Cherry v. Wiesner, COA15–155.
| Decision Date | 16 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. COA15–155.,COA15–155. |
| Citation | 781 S.E.2d 871,245 N.C.App. 339 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Louis CHERRY and Marsha Gordon, Petitioners v. Gail WIESNER, City of Raleigh, and Raleigh Board of Adjustment, Respondents. City of Raleigh, a municipal corporation, Petitioner v. Raleigh Board of Adjustment, Louis W. Cherry, III, Marsha G. Gordon, and Gail P. Wiesner, Respondents. |
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, Raleigh, by Joseph S. Dowdy and Phillip A. Harris, Jr., for petitioner-appellees Louis Cherry and Marsha Gordon.
City of Raleigh Attorney, Thomas A. McCormick, by Deputy City Attorney, Dorothy K. Leapley and Associate City Attorney, Nicolette Fulton, for petitioner-appellee City of Raleigh.
Petesch Law, Raleigh, by Andrew J. Petesch, for respondent-appellant Gail Wiesner.
Gail Wiesner ("respondent") lives across the street from the single-family "modernist" design home of Louis Cherry and Marsha Gordon ("petitioners") in Raleigh's Oakwood neighborhood. Oakwood is a designated historic district, where the design of new construction must be approved by the Raleigh Historic Development Commission ("the Commission"). As required by the rules of the historic district, before building on their vacant lot, petitioners applied for a certificate of appropriateness to build their new home ("the Cherry–Gordon house"). When the Commission held hearings to consider the application, respondent and others objected to petitioners' proposed modernist design because they considered it incongruous with the other houses in the historic district. After a series of hearings, the Commission approved the design, but then the Raleigh Board of Adjustment ("the Board") rejected the design. Petitioners then appealed the Board's ruling to the Superior Court, which reviews decisions of the Board and the Commission to make sure that their rulings comply with the law. The Superior Court reversed the Board's decision, which meant that the Commission's decision to approve the design was affirmed.1 This opinion addresses respondent's appeal from the Superior Court's ruling.
The Superior Court did not rule on the question of the Cherry–Gordon house's modernist design and the claim of "incongruity" with the historic district but decided that respondent did not have legal standing to challenge the approval of the design. A person who brings a legal action challenging a land use decision like this one must have "standing" to bring the action. The applicable statute gives "standing" only to an "aggrieved party," as the law defines that term. Although respondent lives across the street from the Cherry–Gordon house, the location of her home does not automatically give her standing to challenge the issuance of the certificate. A nearby landowner has standing to challenge a land use decision like this one only if the new construction will cause him to suffer some type of "special damages" distinct from other landowners in the area. Usually, special damages include economic damages such as a decrease in property value and other direct adverse effects on the property of the landowner challenging the proposed land use, such as smoke, light, noise, or vandalism created by the new property use, which are different from the effects on the rest of the neighborhood. Respondent's claims of damages from the Cherry–Gordon house are all essentially aesthetic, since she believes the house does not fit in with the historic neighborhood and is unpleasant for her to see from her home across the street. Even if she is correct in her assessment of the Cherry–Gordon house's design, respondent has failed to show that she is an "aggrieved party" as the law defines that term, so the Superior Court's order reversing the Board's decision was correct and we affirm it.
On or about 23 August 2013, petitioners filed an Application for Certificate of Appropriateness with the Commission seeking a determination that their plan for the construction of the Cherry–Gordon house on a vacant lot in the Oakwood Historic District of Raleigh was not incongruous with the guidelines of the City of Raleigh. On 9 September 2013, the Certificate of Appropriateness Committee of the Commission ("the Committee") held a hearing on petitioners' application and voted to approve in part their application ("design approval") subject to certain conditions and to defer consideration of the Cherry–Gordon house's windows until a subsequent hearing. On 7 October 2013, the Committee held a second hearing and voted to approve petitioners' application regarding the proposed windows ("window approval"). On 17 September 2013, respondent gave notice of an intention to appeal the Committee's design approval decision to the Board, and on 24 October 2013, respondent gave notice of an intention to appeal the Committee's window approval decision to the Board. On 24 October 2013, petitioners purchased a building permit from the City of Raleigh and began construction of the Cherry–Gordon house pursuant to the certificate of appropriateness.
