Cheatham v. State
| Decision Date | 15 May 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-29,85-29 |
| Citation | 719 P.2d 612 |
| Parties | Lentz I. CHEATHAM, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Leonard D. Munker and Martin J. McClain, Wyoming Public Defender Program, for appellant.
A.G. McClintock, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sylvia Lee Hackl, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before THOMAS, C.J., * and ROSE, ** ROONEY, *** BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.
The novel question which must be resolved in this case is whether a charging document in the county court in a felony prosecution which is titled an information and which then is filed in the district court only as a part of the record transmitted to the district court by the county court fails to invoke the jurisdiction of either the county court or the district court. Other issues are presented by Lentz Cheatham relating to the admission of a statement which he asserts was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to counsel; impermissible comment on his exercise of his constitutional right of silence; and insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the jury's verdict of guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Only the claim relating to the improper admission of his statement was presented to the district court by Cheatham. The other claims of error are raised for the first time in this appeal. The district court did not err in admitting Cheatham's statement into evidence, and we find no error with respect to the other issues presented by Cheatham. We affirm the judgment and sentence.
Lentz Cheatham's wife died as a result of a subdural hematoma of the right side of her brain according to a pathologist who testified at trial. The hematoma caused expulsion of vomit and also depression of the gag reflex. This combination of physiological problems resulted in her death by aspiration. Cheatham then was charged with and convicted of involuntary manslaughter for causing his wife's death in violation of § 6-2-105(a)(ii)(B), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Rev.). 1 The district court sentenced Cheatham to a term of 10 to 15 years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Cheatham appeals from that judgment and sentence.
In his brief Cheatham sets forth the following issues to be resolved:
In its brief the State of Wyoming articulates the issues in this way:
Cheatham in a reply brief supplements the first issue in his initial brief by stating the following questions:
On the morning of April 14, 1984, the deceased wife's young son had occasion to see her when she was nude. He observed that she only had one bruise below her right knee. Beginning around noon on April 14, 1984 and continuing throughout the afternoon and evening of that day, Cheatham and his wife were seen drinking in several bars in Evanston, Wyoming. They also attended a banquet of a fraternal organization and returned to a local club to dance at approximately 9:00 P.M. The testimony of witnesses at the trial indicates that the wife became intoxicated. The witnesses described her arguments with Cheatham and also her falls while on the dance floor. There was testimony that she had struck her head, once on the table and another time on the dance floor. In addition to testimony about the arguments, witnesses testified to altercations, with some describing Cheatham slapping his wife and others describing her striking him. At approximately midnight of April 14, 1984, Cheatham took his wife home.
What occurred after their arrival home primarily is depicted by Cheatham's statements to investigating officers and by the testimony of the pathologist. Cheatham stated that his wife fell down some stairs at the house, and that later she became belligerent, screaming at Cheatham and they then engaged in a struggle. He said that at one point he pushed his wife causing her to fall against a door and then to the floor. He left her lying there and went to fill his truck with gas. When he returned she was still on the floor, and he went to bed without disturbing her. During the night he awoke and carried his wife to bed because she still was lying on the floor. When he awoke on the morning of April 15, 1984, she was dead.
Cheatham's first reaction was to inform his wife's mother of her death, and the mother suggested an autopsy. Cheatham did not feel that one was necessary. After the embalming process had been commenced, a deputy county coroner noticed a large number of bruises on the wife's body. One count was approximately 118. The pathologist then was requested to perform an autopsy. The autopsy disclosed a subdural hematoma on the right side of the wife's brain. In the opinion of the pathologist this hematoma was caused by a blow to the head by an irregular object. The hematoma caused expulsion of vomit which was accompanied by a depression of the gag reflex, and this combination of effects resulted in the wife's death by aspiration.
On April 15 the police first questioned Cheatham about his wife's death. Later that day Cheatham was arrested, and after he had been taken into custody and advised of his constitutional rights in accordance with the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) the police again questioned him. A further interview was conducted the following morning. Each interview was electronically recorded. At the beginning of the last interview Cheatham said that he would like to have a lawyer but that his friend had been unable to contact one for him at that time. After some dialogue about his desire to see a lawyer, Cheatham continued to answer questions propounded by the officers, and he made both inculpatory and exculpatory statements concerning the circumstances surrounding his wife's death.
At his trial Cheatham presented testimony by another pathologist who discounted the opinion of the examining pathologist. Through this witness Cheatham presented a theory that a combination of valium, which was found to be present in his wife's body, and the intoxicating liquor which she had consumed could cause the suppression of the gag reflex resulting in aspiration of vomit. The pathologist called by Cheatham also testified that it would be impossible to conclude which blow to the head may have caused the subdural hematoma.
An account of the evidence would not be complete without noting certain statements attributed to Cheatham. Unfortunately they can only be appropriately reflected in the language which he used. One witness testified at trial that Cheatham told him, "I killed the bitch." Another witness stated that Cheatham claimed that he "kicked the piss out of her."
With this general background we shall proceed to treat with the issues presented by Cheatham in his appeal. Additional facts relating to the specific issues will be set forth to the extent necessary in resolving the questions posed. We will deal first with the question of the sufficiency of the charging document to invoke the jurisdiction of both the county court and the district court.
On April 16, 1984 an information was filed in county court which alleged that Cheatham had committed second degree murder in violation of § 6-2-104, W.S.1977 (June 1983 Rev.). That information was amended twice. The first amendment adjusted the date of the crime from April 14, 1984 to April 15, 1984. The second amendment reduced the charge to involuntary manslaughter as proscribed by § 6-2-105(a)(ii)(B), W.S.1977 (June 1983 Rev.). A preliminary hearing was conducted in the county court, and after the county court judge found sufficient probable cause Cheatham was bound over for trial in the district court. The record which was transmitted from the county court to the district court included the information and the two amendments to it, and these documents were filed in the district court. No new information was filed in the district court.
In presenting his first issue Cheatham argues that in order to charge a felony in the county court a complaint, not an information, should be filed. This is the reason for his contention that the county court did not acquire jurisdiction. Cheatham then argues that, when an accused has been bound over to the district court, an information must be filed in the district court, and that since no information was filed other than the one incorporated in the documents transmitted from the county court the district court had no jurisdiction over this case. Cheatham does not cite any authorities other than the statutes and the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In his argument he points to § 7-6-102, W.S.1977, Cum.Supp.1985, which provides in pertinent part:
"Information may be filed during term time or in vacation in any court...
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