Cherokee Valley Farms, Inc. v. Summerville Elementary Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 15 February 1973
• Citation: 30 Cal.App.3d 579,106 Cal.Rptr. 467
• Parties: CHEROKEE VALLEY FARMS, INC., Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Appellant, v. SUMMERVILLE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant, Cross-Complaint and Respondent. Civ. 1541.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 467

106 Cal.Rptr. 467

30 Cal.App.3d 579

CHEROKEE VALLEY FARMS, INC., Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Appellant, v. SUMMERVILLE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant, Cross-Complaint and Respondent.

Civ. 1541.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Feb. 15, 1973.

Rushing, Clark & Haight, Ernest Geddes, Sonora, Albert G. Clark, Jr., and Michael L. Lyions, Modesto, for plaintiff, cross-defendant and appellant.

Stephen Dietrich, Jr., County Counsel, Sonora, for defendant, cross-complainant and respondent.

GEO. A. BROWN, Presiding Justice.

This is a controversy wherein each of the two parties seeks to quiet title to a small parcel of real property occupied by the respondent, Summerville Elementary School District (referred to as the 'School District'). The parcel is surrounded by property owned by Cherokee Valley Farms, Inc., appellant herein (referred to as 'Cherokee'). The trial court held that the School District is the owner in fee simple absolute. Cherokee has appealed.

In 1891 Summerville Elementary School District's predecessor, Arastraville School District, built a schoolhouse on the subject property and rebuilt it in 1893. In 1965 Arastraville School District lapsed and its territory was annexed to the Summerville Elementary School District, respondent herein. Based upon substantial evidence, the court found that a public school was maintained and operated continuously on the property through the 1964--1965 school year and that since that time it has been used for school purposes and has not been abandoned. The property had been occupied and used as a school or for school purposes for a period of approximately 79 years as of the date of the trial, June 1, 1970, and as of the date of the filing of the complaint, June 3, 1969, for a period of approximately 78 years.

In 1891 one Robert Marshall owned the property which is the subject of this dispute and also the surrounding property now owned by Cherokee. There is no deed, contract or other writing between Marshall and the School District's predecessor describing the arrangements under which it was permitted to occupy the property. Neither is there any oral evidence bearing upon the subject.

In 1912, approximately 21 years after the first occupation of the property by the School District's predecessor, Robert Marshall conveyed a large parcel of real property, including the property occupied by the School District, to Cherokee's predecessor in interest, Tuolumne Fruit Land Company. That deed recites in part: 'This conveyance is executed subject to the right of the Arastraville School District to maintain upon said land the public school house now erected thereon . . ..' Similar language was contained in subsequent deeds in the chain of title, including the conveyance to Cherokee in 1955.

In 1956 Cherokee filed an official map with the county recorder, which map delineated the land and designated it as 'Arastraville School.' Lots were sold with reference to the map.

The trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law which in pertinent part state:

'1. In 1891 the Arastraville School District acquired a fee simple determinable interest in the subject property.

'2. That prior to the lapsation of the Arastraville School District in 1965, the condition upon which the Arastraville School District had acquired a fee interest in the property, that of maintaining 'upon said land the public school house now erected thereon', had been satisfied by the continuous use of the building and property for school purposes for over 70 years, and, having been satisfied, was of no further force and effect.

'. . .eon

'6. The Summerville Elementary School District is presently the owner of the subject property in fee simple absolute.'

Since there is no deed in evidence from Robert Marshall to the School District's predecessor in 1891, nor any oral evidence germane to the transfer, we must examine the factual and legal basis, if any, for the trial court's conclusion that a fee interest was acquired by the School District in 1891.

It is well to keep in mind the inherent difficulties confronting the courts when resolving questions of title to real property which depend upon ancient transactions, that are not evidenced by written documents, and no one is alive who has personal knowledge of the dealings between the original parties. As this court said in devereaux v. Frazier Mountain Park etc. Co. (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 323, at pages 335--336, 56 Cal.Rptr. 345, at page 352:

'Cases of this character, in which all persons having knowledge of the transaction surrounding a conveyance are dead and all of the grantor's records are lost or destroyed, present grave difficulties to the trial court and equally vexing problems to a reviewing court because the determination rests so largely upon secondary evidence and inference. However, the motivating principle in both trial and appellate courts is expressed by the Supreme Court in Mercantile Trust Co. v. All Persons, 183 Cal. 369, at page 381, 191 P. 691, as follows: 'Upon this whole subject we would say that in dealing with old instruments and muniments of title, the parties and witnesses to which are dead, and as to whose execution or the circumstances under which they were executed, or as to whose exact contents in case they or the original record of them is lost, certain and positive evidence is not possible, the same exactitude and certainty of proof cannot be required as is properly required in a case of more recent events. The courts must go upon probabilities and presumptions. To do otherwise would be to destroy valid titles, not to sustain them.''

