Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 71-1177

• Decision Date: 10 April 1972
• Docket Number: No. 71-1177,71-1300.,71-1286,71-1177
• Citation: 456 F.2d 890
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
• Parties: Elizabeth CHAVEZ et al., Appellants, v. FRESHPICT FOODS, INC., et al., Appellees. Leonel SANCHEZ et al., Appellants, v. GREAT WESTERN EMPLOYMENT AGENCY, INC., Appellees. Carlos OLGUIN et al., Appellants, v. FRESHPICT FOODS, INC., and Imperial Valley Farmers Association, Appellees.

456 F.2d 890 (1972)

Elizabeth CHAVEZ et al., Appellants, v. FRESHPICT FOODS, INC., et al., Appellees.

Leonel SANCHEZ et al., Appellants, v. GREAT WESTERN EMPLOYMENT AGENCY, INC., Appellees.

Carlos OLGUIN et al., Appellants, v. FRESHPICT FOODS, INC., and Imperial Valley Farmers Association, Appellees.

Nos. 71-1177, 71-1286, 71-1300.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

March 13, 1972.

Rehearing Denied April 10, 1972.

Mary J. Allen, Boulder, Colo. (Jonathon B. Chase and Guy T. Saperstein, Boulder, Colo., Albert G. Davis and Arthur R. Smith, Jr., Pueblo, Colo., on the brief), for appellants in No. 71-1177.

William C. McClearn, Denver, Colo. (David G. Palmer, Denver, Colo., on the brief), for Freshpict Foods, Inc. and Great Western Sugar Company, appellees in No. 71-1177.

William P. Waggener, Denver, Colo. (Dale P. Tursi, Pueblo, Colo., John B. Smith, George W. Woodard, Alamosa, Colo., William R. Bartlett, Monte Vista, Colo., on the brief), for Lee A. Consaul Co., Inc., Hayashido Farms, Canon Potatoe Co., Fallis Potatoe Co., Russell Dionisio, Charles Dionisio, Jack Dionisio, Dionisio Brothers Produce, Tony Zinno, Zinno's Produce, Jasper Giadone, and Fidel DeGrado, appellees in No. 71-1177.

Rexford L. Mitchell, Rocky Ford, Colo., for David Nava, Alejandro Martinez Harada Farms, and Truman Lusk, appellees in No. 71-1177.

Alden T. Hill, Fort Collins, Colo. (Alden V. Hill, Fort Collins, Colo., on the brief), for Dreher Pickle Co., appellee in No. 71-1177.

Alan M. Grossman, Denver, Colo., for Mizokami Bros. Produce, appellee in No. 71-1177.

Mary J. Allen, Boulder, Colo. (Guy T. Saperstein, Boulder, Colo., on the brief), for appellants in Nos. 71-1286 and 71-1300.

William C. McClearn, Denver, Colo. (David G. Palmer, Denver, Colo., on the brief), for appellees in Nos. 71-1286 and 71-1300.

Before LEWIS, Chief Judge, and HOLLOWAY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

BARRETT, Circuit Judge.

Civil actions 71-1177, 71-1286 and 71-1300 were filed separately in the District Court. They involve different parties and different factual allegations. The Court granted the appellees' motions to dismiss in each case. This court ordered that the cases be consolidated for appeal as each case involves the issue as to whether a private right of action will be implied from a federal regulatory statute.

Civil No. 71-1177

In No. 71-1177, Chavez, et al. v. Freshpict Foods, et al., sixteen domestic workers from Colorado and Texas filed suit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated in 26 Colorado counties. They allege that the appellees, 34 employers of agricultural workers, employ Mexican nationals who have illegally entered the United States. As a result, appellants allege that they have been deprived of work and that their wages have been depressed. Appellants contend that the knowing concealment and employment of illegal aliens violates sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act, i. e., 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101(a) (15) (H) (ii), 1182(a) (14), 1324, 1325, 20 C.F.R. §§ 602.10-602.10b and 29 C.F.R. §§ 60.1-60.6. They further alleged that employment contracts between the appellees and illegal aliens are against public policy and illegal. The domestic workers seek actual and exemplary damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief.

The trial court dismissed the appellants' complaint with prejudice, 322 F. Supp. 146. It held that no private action for enforcement of the immigration laws was intended, either expressly or by implication.

The appellants contend that: (1) 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101(a) (15) (H) (ii),¹ 1182(a) (14),² 1324³ and 1325⁴ give them a private right of action to redress injury which results from violation of the statutes; (2) the existence of a statutory scheme of federal regulation does not preclude the implication of private remedies; (3) a private remedy exists under 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(a) (14), 1324(a)(3) and 1325 (1964); (4) appellees have incurred liability to appellants by aiding and abetting in violation of 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(a) (14) and 1325 (1964); (5) the employment proviso of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324(a) (1964) does not indicate congressional intent to deny private remedies for the injuries appellants allege; and (6) employment contracts between appellees and illegal aliens in violation of §§ 1182(a) (14) and 1325 (1964) are illegal and their performance may be enjoined.

