Cheney v. State
Decision Date | 29 June 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 1065-84,1065-84 |
Citation | 755 S.W.2d 123 |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Parties | Sandra CHENEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Mark C. Hall, Lubbock, for appellant.
G. Dwayne Pruitt, Criminal Atty., Brownfield, Robert Huttash, State's Atty. and Alfred Walker, First Asst., State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
OPINION ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Appellant was convicted of the offense of felony theft under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 31.03 and a jury assessed punishment at five years' confinement. The Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed the conviction holding that, although the evidence would support the theft conviction, there was also sufficient evidence to support a conviction under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 32.32, the "false statement to obtain property or credit" statute. Assuming without analysis that Section 31.03, supra, is a "general" statute and that Section 32.32, supra, is a "special" statute subsumed by Section 31.03, the appeals court in an unpublished opinion observed that Cheney v. State, No. 07-83-0029-CR (Tex.App. Amarillo, September 19, 1984), citing Jones v. State, 552 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
We granted the State's petition for discretionary review to determine whether the appeals court erred in holding that appellant should have been prosecuted under Section 32.32, supra. Believing that the appeals court holding was erroneous, we reverse and remand for further review.
V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 31.03 (Vernon Supp.1984), in effect at the time of appellant's trial, read in pertinent part:
(1) it is without the owner's effective consent; ...
As applied to this case, the elements of the offense would be:
(4) appropriates the property.
The record shows that appellant purchased various items under an open 90-day account with a furniture store. During this time she obtained a bank loan secured by her execution of a promissory note and security agreement covering the furniture. However, appellant did not use the loan proceeds to pay for the furniture, she failed to repay the loan, her checking account with the bank was closed for insufficient funds, and the bank was unable to enforce its security interest.
In this setting, the appeals court held that another statute more specifically proscribed appellant's conduct. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 32.32, captioned "False Statement to Obtain Property or Credit," provides in part:
As applied to the facts of this case, the elements of the offense would be:
(5) for herself.
After setting out the elements of the two statutes implicated in this cause, the appeals court then said:
The court below assumed that Section 32.32, supra, is a "special" statute "subsumed" within the general subject matter of Section 31.03, supra. The court also assumed that Section 32.32, supra, "in tandem with the State's theory of prosecution," was more specific than the "general" theft statute as to victim, property and means of theft. Although the three-factor analysis found in Jones is helpful in construing two statutes generally proscribing the theft or unlawful acquisition of another's property, such analysis was prematurely invoked in this case, apparently because the appeals court assumed the two statutes are in pari materia and, therefore, subject to a Jones analysis. Before applying the rule and with it the Jones' three factor test, it is incumbent upon a reviewing court when faced with facts like these to first determine whether both statutes are indeed in pari materia.
The doctrine of pari materia is, simply put, a principle of statutory interpretation. It is a rule courts may use in determining the intent of the Legislature in enacting a particular statute or statutes. In 53 Tex.Jur.2d, Statutes, Section 186, page 280, the doctrine is defined and explained in the following manner:
V.T.C.A., Government Code, Section 311.026 (Code Construction Act), 1 made applicable here under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 105, provides for construing the relationship between general and special statutory provisions, viz:
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