Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Grady Cnty.

• Decision Date: 07 April 1936
• Docket Number: Case Number: 24538
• Citation: 58 P.2d 590,1936 OK 318,177 Okla. 240
• Parties: CHICKASHA COTTON OIL CO. v. GRADY COUNTY et al.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1936 OK 318

58 P.2d 590

177 Okla. 240

CHICKASHA COTTON OIL CO. v. GRADY COUNTY et al.

Case Number: 24538

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: April 7, 1936

Syllabus

¶0 1. TAXATION - Proceedings to Assess Omitted Property - Functions of County Court Purely Judicial.

In proceedings to assess omitted property under section 12346, O. S. 1931, the county court exercises purely judicial functions.

2. COURTS - Legislative Authority to Confer Upon County Court Additional Powers.

Section 12, art. 7, Constitution, defining the powers of the county court, does not operate as a limitation upon legislative authority to confer upon said court such additional powers as are not therein specifically withheld.

3. JURY - Denial of Jury Trial in Proceedings to Assess Omitted Property not Violative of Constitution.

The denial of jury trial in proceedings to assess omitted property is not violative of section 19, art. 2, Constitution.

4. SAME - Appeal and Error - Sufficiency of Evidence - Proceeding Before County Court Treated as Purely Equitable in Nature.

A tax ferret proceeding before the county court is not an action triable before a jury as a matter of right, and when considering questions arising under the laws of evidence in connection therewith, this court will treat such proceeding as one purely equitable in nature. In such case, where the question is properly saved on appeal, this court will review the whole record for the purpose of ascertaining whether the judgment of the trial court is clearly against the weight of the evidence.

5. TAXATION - Proceeding to Assess Omitted Personalty - Burden of Proof on State.

In a proceeding to assess omitted personal property, the burden is upon the state to establish ownership of the property in the respondent on the particular assessment day; the situs of the property; the value thereof, and that it escaped taxation for the year named.

6. SAME - Baled Cotton Concentrated at Compress in State for Sale Held not in Interstate Transit and Subject to Ad Valorem Taxation Where Located.

Baled cotton concentrated at a compress within this state for the purpose of sale by the owner to buyers within and without the state is not in interstate transit, and is subject to ad valorem taxation by the state in the county where located.

7. SAME - Burden on Taxpayer to Show Property in Interstate Transit.

Burden of proof is upon taxpayer to show property in interstate transit.

8. SAME - Evidence Held not to Show Property Was in Interstate Transit on Assessment Day.

Evidence in the present case is insufficient to show that the property in question was in interstate transit on assessment day.

Appeal from County Court, Grady County; C.C. Chastain, Judge.

Proceedings by the State to assess omitted property of Chickasha Cotton Oil Company. Judgment for the State, and the taxpayer has appealed. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Melton & Melton, for plaintiff in error.

Bond, Hatcher & Bond, for tax ferrets of Grady County.

Gerald Spencer, Co. Atty., and Owen Vaughn, Asst. Co. Atty., for Grady County.

C.B. Cochran, amicus curiae.

GIBSON, J.

¶1 This action, of that character commonly referred to as a tax ferret proceeding, was commenced by the county treasurer of Grady county pursuant to section 12346. O. S. 1931, for the purpose of listing and assessing certain property of defendant allegedly omitted from the ad valorem tax rolls of that county for certain prior years.

¶2 The treasurer, upon a hearing, determined that the defendant possessed no omitted property for the years named, and the state appealed to the county court pursuant to said section 12346. Upon a trial de novo in that court pursuant to section 12348, O. S. 1931, judgment resulted fixing the value of the property and ordering the same assessed accordingly and placed upon the rolls for the years 1921 to 1930, inclusive. The defendant has appealed from that judgment.

¶3 In addition to the other propositions submitted under the numerous assignments of error, it is urged that the county court was without jurisdiction to entertain this cause on appeal from the county treasurer.

¶4 Defendant says that the foregoing statutes, in so far as they authorize appeal and trial in the county court, constitute an attempt to increase the powers of such court and are invalid, in that the Legislature was without constitutional authority to grant such additional powers. In this connection it is urged that the jurisdiction of the county court is limited by sections 12 and 14, art. 7, of the Constitution, and that the powers therein conferred may not be enlarged or decreased by the Legislature. As authority for the foregoing proposition, our attention is called to Ozark Oil Co. v. Berryhill, 43 Okla. 523, 143 P. 173; State v. Russell, 33 Okla. 141, 124 P. 1092; Armstrong v. Letty, 85 Okla. 205, 209 P. 168. It is further suggested that this inhibition applies as well to attempted administrative as to judicial powers.