The theory of a common-law dedication is one of the theories upon which the School District relied in the trial court. That court stated in the quoted findings and conclusions that the title was 'acquired.' It did not say that the School District was granted the title. The word 'acquire' simply means 'to get or come to have as one's own.' (Webster's New World Dict. (2d College ed. 1972).) 'Acquired' could include gaining title by dedication. The judgment is readily supportable within the ambiance of that concept.

A common-law dedication does not require a writing, nor must the formalities of any statute, such as the statute of frauds, be satisfied. All that is necessary is sufficient evidence that the property owner either expressly or impliedly manifested an unequivocal intention to offer the property for a public purpose and that there was an acceptance of the offer by the public. (Cal. Water & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Com. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 478, 494, 334 P.2d 887; Union Transp. Co. v. Sacramento County (1954) 42 Cal.2d 235, 267 P.2d 10.) In each instance the question of whether there has been a dedication is a question of fact (Henry Cowell Lime & Cement Co. v. State (1941) 18 Cal.2d 169, 173, 114 P.2d 331; Flavio v. McKenzie (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 549, 552, 32 Cal.Rptr. 535), and that intent may be demonstrated in any conceivable way that a person's intention can be shown (Tischauser v. City of Newport Beach (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 138, 144, 37 Cal.Rptr. 141). Oftentimes a common-law dedication has elements of an estoppel against the property owner in favor of the public arising out of the owner's failure to object to acts or events which indicate his implied intent to dedicate his property. (Sussman v. San Luis Obispo County (1899) 126 Cal. 536, 59 P. 24; Schmitt v. San Francisco (1893) 100 Cal. 302, 34 P. 961.) The intention to dedicate need not be evidenced by express words or documents; it can be manifested by the acts or conduct of the property owner, including his knowing acquiescence in the long and open public use of the property, from which conduct or acquiescence the court can presume that he intended to offer his property for dedication. (Union Transp. Co. Sacramento County, Supra, 42 Cal.2d 235, 240--241, 267 P.2d 10; Diamond Match Co. v. Savercool (1933) 218 Cal. 665, 24 P.2d 783; Walter G. Brix, Inc. v. Brown (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 177, 302 P.2d 74; Laguna Beach v. Consolidated Mtg. Co. (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 38, 42--44, 155 P.2d 844.)

An implied in fact dedication is to be distinguished from a dedication implied in law. In the latter case, title is acquired by prescription, all of the elements necessary to the acquisition of title by adverse possession having been satisfied. (Gion v City of Santa Cruz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 29, 84 Cal.Rptr. 162, 465 P.2d 50; Arnold v. City of San Diego (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 353, 261 P.2d 33.) In this case we are concerned with a dedication implied in fact.

In the case at bench there has been a continuous, open and uninterrupted occupancy and use of the premises, acquiesced in by the grantor and his successors, for some 78 years--an extraordinary period. In addition, the School District invested a substantial amount of public funds to build in 1891 and rebuild in 1893 a permanent structure upon the premises, which so far as appears, remains on the property.

The recordation of an official map in 1956 by Cherokee and the sale of lots with reference to it is some evidence of recognition by Cherokee of the School District's claim of an interest in the property.

Buttressed by the foregoing authorities, the conclusion is inescapable that the facts furnish substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the School District's predecessor acquired an interest in 1891 by implied dedication. That finding is binding on this court on appeal. (Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 101 Cal.Rptr. 568, 496 P.2d 480.)

The conclusion of the trial court that the interest acquired was a fee interest is supported by rational inference and by legal principle. It would scarcely be reasonable to assume the School District would have invested substantial sums of public funds to build and rebuild the structure thereon without the assurance of an interest more durable that an easement or a license. It is...