The appellants contend that the test is to look to the overall purpose of the legislation in determining if the implication of a private remedy would be consistent with its purpose. They argue that a private remedy is consistent with the purpose of the Immigration and Nationality Act, hereinafter called the Act, and that it should therefore be implied by this court. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964); Texas & Pacific Railway Company v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 482, 60 L.Ed. 874 (1916); Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service, 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969); Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2nd Cir. 1956).

These decisions are inapposite. In Borak the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains express evidence that Congress intended private enforcement. In Fitzgerald the Court found a compelling federal interest dictating its reason for implementing civil remedies. There is no such compelling reason here. In Gomez, supra, the Court implied a civil remedy because there was no other available remedy, either administrative, criminal or civil. The Rigsby case has been changed by more recent cases which have held that tort actions under the Federal Safety Appliances Act do not state a federal question.

The appellants contend that the Department of Justice and other governmental agencies which are required to enforce the federal immigration laws are "grossly inadequate" and that this court should enforce the Act. Accordingly, they seek to by-pass the enforcement procedures set forth in the Act. In order to accommodate them, this court must "fashion" or create a private right of action and a private remedy even though Congress has revealed no intention to do so under the immigration laws. This we decline to do. T.I.M.E., Incorporated v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 79 S.Ct. 904, 3 L.Ed.2d 952 (1959); Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Company, 355 U.S. 373, 78 S.Ct. 352, 2 L.Ed.2d 340 (1958); Oppenheim v. Sterling, 368 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 386 U. S. 1011, 87 S.Ct. 1357, 18 L.Ed.2d 441 (1967); Consolidated Freightways v. United Truck Lines, 216 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied 349 U.S. 905, 75 S.Ct. 582, 99 L.Ed. 1242 (1955).

The appellants allege that four sections out of the Act entitle them to bring a private cause of action. The segments selected by the appellants demonstrate that private enforcement was not intended. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a) (15) (H) (ii) is part of a definitional section which defines nonimmigrant aliens; it cannot be construed so as to create private rights. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a) (14) contemplates administrative action by the Secretary of Labor. Nothing therein expresses a grant of private cause of action based upon its violation. 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1324 and 1325 are penal sanctions to be applied against employers who harbor illegal aliens. Employment is not deemed to constitute harboring. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324(a)(4). No intent to confer civil liabilities for their violation is expressed.

At the present time there is a resolution before Congress directed toward the exact practices which are complained of by the appellants in this suit. House Resolution 2328. Since the remedy appellants seek here is properly under Congressional consideration, this court will not usurp the lawmaking power of Congress by judicially implying the remedy sought by the Resolution. There is no indication that Congress intended to create a private cause of action under the Act.

Civil Actions 71-1286, 71-1300

In Civil No. 71-1286, Sanchez, et al. v. Great Western Employment Agency, Inc., and Civil No. 71-1300, Olguin, et al. v. Freshpict Foods, Inc. and Imperial Valley Farmers Association, the appellants, migrant farmworkers seek damages for violation of the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 1963, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2041-2053 (Supp.1970), alleging breach of contract, and violation of Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 80-11-4, 80-11-7 (1963). In Sanchez, the appellants further allege negligent misrepresentation. In both cases appellants contend that the appellees induced them to come to Colorado by misrepresenting the amount of wages to be paid, the conditions of housing to be provided, and the conditions for return transportation all in violation of 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2044(b)⁵ and 2045(b).⁶

The District Court held that the complaints failed to state sufficient facts to constitute causes of action, in that no federally protected right is involved.

The appellants urge that: (1) the Farm Labor Registration Act, hereinafter called the Act, confers on migrant farmworkers, injured by violations of the Act, a private cause of action in federal court for damages; (2) the existence of a statutory scheme does not preclude the implication of private remedies; and (3) the existence of state court remedies for breach of contract and tort injuries does not preclude the implication of private remedies for requisite federal district court jurisdiction.

The appellants urge the same rule for implication of private rights and remedies fashioned in Chavez and cite the same cases. That argument will be incorporated here.

The appellants contend that the Act's authorization to the Secretary of Labor to investigate complaints does not preclude judicial implication of private remedies. They argue that the remedies prescribed in the Act are not intended to be exclusive.

The legislative history of the Act does not indicate that Congress intended to imply civil remedies. Congress expressly vested the Secretary of Labor with the authority to enforce the Act. Its sanctions are penal in nature. In...