Chavarria v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 01 August 1974
• Citation: 115 Cal.Rptr. 549,40 Cal.App.3d 1073
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Jesus CHAVARRIA et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF FRESNO COUNTY, Respondent; BENAVIDES & BENAVIDES FARM LABOR AGENCY, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 2257.

Page 549

115 Cal.Rptr. 549

40 Cal.App.3d 1073

Jesus CHAVARRIA et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF FRESNO COUNTY, Respondent BENAVIDES & BENAVIDES FARM LABOR AGENCY, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 2257.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Aug. 1, 1974.

Bernstein & Henry, Fresno, for petitioners.

L. Nelson Hayhurst, Fresno, for real party in interest.

OPINION

FRANSON, Associate Justice.

This is a proceeding in mandamus to vacate the trial court's order staying the action on the ground of inconvenient forum, pending the filing of suit in Texas. The sole issue is whether petitioners will be deprived of their remedy of double damages under Labor Code sections 970 and 972 if the action is tried in Texas. If so, the trial court abused its discretion in staying the action; if not, the order should stand.

Petitioners filed a class suit alleging: they and the class of approximately 35 persons whom they represent are residents of the Republic of Mexico. The defendants Benavides & Benavides Farm Labor Agency and Anderson-Clayton & Co., solicited petitioners in Texas for employment as gin laborers at Anderson-Clayton's place of business at Mendota, California. Defendants represented that employment would be available at $2.08 per hour, 12 hours per day, for about 6 weeks if petitioners would come to California but, contrary to these representations, defendants intended to use petitioners as standby labor only. In reliance on the representations, petitioners came to California. Each petitioner suffered a loss of wages and the cost of busfare in the sum of $1,091.97. Each petitioner also seeks double damages under Labor Code sections 970 and 972. ¹

Raul Benavides states by affidavit that he resides in Texas and does business as a labor agent in various locations in Texas under the name of Benavides & Benavides Farm Labor Agency. He states that he intends to call as witnesses at the trial nine of his employees in Texas who will testify concerning the alleged misrepresentations. In addition, Benavides asserts that another 22 persons residing in Texas and Mexico might also testify on his behalf. The trial court found that petitioners and defendants entered into their relationship in Texas and that all witnesses to the facts, with the possible exception of those that might be called by Anderson-Clayton, would be greatly inconvenienced if the action were prosecuted in California.

Where a trial court finds in the interest of substantial justice that an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, it may stay or dismiss the action on any conditions that may be just. (Code Civ.Proc., § 410.30.) This simply means that the court has discretion to decline to exercise its jurisdiction over a transitory cause of action when it believes that the action before it may be more appropriately and fairly tried elsewhere. (Great Northern Ry. Co., v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.App.3d 105, 108--109, 90 Cal.Rptr. 461; Leet v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 25 Cal.2d 605, 609, 155 P.2d 42.)

Petitioners contend that if they are required to prosecute the action in Texas they will be deprived of their remedy of double damages as set forth in Labor Code section 972. To answer this contention we must ascertain which law the Texas forum would choose to apply in deciding the case. Our research discloses that in determining the substantive rights of the parties in tort actions, Texas courts follow the common law and apply the law of the place where the cause of action arose. (Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc. (Tex.) 430 S.W.2d 182, 185, fn. 3; Garza v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Tex.Civ.App.) 418 S.W.2d 595, 597--598.) This is considered to be the place of the injury rather than the place of the wrongful act or omission. (El Paso & N.W. Ry. Co. v. McComas 36 Tex.Civ.App. 170, 81 S.W. 760, 761; Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chemical Company, D.C., 224 F.Supp. 90, 96.) Although the alleged representations were made in Texas, petitioners' injury occurred only after they came to California and found that the promised work was unavailable. It was in California that the last event necessary to establish defendants' liability took place. (See Rest., Conf. of Laws 2d, introductory note, p. 412; 16 Am.Jur.2d, Conf. of Laws, § 72, p. 113.)

Moreover, Texas considers the measure of damages to be a substantive matter controlled by the law of the state where the injury occurred. (Corrosion Rectifying Co. v. Freeport Sulphur Co., D.C., 197 F.Supp. 291, 293; cf. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Smith (Tex.Civ.App.) 188 S.W. 702, 703; Seale v. Major Oil Company (Tex.Civ.App.) 428 S.W.2d 867, 869.) 'A question of damages pertains to the right, not to the remedy and is not governed by the law of the forum.' (12 Tex.Jur.2d, Conflicts of Laws, § 14 (1960); see also Corrosion Rectifying Co. v. Freeport Sulphur Co., Supra, 197 F.Supp. 291; Rest., Conf. of Laws, § 412.) Since petitioners' injury occurred in California, the courts of Texas should give effect to the double damages provision of Labor Code section 972.

Nor do we agree with petitioners' argument that the damages provided by section 972 constitute a 'penalty' and will not be enforced by the Texas courts.

'The question whether a statute of one state, which in some aspects may be called penal, is a penal law, in the international sense, so that it cannot be enforced in the courts of another state, depends upon the question whether its purpose is to punish an offense against the public justice of the state, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act . . . The test is not by what name the statute is called by the legislature or the courts of the state in which it is passed, but whether it appears to the tribunal which is called upon to enforce it to be, in its essential character and effect, a punishment of an offense agaisnt the public, or a grant of a civil right to a private person.' (Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673--674, 13 S.Ct. 224, 230, 36 L.Ed. 1123.)

(See also Bowles v. Angelo (Tex.Civ.App.) 188 S.W.2d 691, 694; Farmers & Merchants Trust Co. v. Madeira, 261 Cal.App.2d 503, 508--510, 68 Cal.Rptr. 184.)

In determining whether a foreign remedy was applicable in a suit in New York, Justice Cardozo explained the doctrine enunciated in the Huntington case in this manner: '(T)he question is not whether the statute is penal in some sense. The question is whether it is penal within the rules of private international law. A statute penal in that sense is one that awards a...