Chavarria v. Despachos Del Notre, Inc., Civ.A. L-03-96.

• Decision Date: 22 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. L-03-96.,Civ.A. L-03-96.
• Citation: 390 F.Supp.2d 591
• Parties: Diamantina CHAVARRIA and Dante Gonzalez Plaintiffs, v. DESPACHOS DEL NOTRE, INC., Leopole Garza Benavides, and Humberto Garza Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

390 F.Supp.2d 591

Diamantina CHAVARRIA and Dante Gonzalez Plaintiffs, v. DESPACHOS DEL NOTRE, INC., Leopole Garza Benavides, and Humberto Garza Defendants.

No. Civ.A. L-03-96.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Laredo Division.

June 22, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ricardo E Morales, Person Whitworth et al, Laredo, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Ricardo Daniel Palacios, Attorney at Law, Laredo, TX, for Defendants.

WRITTEN OPINION AND ORDER

ALVAREZ, District Judge.

Pending before the Court are Defendants¹ Despacho Del Notre Inc., Leopole Garza Benavides and Humberto Garza's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 35), filed on December 3, 2004; Plaintiffs² Diamantina Chavarria and Dante Gonzalez' Response³ to that motion (Docket No. 39), filed on January 10, 2005; and Defendants' Reply Brief in Support of Summary Judgment filed on January 26, 2005. Contained within Defendants' Reply Brief is an objection to any summary judgment evidence that references Lucy Ornelas' age and disability discrimination claim against the Defendants.

When originally filed, this action included Lucy Ornelas as a Plaintiff. On August 24, 2004, the Court severed Ms. Ornelas' claims from the claims of these Plaintiffs' because "their claims did not arise out of the same, transaction, occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences." (Docket No. 32). Lucy Ornelas' claim is now docketed under Case No. L: 04-CV-122. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on December 3, 2004, after Plaintiff Ornelas' claim had been severed. Thus, the only summary judgment evidence before the Court is that which was filed in this case. Any evidence filed in Case No. L-04-CV-122 will not be admitted or considered herein. Defendants' objection to the Court's consideration of any evidence referencing Lucy Ornelas' claims is hereby GRANTED.

After careful consideration of the motions, the properly filed summary judgment evidence and the applicable law, the Court finds for the reasons enumerated below, that Defendants' Motion has merit and it is GRANTED.

I. Background/Procedural History

Plaintiffs Diamantina Chavarria and Dante Gonzalez were both long-time employees of Despachos Del Notre Inc., (hereinafter "the Company"), a small Laredo based custom brokerage company that provides import and export services across the US-Mexico border.⁴ Plaintiff Chavarria was employed in the Company's traffic department for approximately twenty-five years. Plaintiff Gonzalez was an employee of the Company for approximately twenty-seven years and at the time of his termination in 2001, he was the supervisor of the Pediemento Department. Leopold Garza Benavides, one of the named defendants in this lawsuit, founded the Company in 1951. Despachos Del Notre experienced financial difficulties in 2000 and posted a net loss of over $25,000 for that year. In 2001, the Company experienced net losses of over $170,000. Based on their financial situation, the Company reduced the number of its employees. The Company closed its transportation department and terminated eight employees in May 2001. The Company further reduced its workforce in September 2001. Plaintiffs were laid off in this second wave of reduction in work force.

Plaintiffs Chavarria and Gonzalez, along with Ornelas, filed a lawsuit in July 2003 against the Defendants alleging that they were terminated because of their age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 and its state analog, the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). Plaintiffs also asserted a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). As previously noted, on August 24, 2004, the Court severed the third Plaintiff's claim into a separate action and retained Plaintiffs Chavarria and Gonzalez in this action.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment seeks Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' ADEA and TCHRA claims, as well as Plaintiffs' IIED claims.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (internal quotations omitted); See also Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation Inc., 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990); Innovative Database Systs. v. Morales, 990 F.2d 217 (5th Cir.1993); Fed. r.civ.p.56(c). However, if the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element of a claim on which she bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted for the moving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating and identifying those portions of the record that reveal the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Lynch Properties, Inc. v. Potomac Inc. Co. of Ill., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir.1998). If that threshold is met, the nonmovant must designate specific facts that show a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177; See also Hightower v. Texas Hosp. Assn., 65 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir.1995). "Conclusory allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation are not adequate substitutes for specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc). In determining whether there is a dispute as to any material fact, the Court considers all of the evidence in the record, but it does not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. See St. David's Health Care Sys. v. United States, 349 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir.2003); See also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Instead, the Court must "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party...." See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097. A dispute over a material fact is a genuine issue for trial if, based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. See Kee v. City of Rowlett, Texas, 247 F.3d 206, 210-11 (5th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 892, 122 S.Ct. 210, 151 L.Ed.2d 149 (2001). If taken as a whole, the record could not and would not lead a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party, then there is no genuine issue for trial. See Friou v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 948 F.2d 972, 974 (5th Cir.1991)

III. Analysis

The ADEA⁵ makes it unlawful for an employer "to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1998). Plaintiffs may prove that they were intentionally discriminated against using either direct or circumstantial evidence. See Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir.2000); accord Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1213 (5th Cir.1995). However, since direct evidence is rarely available in such cases, the Supreme Court has developed a burden-shifting approach, set out in the seminal McDonnell Douglas case, which enables plaintiffs to make their claim of discrimination using circumstantial evidence. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).⁶

Pursuant to this burden shifting approach, Plaintiff must create an inference of discrimination by initially establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097; See also Russell, 235 F.3d at 222 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817); See also Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Once established, this prima facie case raises a rebuttable presumption that discrimination occurred. Id. The burden of production then shifts to the defendant employer, who must articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for his employment decision. See Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 350 (5th Cir.2001). An employer meets this burden by proffering admissible evidence of a legally sufficient explanation that justifies a judgment in his favor. See Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 957. If the employer defendant provides a legitimate reason, in order to defeat summary judgment, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's reason is a pretext for discrimination. See Evans, 246 F.3d at 350.

As a threshold matter, plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination to proceed further with the rest of the burden shifting analysis. If a defendant files a motion for summary judgment and the Court finds that the plaintiff has not established his prima facie case, the Court must grant that motion. See Eugene v. Rumsfeld, 168 F.Supp.2d 655, 670 (S.D.Tex.2001).

A. Prima Facie Case

As previously noted, Plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.⁷ See St Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). The requirements for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination vary slightly depending on the type of claim brought. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817. In this instance, Defendants classify this case and analyze the facts utilizing the Reduction in Workforce (hereinafter RIF) paradigm. However, on the very first page of their Response to the Defendants' Motion, Plaintiffs describe the termination as an "alleged layoff." Indeed, Plaintiffs aver...