Chavis v. Heckler

• Decision Date: 30 September 1983
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 81-2669.
• Citation: 577 F. Supp. 201
• Parties: Charles CHAVIS, Plaintiff, v. Margaret H. HECKLER, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

577 F. Supp. 201

Charles CHAVIS, Plaintiff, v. Margaret H. HECKLER, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 81-2669.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

September 30, 1983.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ruth Chamowitz, Charles M. Rust-Tierney, Joan H. Strand, Stephen J. DelGiudice, Community Legal Clinic, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.

Mitchell R. Berger, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

HAROLD H. GREENE, District Judge.

Chavis brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c), to seek review of the final decision of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services denying plaintiff's claim for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. Both parties to this action have stipulated that the only issues in dispute are questions of law, and they have accordingly filed cross motions of judgment. For the reasons stated below, plaintiff's motion for judgment reversing the decision of the Social Security Appeals Council is granted and defendant is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff SSI benefits for the period from August 1979 through March 1980.

Plaintiff began receiving SSI disability benefits in January 1974. In May 1979, the Social Security Administration (SSA) determined that Chavis' disability had ceased and that Chavis' last month of entitlement to benefits was July 1979. On June 13, 1979, the Secretary sent plaintiff a written notice of the agency's findings and its intention to terminate his benefits as of July 1979, and set forth plaintiff's right of appeal. Although Chavis had previously requested that all notices be sent to his post office box rather than his residence because of "chronic mishandling of mail addressed to his street address," defendant sent the notice of termination to plaintiff's home address. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Chavis never received the written notice and did not learn that his benefits had been terminated until he telephoned the SSA Office to inquire about his August 1979 benefits check. Plaintiff was not, however, told of his right to appeal at that time.

In March 1980, plaintiff reapplied for social security and SSI disability benefits. The Secretary denied both claims on the ground that Chavis did not satisfy the disability requirements of the Social Security Act. The Secretary also denied plaintiff's request for reconsideration. Chavis then sought and was granted a de novo hearing before an ALJ. The ALJ held that Chavis was not eligible for either Social Security or SSI benefits. Because the Secretary mistakenly sent the written notice of termination to the wrong address, however, the ALJ held that Chavis was denied his due process rights of timely notice guaranteed by the Constitution, the Social Security Act, and the applicable regulations. To make plaintiff "whole again," the ALJ awarded plaintiff SSI benefits for the months of August 1979 through March 1980, the time when plaintiff reapplied for benefits and had his claim reevaluated.

In June 1981, the Social Security Appeals Council notified Chavis that it was reopening the ALJ's determination pursuant to its authority under 20 C.F.R. § 416.1488-1489 to review the ALJ's authority to award SSI benefits to plaintiff for the months of August 1979 through March 1980. In its decision of August 31, 1981, the Appeals Council held that the ALJ lacked a legal basis to award compensatory damages against the Social Security Administration and that, in fact, Chavis' due process rights had not been violated. Accordingly, the Appeals Council reversed the ALJ's decision. Chavis does not challenge the SSA's determination that he is not disabled, rather he appeals only the decision of the Appeals Council reversing the ALJ's award of SSI benefits for the months of August 1979 through March 1980.

Recipients of welfare benefits have a protected property interest in the continued receipt of those benefits which cannot be terminated without the protections of due process. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). The extent to which due process applies is influenced by the extent to which the recipient may be "condemned to suffer grievous loss." Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S. at 263, 90 S.Ct. at 1018.¹ SSI benefits are considered so vital that they can be terminated only after affording the recipient notice of the proposed termination and an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. Cardinale v. Mathews, 399 F.Supp. 1163, 1171-75 (D.D.C.1975); Johnson v. Mathews, 539 F.2d 1111, 1120-22 (8th Cir. 1976). The SSA regulations incorporate these procedural due process requirements by requiring the Secretary to give advance written notice of his intent to terminate benefits and to inform the recipient of his right to appeal the decision before the benefits are terminated. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1336.

The Secretary does not contend that the constitutional and statutory requirements of notice and a pre-termination hearing are inapplicable in the case of SSI benefits. Rather, what is at issue in this case is (1) whether plaintiff received notice as required by due process, and (2) assuming plaintiff did not receive notice, what, if any benefits, is plaintiff entitled to receive.

First. The traditional standard for determining whether notice of a pending legal action conforms with the requirements of due process is whether the notice is "reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). What is reasonable depends on the circumstances of the case. Here, plaintiff specifically told the SSA to send all written communications to his post office box rather than to his home address. Defendant recorded and entered plaintiff's change of address into its computers, but due to an admitted clerical error, sent the advance written notice of termination to plaintiff's street address. The ALJ found that Chavis did not receive actual notice of his termination and that defendant had not used the best possible procedure under the circumstances. See, Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 1074 at 301. Accordingly, the ALJ found that the SSA had deprived plaintiff of his constitutional, statutory, and regulatory due process rights to reasonable notice of termination of benefits and appeal rights.

The Secretary maintains that by sending the termination notice to plaintiff's home address, the SSA did all that due process requires. In support of this argument, defendant advances two theories: First, defendant relies on the statutory presumption that a letter properly addressed, stamped, and mailed is evidence that it has been delivered to the addressee. This presumption, however, is rebuttable and disappears as a rule of law if the opponent offers some evidence to the contrary. Legille v. Dann, 544 F.2d 1, 5-6 (D.C.Cir. 1976). Based on evidence that plaintiff made a change of address request several months before the SSA sent the termination letter, defendant's admitted clerical error, and plaintiff's testimony that he never received the notice, the ALJ found that Chavis did not receive the advance written notice of the termination of his benefits and his right to appeal.

The Appeals Council, which unlike the ALJ did not have an opportunity to observe plaintiff's demeanor and thus could not evaluate his credibility, reversed the ALJ's finding of improper notice on the grounds...