State ex rel. Kowats v. Arnold

• Decision Date: 09 June 1947
• Docket Number: 40226
• Parties: State of Missouri, at the Relation of Victoria L. Kowats, a Citizen of the State of Missouri, Residing in the City of St. Louis, Relator, v. Glendy B. Arnold, Judge of the Probate Court Within and For the City of St. Louis
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

204 S.W.2d 254

356 Mo. 661

State of Missouri, at the Relation of Victoria L. Kowats, a Citizen of the State of Missouri, Residing in the City of St. Louis, Relator, v. Glendy B. Arnold, Judge of the Probate Court Within and For the City of St. Louis

No. 40226

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 9, 1947

Rehearing Denied in Per Curiam Opinion Filed July 5, 1947.

Original Proceeding in Mandamus.

ALTERNATIVE WRIT MADE PEREMPTORY.

Alternative writ made peremptory.

George L. Stemmler, City Counselor, James V. Frank First Associate City Counselor, and Albert Miller Associate City Counselor, for relator.

(1) In Missouri, probate courts are created by the Constitution. Secs. 1, 16-17, Art. V, Constitution of Missouri, 1945. (2) Sections 16 and 17, Article V of the Constitution of Missouri, defining the powers of the probate court, do not operate as a limitation upon the legislative authority to confer upon said court such additional powers as are not therein specifically withheld. Chickasha Cotton Oil Co v. Grady County, 177 Okla. 240; Ludlow v Johnson, 3 Ohio 553; Geiger v. Geiger, 117 Ohio St. 451; First State Bank of Steger v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 302 Ill. 77, 134 N.E. 46. (3) It is by legislative enactment alone that courts, with their constituent elements of time, place, and officers, are brought into actual and real existence, as contradistinguished from their existence solely under constitutional provisions. Board of Commissioners of White County v. Gwin, 136 Ind. 562, 36 N.E. 237, 22 L.R.A. 402; Ludlow v. Johnson, 3 Ohio 553, 17 Am. Dec. 609. (4) A change of the substantive law by the Legislature, which increases or decreases the subject matter on which the jurisdiction of the court operates, is not an unconstitutional interference with such jurisdiction. 21 C.J.S., p. 184, sec. 122; American Fixture Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers General Local No. 200 of Milwaukee, 222 Wis. 338, 268 N.W. 250, 106 A.L.R. 335; Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' International Union, 358 Ill. 239, 193 N.E. 112, 97 A.L.R. 1318. (5) The Legislature possesses every power not delegated to some other department or to the Federal government, or not denied to it by the Constitution of the state or the United States. Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' International Union, supra, l.c. 1327. (6) To the extent that the Constitution allows or does not prohibit, the Legislature may legislate with respect to constitutional courts; and thus, depending on the particular constitutional provisions involved, may increase, diminish, or change their jurisdiction, confer on them any additional jurisdiction that it deems advisable, may extend their jurisdiction in harmony with their character and general jurisdiction, without infringing on the inherent or constitutional powers of any other court, or may abridge their jurisdiction without infringing on their inherent powers. 21 C.J.S., pp. 184-185, sec. 122; Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Grady County, 177 Okla. 240, 58 P.2d 590. (7) The constitutional validity of a law is to be tested, not by what has been done under it, but by what may, by its authority, be done. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Baldwin, 195 A. 287. (8) The constitutionality of the statute should be sustained, unless the contrary is clearly established. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Baldwin, supra, l.c. 295. (9) A statute will not be declared void unless it is impossible by any reasonable construction to interpret its provisions in harmony with the Constitution. Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264. (10) Every rational presumption should be made in favor of the validity of every statute; and, the court will not refuse to enforce it unless its conflict with the Constitution is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Attorney General v. Pelletier, supra, l.c. 298-299. (11) The act of the General Assembly will be declared void only when it violates the Constitution clearly, palpably, plainly and in such manner as to leave no doubt. Hines v. Hook, 89 S.W.2d 52, 338 Mo. 114; Penn. Anthracite Co. v. Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania, 318 P. 401, 178 A. 291. (12) A statute enacted for the protection of public health can be set aside by the courts only when it plainly has no real or substantial relationship to the subject or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law. Commonwealth v. Dietz, 285 Pa. 511, 132 A. 572; Commonwealth v. Artz, 285 Pa. 521, 132 A. 575. (13) The welfare of the indigent insane should be considered. La Rocca v. La Rocca, 259 N.Y.S. 569. (14) Judicial power is that which adjudicates upon and protects the rights and interests of individual citizens, and to that end construes and applies the law. People ex rel. v. White, 334 Ill. 465, 166 N.E. 100, 64 A.L.R. 1006. (15) An extension of the jurisdiction of a court, such extension being in harmony with its character, and not being a usurpation of the inherent powers of any other court, is not within the constitutional prevention. State v. Knight, 96 N.J.L. 461, 115 A. 569, 19 A.L.R. 733. (16) The rule is firmly established that in special statutory proceedings the Legislature may confer jurisdiction to determine the questions arising therein on any court that it may choose, to the exclusion of others, and if such acts furnish adequate protection to the rights of persons concerned they will be sustained by the court. White v. City of Ottawa, 318 Ill. 463; People v. McGoorty, 270 Ill. 610. (17) A legislative enactment should not be set aside unless its unconstitutionality indisputably appears, and if there be a permissible doubt as to the existence of the constitutional limitation invoked against the validity of the act, the courts will not declare the act to be contrary to the Constitution. State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N.J.Eq. 504, 179 A. 116. (18) The court cannot substitute its conception of sound public policy for that entertained by the Legislature, if there be no disregard of a constitutional mandate. State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., supra. (19) Probate courts possess such powers as have been expressly granted to them by the Constitution and the statutes, together with such implied powers as are necessary to effectuate those expressly granted. Secs. 1, 16, 17, Art. V, Constitution of Missouri; Sec. 493, Mo. R.S. Ann., Vol. (1), 1946 Cum. An. Pk. Pts.; Sec. 2437, R.S. Ann., Vol (8), 1946 Com. An. Pk. Pts.; Sec. 2442, Mo. R.S. Ann., Vol (8), 1946 Cum. An. Pk. Pts.; Secs. 9321-9347, Mo. R.S. Ann., Vol. (19), 1946 Cum. An. Pk. Pts.; State ex rel. v. Bird, 162 S.W. 119, 253 Mo. 569; State ex rel. v. Weill, 182 S.W.2d 521, 353 Mo. 337; State ex rel. v. Holtcamp, 14 S.W.2d 646, 322 Mo. 258; Parsons v. Harvey, 221 S.W. 21, 281 Mo. 413; Johnston v. Grice, 199 S.W. 409, 272 Mo. 423; State ex rel. v. Shackelford, 263 Mo. 52. (20) The Legislature may vest in the probate courts additional powers not named in the Constitution; provided, however, that such powers fall within the general classes of matters named in the Constitution and apply alike to all probate courts. State ex rel. v. Tincher, 166 S.W. 1028, 258 Mo. 1; Painter v. Painter, 228 S.W. 538, 206 Mo.App. 312. (21) By the provisions of Senate Bill No. 284 (Sections 9321 to 9347, Mo. R.S. Ann., Vol. 19, 1946 Cum. An. Pk. Pts.), the power and duty to conduct a hearing and determine whether an indigent insane person is a person of unsound mind and to commit such person to a state hospital at the expense of a county or the City of St. Louis have been taken from the county court and added to the probate court. This the Legislature had the authority to do under Sections 16 and 17 of Article V, Constitution of Missouri 1945. Downey v. Schrader, 182 S.W.2d 320, 353 Mo. 40; Ussery v. Haynes, 127 S.W.2d 410, 344 Mo. 530; Van Loo v. Osage County, 141 S.W.2d 805, 346 Mo. 358; State ex rel. v. Montgomery, 186 S.W.2d 553. (22) In the absence of any statute regulating the procedure, the rule always followed is that the chancery or probate court of the residence of a supposed lunatic is the proper forum to conduct an inquiry as to his mental state. 44 C.J.S., pp. 57-59, sec. 10; State ex rel. Taylor, Public Admr., v. Wurdeman, 108 S.W. 144, 129 Mo.App. 263; Ex parte Zorn, 145 S.W. 62, 241 Mo. 267; Peck v. Fillingham's Estate, 202 S.W. 465, 199 Mo.App. 277; In re Elliott's Estate v. Wilson, 27 Mo.App. 218. (23) The Legislature possesses all legislative powers not prohibited by the Constitution, expressly or by necessary implication. State ex rel. v. Koeln, 61 S.W.2d 750, 332 Mo. 1229. (24) And our State Constitution is not a grant of, but a limitation on, legislative powers, so the Legislature may enact any law not expressly or impliedly prohibited by the Federal or State Constitutions. State ex rel. v. Canada, 113 S.W.2d 783, 342 Mo. 121; Downey v. Schrader, 182 S.W.2d 320, 353 Mo. 40. (25) The Constitution of Missouri, Section 16, of Article V, vests the probate court in each county with jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to the appointment of guardians and curators of persons of unsound mind, and the provisions of Senate Bill No. 284 [Sections 9321 to 9347, Mo. R.S. Ann. (Vol. 19), 1946 Cum. An. Pk. Pts.], merely prescribes the mode of procedure by which that jurisdiction is to be exercised, and nothing in the Constitution or laws of this state prohibit such legislation. The very fact of the grant of express powers inevitably carries with it a corresponding grant of such implied powers as may be necessary and essential to the performance of the powers expressly granted. The provisions of Senate Bill No. 284 [Sections 9321 to 9347, Mo. R.S. Ann. (Vol. 19), 1946 Cum. An. Pk. Pts.], is an addition to an enlargement of the powers granted to probate courts by Article 18 of Chapter 1, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1939, and am...