On or about 7 November 2013, respondent, through counsel, submitted her Application for Review of the Committee's design approval decision with the Board. The Application for Review form includes the following question: "EXPLAIN TO THE BOARD HOW YOU ARE AN AGGRIEVED PARTY[.] " (Emphasis in original.) Respondent answered: "As a resident adjacent to the subject property and a property owner in the Oakwood Historic District, I opposed and sought the denial of the Application for Certificate of Appropriateness, No. 135–13–CA, for 516 Euclid Street." Respondent also stated:
The structure as proposed is incongruous to the Oakwood Historic District. It will harm the character of the neighborhood and contribute to erosion of the neighborhood's value as an asset to its residents, to the surrounding communities, to the businesses it supports, to in-town and out-of-town visitors, and to the City as a whole.
Respondent also alleged that the Committee made various procedural errors.
On or about 6 December 2013, respondent, again through counsel, submitted a substantively identical Application for Review of the Committee's window approval decision to the Board. Under the "EXPLAIN TO THE BOARD HOW YOU ARE AN AGGRIEVED PARTY " question, respondent answered:
As a resident adjacent to the subject property and a property owner in the Oakwood Historic District, I opposed and sought the denial of the Application for Certificate of Appropriateness, No. 135–13–CA, for 516 Euclid Street at both the Sept. 9, 2013 and Oct. 7, 2013 public hearings before the Certificate of Appropriateness Committee.
Respondent also stated:
The windows proposed for the dwelling structure are incongruous to the Oakwood Historic District. It will harm the character of the neighborhood and contribute to erosion of the neighborhood's value as an asset to its residents, to the surrounding communities, to the businesses it supports, to in-town and out-of-town visitors, and to the City as a whole.
Respondent again alleged that the Committee made various procedural errors.
The Commission answered respondent's pleadings and moved to dismiss her appeal to the Board for lack of standing.2 On 13 January 2014, the Board held a hearing on respondent's appeal and the Commission's motion to dismiss for lack of standing but postponed rendering its decision until a 10 February 2014 hearing. The Board invited the parties to submit written responses by 31 January 2014. On or about 31 January 2014, respondent filed a brief in which she argued:
[T]he Record is sufficient to demonstrate that she will suffer special damages distinct from the rest of the community if an incongruous structure is constructed directly across the street from her home. However, should the Board need additional evidence as to special damages, [respondent] requests that she be permitted to present such evidence to the Board.
At a 10 February 2014 hearing, the Board announced its ruling to reverse the Commission's decision but did not directly address the issue of standing.
On or about 20 February 2014, petitioners moved to alter or amend the judgment. On or about 10 March 2014, the City of Raleigh filed procedural objections to the Board's proposed findings and conclusions, including an argument that the Board had not addressed the issue of standing. At a 10 March 2014 hearing, the Board announced its ruling denying petitioners' motion and voted to approve the minutes of the 10 February 2014 hearing. The Board's counsel noted:
With regard to this standing issue, I don't know that the Board is equipped to determine whether or not [respondent] sustained special damages, but I do—do believe that, by continuing with the hearing, that that was tantamount to making a determination that standing did exist. And, certainly, that is something that's preserved on the record for the City [of Raleigh] to appeal.
On 28 March 2014, petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari and a motion to stay in the Superior Court in Wake County, arguing that respondent lacked standing, among other arguments. On 31 March 2014, the Clerk of Superior Court for Wake County granted petitioners' petition and issued a writ of certiorari. On 31 March 2014, petitioners moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. On 2 April 2014, the trial court granted petitioners' motion for a temporary restraining order. The trial court ordered that respondent "shall cease, desist and refrain from enforcing" the Board's decision and "any subsequent threat of a Stop Work Order" and that petitioners "shall cease work" on the Cherry–Gordon house, provided that they "are allowed to preserve the property from ruin by wind, water, mildew, vandalism, as well as potential harm to trespassers[.]" On 2 April 2014, the City of Raleigh also filed a petition for writ of certiorari also arguing that respondent lacked standing, among other arguments.
On 2 April 2014,...
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