Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local Union No. 878 v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
| Decision Date | 26 February 1980 |
| Docket Number | COCA-COLA,No. 79-1196,79-1196 |
| Parties | 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2380, 87 Lab.Cas. P 11,791 CHAUFFEURS, TEAMSTERS AND HELPERS LOCAL UNION NO. 878, Appellee, v.BOTTLING COMPANY, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Jeff Starling, Coleman, Gantt, Ramsay & Cox, Pine Bluff, Ark., for appellant.
Melva H. Kozinsky, Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.
Before LAY, * Chief Judge, and HEANEY and HENLEY, Circuit Judges.
The sole issue on appeal is whether an arbitrator exceeded his authority in reinstating a discharged employee of the Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Arkansas. The discharge was submitted to arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 878 and the Company. After arbitration, the Company refused to reinstate the employee. The Union then commenced this action in district court 1 under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, seeking to compel enforcement. On cross motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, F.R.Civ.P., the district court found the arbitrator's decision to be within the authority granted to him by the bargaining agreement and ordered compliance. We affirm.
We note initially that judicial review of labor arbitration is limited. This Court recently summarized the nature of that review as follows:
To effectuate the strong federal policy favoring arbitration as a means of resolving labor disputes, our review of the arbitrator's award is limited. United Steelwkrs. of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960); United Steelwkrs. of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf N. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); United Steelwkrs. of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). See also Resilient Floor v. Welco Mfg. Co., Inc., 542 F.2d 1029 (8th Cir. 1976); General Drivers v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 535 F.2d 1072 (8th Cir. 1976). It is not within the scope of our review to pass upon the merits of a grievance. See General Drivers & H.U., L. 554 v. Young & Hay Transp. Co., 522 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1975). The grant of power by the agreement must be broadly construed, with any doubt resolved in favor of the arbitrator's authority. Resilient Floor Etc. v. Welco Mfg. Co. Inc., supra at 1032; (Western Iowa Pork Co. v. National Bro. Pack. & Dairy Wkrs., 366 F.2d 275, 277 (8th Cir. 1966)).
Kewanee Machinery v. Local U. No. 21, Intern. Bro., 593 F.2d 314, 316-317 (8th Cir. 1979).
With this standard in mind, we turn to the facts of the case.
On the afternoon of June 9, 1976, the Company discharged Ray Lievsay, a Union member, from his employment as a merchandiser. The discharge arose out of an incident that occurred that morning as Lievsay was in the process of preparing to embark on his truck route delivering cases of the Company's product. Apparently, Lievsay broke a case of Dr. Pepper and, instead of admitting this to the Company, he represented to the clerk-checker that he had been shorted this case by the packers. After the missing case was added to his load, Lievsay left on his route.
During the day, Lievsay's supervisor, Mr. Haguewood, was informed by another manager that one of the drivers had broken a case of product in the Company's parking lot. Haguewood investigated and learned that the area manager had observed Lievsay sweeping up the remains of a case of Dr. Pepper in the parking lot near the plant's back gate. Haguewood then talked with the clerk-checker who stated that Lievsay had claimed at checkout that he was improperly charged with two cases of Sprite and that he was short a case each of Tab, Fresca and Dr. Pepper. On the basis of this information and a review of Lievsay's personnel record, which contained two warnings for prior unrelated incidents, Haguewood decided to terminate Lievsay's employment. He prepared a letter to that effect citing only the dishonesty charge.
That afternoon, after Lievsay returned to the Company's plant and turned in his receipts, he was presented with the letter. He was not afforded an opportunity to tell his side of the story prior to termination.
