Chester v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 16 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2:14-cv-640-FtM-MRM |
| Parties | SARA CHESTER, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This cause is before the Court on Plaintiff Sara Chester's Complaint (Doc. 1) filed on October 30, 2014. Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") denying her claim for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income. The Commissioner filed the Transcript of the proceedings (hereinafter referred to as "Tr." followed by the appropriate page number), and the parties filed legal memoranda in support of their positions. For the reasons set out herein, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The law defines disability as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905. The impairment must be severe, making the claimant unable to do her previous work, or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2), 1382c(a)(3); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505 - 404.1511, 416.905 - 416.911. Plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion through step four, while the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
On February 14, 2011, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits and for supplemental security income asserting an onset date of March 17, 2007. (Tr. at 92-93, 236-250). Plaintiff's applications were denied initially on April 19, 2011, and on reconsideration on May 23, 2011. (Tr. at 92-95). A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Dwight Evans on October 18, 2012, and a Supplemental Hearing was held on January 23, 2013. (Tr. at 29-83). The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on April 12, 2013. (Tr. at 11-22). The ALJ found Plaintiff not to be under a disability from March 17, 2007, through the date of the decision. (Tr. at 21).
On September 5, 2014, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (Tr. at 1-5). Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) in the United States District Court on October 30, 2014. This case is ripe for review. The parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings. (See Doc. 13).
An ALJ must follow a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine if a claimant has proven that she is disabled. Packer v. Comm'r of Social Security, 542 F. App'x 890, 891 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999)).1 An ALJ mustdetermine whether the claimant: (1) is performing substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has a severe impairment that meets or equals an impairment specifically listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) can perform her past relevant work; and (5) can perform other work of the sort found in the national economy. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237-40 (11th Cir. 2004). The claimant has the burden of proof through step four and then the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Hines-Sharp v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 511 F. App'x 913, 915 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through September 30, 2012. (Tr. at 13). At step one of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 17, 2007, the alleged onset date. (Tr. at 13). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: right distal femur fracture (status post open reduction internal fixation (ORIF) surgery); and osteoarthritis. (Tr. at 13). At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). (Tr. at 15). At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a full range of sedentary work. (Tr. at 15). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work. (Tr. at 20). After considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (Tr. at 21). The ALJ concluded thatPlaintiff was not under a disability from March 17, 2007, through the date of the decision. (Tr. at 21).
The scope of this Court's review is limited to determining whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standard, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988), and whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla; i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982); Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401).
Where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that "the evidence preponderates against" the Commissioner's decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); and Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; accord Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) ().
On appeal, Plaintiff raises three issues. As stated by Plaintiff, they are:
(Doc. 15 at 1-2). The Court will address each issue in turn.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider Listing 12.02 for Organic Mental Disorders in his decision, despite the evidence establishing that Plaintiff suffered from a traumatic brain injury, evidence that she continues to have memory and depression problems, evidence that she has deficits in her intellectual functioning, and evidence that memory testing revealed deficits in memory. Plaintiff argues in her second issue that the ALJ erred in failing to consider whether Plaintiff met or equaled Listing 12.05C. Plaintiff claims that her condition medically equals this Listing. The general principals are the same for the first two issues.
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Tr. at 15). The ALJ specifically mentioned Listing 1.02 in his decision, and did not mention either Listing 12.02 or Listing 12.05C. (Tr. at 15). In the decision, the ALJ stated that "[t]he medical evidence does not establish the presence of medical findings that would meet or equal any listed impairment." (Tr. at 15) (emphasis added).
At step three, to meet the requirements of a listing, a plaintiff must "have a medically determinable impairment(s) that satisfies all of the criteria in the listing." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(d). The Listings of Impairments in the Social Security Regulations identify impairments that are considered severe enough to prevent a person from engaging in gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If a plaintiff can meet a listed impairment or otherwise establish an equivalence, then a plaintiff is presumptively determined to be disabled, and the ALJ's sequential evaluation of a claim ends. Edwards v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 625, 626 (11th Cir. 1984). The burden is on Plaintiff to show that she meets the Listings. Wilkinson on Behalf of Wilkinson v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 660, 662 (11th Cir. 1987). If an impairment manifests only some of the criteria, then it does not qualify, no matter how severe the impairment. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990).
To meet a Listing, a plaintiff must have a diagnosis included in the Listings, and "must provide medical reports documenting that the conditions meet the specific criteria of the Listings and the duration requirement." Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing 20...
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