fact by the trial court are supported by competent evidence in the record; if so, this Court must affirm the order of the trial court." Id . at 694, 611 S.E.2d at 183 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff sued Defendant in both his individual and official capacities. Defendant argues he is entitled to sovereign immunity on any claim asserted against him in his "official capacity," and Plaintiff's claim must be asserted in the Industrial Commission under the Tort Claims Act. We agree.
"It is a fundamental rule of law that the State is immune from suit unless it expressly consents to be sued." Zimmer v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp. , 87 N.C.App. 132, 134, 360 S.E.2d 115, 117 (1987) (citation omitted). "By enactment of the Tort Claims Act, N.C.G.S. § 143-291, et seq ., the General Assembly partially waived the sovereign immunity of the State to the extent that it consented that the State could be sued for injuries proximately caused by the negligence of a State employee acting within the scope of his employment." Id .
"The State may be sued in tort only as authorized in the Tort Claims Act." Guthrie v. State Ports Auth ., 307 N.C. 522, 535, 299 S.E.2d 618, 625 (1983) (citation omitted). The Tort Claims Act provides "[t]he North Carolina Industrial Commission is ... a court for the purpose of hearing and passing upon tort claims against the State Board of Education, the Board of Transportation, and all other departments, institutions and agencies of the State." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-291(a) (2015). If the Commission finds there was actionable "negligence on the part of an officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State while acting within the scope of his ... employment," the Commission shall determine the amount of damages the claimant is to be paid. Id . The statute specifically states "[c]ommunity colleges and technical colleges shall be deemed State agencies for purposes of this Article." Id .
"Because an action in tort against the State and its departments, institutions, and agencies is within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission, a tort action against the State is not within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court." Guthrie , 307 N.C. at 539-40, 299 S.E.2d at 628. It is undisputed that the North Carolina Industrial Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against Gaston College and its Board of Trustees. See id .
The trial court's order does not refer to the official or individual capacity of Defendant. "A suit against a defendant in his individual capacity...
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