Chick v. Superior Court In and For City and County of San Francisco

• Decision Date: 02 November 1962
• Citation: 25 Cal.Rptr. 725,209 Cal.App.2d 201
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Nelson Hyde CHICK, dba Underground Construction Company, and F. P. Lathrop Construction Company, Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California IN AND FOR the CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent, Claude JONES, dba Claude Jones Company, and State Compensation Insurance Fund, Real Parties in Interest. Civ. 20799.

Page 725

25 Cal.Rptr. 725

209 Cal.App.2d 201

Nelson Hyde CHICK, dba Underground Construction Company, and F. P. Lathrop Construction Company, Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California IN AND FOR the CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent Claude JONES, dba Claude Jones Company, and State Compensation Insurance Fund, Real Parties in Interest.

Civ. 20799.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Nov. 2, 1962.

Hearing Denied Dec. 26, 1962.

Russ & Moore, San Francisco, for petitioners.

Gonick & Schmid, Oakland, T. Groezinger, Loton Wells, Charles M. McMillan, Henry F. O'Connell (State Comp. Ins. Fund), San Francisco, for real parties in interest.

BRAY, Presiding Justice.

Petition for writ of mandate and writ of prohibition.

QUESTION PRESENTED.

Does the rule set forth in Witt v. Jackson (1961) 57 Cal.2d 57, 17 Cal.Rptr. 369, 366 P.2d 641, that the contributory negligence of a plaintiff's employer will bar recovery from a third person of workmen's compensation payments made by the employer and its insurer, apply to causes of action accruing prior to the passage in 1957 of the joint tortfeasor statute (Code Civ.Proc. §§ 875-880)?

RECORD.

Petitioners were the general contractors for the construction of a building in Oakland. Claude Jones, doing business as the Claude Jones Company, was a subcontractor on the project. Plaintiff in the court below was an employee of the subcontractor and was injured in 1954 while working on the building. He received workmen's compensation benefits from his employer and the latter's compensation carrier. Plaintiff sued petitioners, the general contractors, to recover for the injuries sustained. Jones, the subcontractor, and his insurance carrier, seek in that action to recover from defendants therein, petitioners in this proceeding, the workmen's compensation disability and medical payments made to plaintiff. Petitioners filed a motion in that action to amend its answer theretofore filed to allege that Jones was negligent in the performance of the construction work, which negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, and that said negligence bars Jones and his carrier from recovery of said compensation payments. Petitioners also moved to compel joinder of Jones and his carrier as necessary parties plaintiff in the event the court deemed their presence necessary for petitioners to raise the proposed defense.

The trial court denied both motions. Petitioners seek a writ of mandate compelling the respondent court to allow the amendment and a writ of prohibition prohibiting that court from proceeding to trial without permitting the amendment.

THE DEFENSE IS AVAILABLE.

In 1954 it was the law in California that the concurring negligence of a workman's employer did not bar the employer's recovery, in an action brought by the injured employee, from a third party tortfeasor of compensation benefits paid to the injured employee. (Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co. (1950) 35 Cal.2d 409, 434-435, 218 P.2d 17; Pacific Ind. Co. v. Cal. Electric Works., Ltd. (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 260, 84 P.2d 313.)

In December, 1961, the Supreme Court held in Witt v. Jackson, supra, 57 Cal.2d 57, 69-73, 17 Cal.Rptr. 369, 366 P.2d 641, that a third party tortfeasor could invoke the concurrent negligence of an employer to defeat the latter's rights to recover for the benfits paid to an injured employee.

At the time of the plaintiff-employee's injury, it was also the rule in California that there was no right of contribution among joint tortfeasors. (Smith v. Fall River J. U. High School Dist. (1934) 1 Cal.2d 331, 34 P.2d 994; Dow v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co. (1912) 162 Cal. 136, 121 P. 379.) However, in 1957, this doctrine was partially abrogated by the enactment of sections 875-880 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to permit contribution, under certain conditions, 'Where a money judgment has been rendered jointly against two or more defendants in a tort action * * *.' This modification of the common law doctrine of noncontricution among joint tortfeasors was discussed in Supreme Court's decision in Witt v. Jackson, supra.

It is the contention of Jones and his carrier, the real parties in interest, and it was the holding of the trial court, that the ruling in Witt was not available to petitioners since to apply it would entail retroactive applications of sections 875-880.

Such reasoning is erroneous: First, because it is obvious that since a covered employer is not liable in tort to his injured employee (Lamoreux v. San Diego etc. Ry. Co. (1957) 48 Cal.2d 617, 624-626, 311 P.2d 1), sections 875-880, permitting contribution between judgment joint tortfeasors only, could have no application as between a covered employer and a third party tortfeasor. The employee's remedy is provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act; hence he could not recover a judgment in a personal injury action against his employer whether singly or with other tortfeasors.

This was explained in the recent case of American Can Co. v. City & County of San Francisco (1962) 202 A.C.A. 580, 583, in footnote 2, 21 Cal.Rptr. 33, 35, which stated, 'It would seem evident that section 875 would never be applicable in situations where the injured party is the employee of one of two tortfeasors and the employer has secured Workmen's Compensation insurance. Since the employee's 'exclusive remedy' against his employer is the right to recover compensation (see Labor Code, § 3601), he may not bring a tort action against the employer, and the two tortfeasors will never be held jointly liable as required by Code of Civil Procedure, section 875. (See Witt v. Jackson * * *, where the court indicated that a negligent third party could obtain contribution pursuant to Code Civil Procedure, section 875, only in the absence of Workmen's Compensation.)'

Secondly, the Supreme Court in Witt did not in any sense indicate that its decision was compelled by sections 875-880. Rather, the court's sele reference to sections 875-880 of the Code of Civil Procedure was made during its demonstration that the rationale of prior decisions was no longer sustainable. These sections are not cited by the court among the reasons for its decision.

It is the general rule that decisions which reverse prior rulings have retroactive effect. (Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 573, 12 Cal.Rptr. 257, 360 P.2d 897; 3 Witkin, Cal.Proc., Appeal, § 238, p. 2459.) However, the court in Witt did not overrule prior decisions to the contrary, but merely distinguished them on the basis of the intervening enactment of Code of Civil Procedure sections 875-880.

In Witt the Supreme Court stated that the reasoning in Pacific Ind. Co. v. Cal. Electric Works, Ltd., supra, 29 Cal.App.2d 260, 84 P.2d 313, and Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., supra, 35 Cal.2d 409, 218 P.2d 17 (upon which cases the trial court relied) 'has been rendered obsolete' (57 Cal.2d p. 70, 17 Cal.Rptr. 369, 366 P.2d 641) because to follow such reasoning would permit a negligent employer to profit by his own wrong.

The opinions in the Pacific Indemnity, Finnegan and Witt cases make clear the fact that the rules announced in each case are rules of decisional law. There is no doubt but that the court in Witt was influenced by the expression of legislative will as set forth in Code of Civil Procedure sections 875-880. However, the two rules are related only because of the extent to which they are impelled by the same policy considerations. The decision in Witt is in terms not made to depend upon these sections, which have, in fact, no direct bearing on the question decided in the Witt case. It follows that the application of that decision to the case at bar does not involve retroactive application of sections 875-880, and that the court below erred in basing its ruling on that ground.

In Witt the court discussed the Pennsylvania rule which permits a third party tortfeasor against whom an injured employee has recovered a judgment to secure contribution from the negligent employer, limited to the amount of compensation payments the employer has made to the employee. It then discussed the North Carolina rule which holds that the third party is entitled to have the judgment against him reduced by the amount of compensation paid to the...