Within a week, Lievsay filed a grievance claiming that he was unjustly terminated and requesting reinstatement and back pay. This grievance was ultimately submitted to arbitration and the arbitrator, construing a contract term permitting disciplinary action for "just cause," ordered reinstatement but without back pay. In so doing, he found as follows:
The weight of the evidence indicates that Lievsay told (the Company's clerk-checker) that he was short the case of Liter Dr. Pepper instead of telling him that he had broken the case. * * * This leads to the conclusion that the termination of Lievsay was for just cause Provided due process was followed in handling the discharge. But the Company's action was marked by a serious defect in that it appears that Management did not give the Grievant adequate opportunity to present his side of the case before discharging him.
(Emphasis included.)
Thus, the arbitrator held that a lack of procedural fairness caused Lievsay's dismissal to fall short of the just cause standard.
The district court, in enforcing the arbitrator's award, held that the arbitrator's construction of "just cause" was not an unauthorized modification of the contract but was a legitimate resolution of contractual ambiguity. The court wrote:
It is clear from the contract language that the arbitrator will have to determine some standard by which to measure employer actions against the operative guide of "just causes." The contract language nowhere explicitly covers the question of what requirements may obtain in the Process of a discharge. In this case, the arbitrator, despite somewhat inexact language, clearly interpreted the requirement of "just cause" for discharge to include not only the substantive elements of appropriate factual circumstances but also the procedural requirement of what is commonly referred to as "industrial due process" that the employee be given some minimal, adequate opportunity to present his side of the case before the discharge. The Court recognizes that such a requirement does not have its specific foundation in constitutional law, or in any specific language of the contract, but the Court cannot say that the arbitrator's requirement is unfounded in reason or so unconnected with the wording and purpose of the agreement as to manifest an infidelity to the obligation of the arbitrator.
Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 878 v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Arkansas, slip op. at 6-7, No. LR-C-77-0107 (E.D.Ark. Feb. 2, 1979).
The Company's primary contention, advanced to both the district court and us, is that the arbitrator's award is unenforceable because it was without foundation in the collective bargaining agreement and was, therefore, in excess of the arbitrator's authority. In particular, it cites to Articles 7, 9 and 34 of its collective bargaining agreement for the proposition that the arbitrator was without authority to find as he did. These agreements, in pertinent part, are set out below:
ARTICLE 7 DISCHARGE OR DISCIPLINARY ACTION
The Employer shall not discharge, suspend or take other disciplinary action with respect to any employee without just cause. In disciplinary matters at least one warning notice of the complaint against the employee shall be given to the employee in writing either by mail or in person and a copy will be sent to the Union; PROVIDED, no warning notice need be given to an employee before discharge if the cause of the discharge is dishonesty ; physical and/or verbal abuse of a customer; refusal to carry out job assignment; drinking alcoholic beverages or being under their influence while on duty or on Employer property; the use of stimulants or narcotics or being under their influence while on duty or on Employer property; recklessness resulting in serious accident while on duty or on Employer property; the transportation of unauthorized passengers; the carrying of unauthorized firearms; the failure to report an accident to the Employer and to the police. The first written warning notice provided herein shall be withdrawn from an employee's file after one year unless during such year the employee shall receive another written warning for the same reason. A pattern of warning notices, related or unrelated, and without limitation in time, shall be just cause for discharge. All warning notices, discharges, suspensions, or other disciplinary action must be by proper written notice to the employee and to the Union.
ARTICLE 9 ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
In rendering a decision, the arbitrator shall be governed and limited by the express provisions of this Agreement, and the clear intent of the parties as set forth hereinabove. He shall not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice and he shall have no power to add to, subtract from, or modify any of the terms and provisions of this Agreement and he shall consider and render decision concerning only such issues as are directly raised by the written complaint, which shall not be in any way changed or amended after it is first presented to the Employer.
ARTICLE 34 MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
The Employer retains and shall continue to exercise any and all rights, authority, powers and privileges which it had prior to the execution of this Agreement except only as such rights, authority, powers and privileges are clearly and expressly relinquished by the specific terms and provisions of this Agreement. Included within such rights, authority, powers and privileges, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, are the rights to determine the size of the working force and the number of employees required, either temporarily or...
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