¶5 There is the further contention that if the trial in the county court constitutes an administrative function, the statute is void for the further reason that it violates section 1, art. 4, Constitution, as an attempt to confer legislative powers upon the judicial branch of the government. In support thereof, the defendant cites In re Assessment Kansas City Southern Ry., 168 Okla. 495, 33 P.2d 772.

¶6 Our amicus curiae, whose brief we have considered with much interest, calls our attention to numerous decisions which he believes authority for the latter proposition. Anderson v. Ritterbusch, 22 Okla. 761, 98 P. 1002; Ex parte State of Oklahoma, 37 Fed. (2d) 862; Rounds & Porter Lbr. Co. v. Livesay, 66 Fed. (2d) 298; Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461; In re Daniels' Omitted Property, 108 Okla. 195, 235 P. 543.

¶7 After due consideration of the authorities and the constitutional provisions bearing upon the question, we have concluded that the county court in such cases performs purely judicial functions.

¶8 In Anderson v. Ritterbusch, supra, the tax ferret statute, prior to amendment, was attacked on certain constitutional grounds not here urged. The action was one for prohibition commenced in this court against a county treasurer to prohibit the treasurer from proceeding against the plaintiff under the statute. The constitutionality of the statute was sustained here. The opinion contains certain statements indicating that proceedings for the assessment of omitted property were considered by the court as ministerial and not judicial, but the decision does not stand for that rule. The proceeding is there termed remedial; and we believe the rules therein laid down and the expressions of the court in connection therewith conclusively brand the action when tried in the county court as exclusively judicial. We are not unmindful of the rule that the act of raising revenue by public officials in pursuance of the revenue laws of the state is an administrative function coupled with certain duties quasi-judicial in nature. The levying of taxes under revenue laws to be collected and used in the future presents a proceeding bearing a legal aspect distinctly different from a proceeding to collect a debt already due. Any taxes that may be properly payable to the state upon property omitted from the tax rolls constitutes a debt due the state. Anderson v. Ritterbusch, supra. There this court said:

"Taxes due the territory of Oklahoma prior to statehood on account of omitted property, constituted a debt accruing to the territory, under section 3 of the schedule (Bunn's Ed. sec. 452) to the Constitution, and the Legislature of the state may make provisions for the recovery of such taxes by the state."

¶9 Statutes authorizing assessment and collection of taxes on omitted property are not "revenue laws." Id., syllabus 2. The statutes are remedial; they grant the state a new remedy for the enforcement of a right it at all times possessed.

¶10 While the treasurer is an administrative officer, in the remedial proceeding in question, he exercises quasi-judicial powers, and on appeal the matters before the county court are all matters typically judicial. It ascertains whether or not there is a debt due from the defendant taxpayer to the plaintiff, the state of Oklahoma, and the amount thereof; and the judgment is final unless appealed from. We can discover no characteristics of an administrative nature in the entire proceeding before the court.

¶11 We think this case in all respects analogous to the case of City Bank v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 24, 54 S.Ct. 259, cited with approval by this court in Re Assessment of Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., supra. The Schnader Case involved the valuation and assessment of inheritance transfer tax in Pennsylvania. An officer of the revenue department was charged with the duty of appraising the property. From this valuation the taxpayer could appeal to the county court, which, upon a trial de novo, was authorized to determine all questions, including the valuation of the property and liability for the tax. The Supreme Court there held, as quoted in the Kansas City Southern Case, supra:

" '* * * Since the Dauphin county court is empowered, upon appeal from the action of the appraiser, to determine all questions, including both valuation and liability for the tax, the contention is made that its function is at least in part administrative, and a suit for injunction may not be entertained by a federal court prior to the decision of the state court. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67, 53 L.Ed. 150; Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461, 52 S.Ct. 617, 76 L.Ed. 1226. The statutes under consideration in those cases delegated legislative power of regulation to an administrative body and vested a revisory power in a court. As has repeatedly been held, the action of the court in such a matter is legislative rather than judicial, so that one who has not pursued the legislative process to a conclusion cannot

...