Chatman v. Alameda County Flood Control etc. Dist.
Decision Date | 23 June 1986 |
Citation | 228 Cal.Rptr. 257,183 Cal.App.3d 424 |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Parties | Thressa CHATMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALAMEDA COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL and WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents. A031382. |
Robert E. Breecker, Oakland, for plaintiff and appellant.
Richard L. Reynolds, Bennett, Samuelsen, Reynolds & Allard, P.C., Oakland, for defendants and respondents.
Thressa Chatman, plaintiff below, appeals from a judgment of dismissal after order granting motion for summary judgment in favor of defendants Alameda County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (District) and County of Alameda (County). She argues that triable issues exist as to material facts and that therefore summary judgment was improperly granted. We affirm the judgment.
Lion Creek commences in the Oakland Hills, meanders through that city, and empties into San Francisco Bay. Between 1912 and 1916, a private developer covered a portion of the creek bed in the Havenscourt District of Oakland by laying a concrete pipe eight feet in diameter in the creek bed and placing landfill atop the culvert. Appellant's home, located at 2466 -- 64th Avenue, was constructed on top of the fill. Appellant purchased the house in 1965. Lion Creek continued to drain the existing watershed.
The District was created in 1949 (Wat.Code Appen., § 55-2), with the purpose of providing "for the control of the flood and storm waters of said district" and protecting "from such flood or storm waters the ... property in said district...." (Wat.Code Appen., § 55-4.)
Following a severe storm in October 1962, the City of Oakland requested the assistance of the District in constructing flood control and storm drainage facilities. Zone 12, encompassing the Cities of Oakland and Emeryville, was created in 1963 for this purpose.
Prior to zone 12's creation, the City of Oakland surveyed most of Lion Creek. The report noted that the culvert running underneath appellant's property was "clear but the bottom is badly corroded and potholed." The District also conducted its own intensive field investigation of the major streams and tributaries in zone 12 in order to locate problem areas that required improvement. Lion Creek, designated as line J, was included in the 1965 zone 12 channel clearing program.
Several inspections of line J were conducted by the District over the years. A 1972 inspection of line J from Lucille to Bancroft Avenue noted cracking in the roof of the culvert, and "[t]he bottom of this pipe is so badly eroded that in some places holes of 1' exist." In 1976, the District received a complaint of subsidence along line J and inspected the area. In 1977, an engineer involved with the District's construction program suggested that the culvert be repaired. A 1981 inspection of the culvert disclosed cracks in and seepages from the pipe. In 1982, the District conducted inspections of several lines, including line J. The inspection was performed in order to identify problems in the underground system. The inspector's report noted that the concrete pipe was "severely eroded."
In 1982, appellant noticed a crack between the wall and ceiling of her dining room. The crack grew larger, and others appeared. The District inspected the culvert. The inspector concluded, "Settlement may be due to minor failures of culvert or to other causes unknown at this time, but it appears to have some relation to culvert which was constructed in the bed of Lion Creek...." In a letter to appellant, the District stated,
In 1983, after filing the requisite claims, appellant filed an action against the City of Oakland, the County, and the District. 1 Appellant's first cause of action alleged that respondents "owned, constructed, used, maintained, and controlled" the concrete culvert which ran beneath her house. It also alleged that the culvert was in a dangerous condition, that respondents knew of the dangerous condition, and that respondents failed to protect against that dangerous condition. Appellant asserted that as a consequence, water escaped from the culvert, undermining the land upon which her house is built, causing damage to her property. Appellant's second cause of action sought recovery premised upon inverse condemnation. Respondents moved for summary judgment based upon the lack of their ownership of or control over the culvert.
In support of their motion, respondents submitted the declaration of Roger Campbell, maintenance engineer of the District since 1966 and an employee of the District since 1956. Although the District made no showing that Campbell was qualified to testify as an expert witness, his declaration stated that District records demonstrated that the subject culvert was privately planned and built; that the District did not plan, design, create, install, approve, or accept the culvert; that the District owned no easements or rights of way in the culvert; that the District had not maintained, repaired, or reconstructed the culvert; that the District had conducted channel-clearing activities in Lion Creek; that the District undertook no responsibility or liability for the culvert; that in 1983 the District completed a line J bypass pipeline which reduced the storm water flowing in Lion Creek to a trickle; that the District undertakes full maintenance responsibility and liability for parts of the system designed, constructed, or accepted by it.
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, appellant submitted her own declaration as well as that of her attorney. Attached to the declarations were photographs of the damaged property, photographs of the culvert, and several documents regarding the District inspections of line J and the creation of zone 12. The parties filed supplemental pleadings concerning the motion. The motion was heard and granted, and judgment was entered accordingly.
Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), provides that the court shall grant a motion for summary judgment "if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law...." (Brown v. City of Fremont (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 141, 145, 142 Cal.Rptr. 46.)
(Powell v. Standard Brands Paint Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 357, 362, 212 Cal.Rptr. 395.)
Appellant objected to Campbell's declaration, alleging it contained legal conclusions and was therefore inadmissible pursuant to Evidence Code section 800. (See Bowden v. Robinson (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 705, 720, 136 Cal.Rptr. 871.) (Angelus Chevrolet v. State of California (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 995, 1001, 171 Cal.Rptr. 801, fn. omitted.)
As the District's maintenance engineer for almost 20 years, Campbell was intimately familiar with the District's operations. Tested by the above cited standard, Campbell's statements regarding the District's approval or acceptance of the culvert, its ownership of rights of way, its assumed responsibilities, and the culvert's status as private property were not inadmissible legal conclusions.
Appellant also objected to many of Campbell's statements as violating the best evidence rule (Evid.Code, § 1500), in that he was interpreting writings already in evidence. Campbell's declaration shows that his statements were not dependent upon the attached documents, but were based upon his personal knowledge of facts gleaned in his capacity as maintenance engineer. (Angelus Chevrolet v. State of California, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d at p. 1001, 171 Cal.Rptr. 801.) Therefore, Campbell's declaration constituted admissible evidence.
Government Code section 835 provides for liability for injury resulting from a dangerous condition of public property. Government Code section 830,...
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