Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Doe
| Decision Date | 27 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 24457.,24457. |
| Parties | CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, State of Hawai`i, Plaintiff-Appellee v. John DOE, Defendant-Appellant and Jane Doe, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Steven L. Hartley, Honolulu, and Jen-L. W. Lyman of Stirling & Kleintop, on the briefs, for defendant-appellant John Doe.
Huilin Dong, on the briefs, for defendant-appellee Jane Doe.
Rosemary McShane and Trina Yamada, Deputies Corporation Counsel, on the briefs, for plaintiff-appellee Child Support Enforcement Agency, State of Hawai`i.
MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, and NAKAYAMA, JJ., Intermediate Court of Appeals Judge LIM, in place of ACOBA, J., unavailable, and Circuit Judge NAKAMURA, assigned by reason of vacancy.
Defendant-appellant John Doe (hereinafter "the father") appeals from the July 6, 2001 order, findings of fact, and conclusions of law of the Family Court of the First Circuit, the Honorable John C. Bryant, Jr. presiding, establishing John Doe as the father of the child in question, ordering the father to pay child support, arrearages, and birth-related expenses, and allocating expenses for the child's future medical expenses equally between the parents.
On appeal, the father argues that (1) the Hawai`i Uniform Parentage Act (HUPA), Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 584, is unconstitutional because it violates the father's rights to privacy and equal protection under the Hawai`i Constitution and the United States Constitution (a) by violating the father's right to procreational autonomy and (b) by creating an improper gender-based classification; and (2) insofar as the father is an unemployed student, the family court violated the father's right to be free from compulsory service when it ordered him to pay child support in the amount of fifty dollars per month, because the father would be forced to get a part-time job.
Each of the father's arguments is manifestly and palpably without merit. First, the father failed to raise the question of equal protection at trial or in his pretrial legal memoranda; consequently, the issue is waived. Second, the father is entitled only to a "rational basis" review of HUPA because: (1) HUPA does not implicate the father's fundamental privacy right to procreational autonomy, but rather his economic interest in not supporting his child; and (2) even if the father hadn't waived his equal protection argument, his standing to raise the challenge would be based on a non-suspect classification, i.e., the biological relationship of fathers to their children. Because HUPA bears a rational relation to the public welfare, it survives our rational-basis review, and the father's procreational autonomy arguments (as well as his waived equal protection arguments) fail. Finally, an obligation to financially support one's child and to become employed if necessary to meet the obligation is in no way comparable to peonage or slavery. It is well-settled that child support is an obligation that may be compelled, even by imprisonment, without violating the right to be free from involuntary servitude; ipso facto, the family court did not exceed its authority by ordering the father to pay the minimum amount of child support allowed by the then-applicable guidelines.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the family court's order, findings of fact, and conclusions of law. We also notify the parties that the appeal was frivolous and request briefing with regard to damages and costs to be awarded to CSEA as authorized by Hawai`i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 38.
The mother and father met while they were both in high school; they dated intermittently for approximately fourteen months. During the course of their relationship, the couple agreed to always engage in "safe sex" and did not intend to procreate. The trial court found that it was reasonably foreseeable by both parties that an unwanted pregnancy could occur if the parties relied on the use of condoms as a method of birth control.
The mother became pregnant due to a failure in either the construction or use of a condom; this pregnancy was not planned. After the mother became pregnant, the prospective parents discussed and considered the possibility that the mother might undergo an abortion or seek an adoptive placement for the child with the father's consent and cooperation. However, the trial court found that the parties never entered into an express agreement that the mother would have an abortion or place the child up for adoption. Ultimately, after discussing the pregnancy with her family and despite the child's father's objection, the mother decided to raise the child with her family's help. The father strongly opposed the mother's decision to keep the child because he believed that he and the mother were unable to support a child emotionally or financially and because he believed that they were too young to care for a child. The parents' sexual relationship continued through the sixth month of the pregnancy.
The mother gave birth to the child at issue in these proceedings (hereinafter "child") on March 22, 2000. The Department of Human Services (DHS) paid $878.13 for medical expenses related to the birth of the child. At the time of the trial, DHS had paid $6,203 in cash assistance to the mother for the benefit of the child.
On July 10, 2000, the Child Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA) filed an amended complaint for establishment of paternity pursuant to HRS § 584-6.2 In connection with that complaint, the mother and father stipulated to genetic testing. The test results indicated a 99.99% probability that the party referred to here as "the father" is the biological father of the child. In light of the test results, the father did not contest that he is the biological father of the child, but nevertheless objected to being named as the child's legal father and to being ordered to provide any past or future support for the minor child. Pursuant to HRS § 346-37.1,3 DHS, through CSEA, sought, inter alia, reimbursement of certain public assistance monies paid for the benefit of the child and such other relief as might be appropriate. Specifically, CSEA sought ongoing child support payments, child support arrearages, and $439.07 for birth-related expenses from the father.4
On December 21, 2000, a pretrial conference was held before the Honorable John C. Bryant. Following this conference, a judgment of paternity was entered. Sole physical and legal custody of the child was awarded to the mother. The court reserved judgment with respect to allocation of birth expenses, child support, and arrearages. A hearing on the reserved issues was set for February 7, 2001. On February 5, 2001, the father filed a pre-hearing legal memorandum in which he alleged that the mother had promised he would not be subject to financial responsibility for the child and asserted that his fundamental right to decide whether to have a child would be violated if he were required to accept financial responsibility for the child:
The Roe case, of course, specifically dealt with a woman's right to procreate. However, the Supreme Court in Roe also recognized that the state has an interest in regulating decisions (such as abortion) if such an interest is "compelling." Roe[v. Wade], 410 U.S. at 155, 93 S.Ct. 705. If the State has such an interest, surely the natural father also has an interest.
Simply put, if a woman has a Constitutional right to procreate, so should a man. It is completely unfair and unjust for a woman to force a man to have a child against his will and then force him to provide financial and other support for that child. That is exactly what happened in the instant case.
....
Obviously, [the father] could not force [the mother] to have an abortion or give the child up for adoption. That would violate her Constitutional rights. However, [the mother] should not be allowed to force [the father] to take up a role and responsibilities he clearly did not want and which she promised him he would not have to bear. That would violate his Constitutional rights.
The father also asserted that, because he was a full-time university student, he "simply [couldn't] afford to take care of a child." Consequently, any imposition of a financial obligation to support his child would be tantamount to slavery and unconstitutional:
The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that involuntary servitude shall not exist in the United States and gives Congress the power to enforce the article by appropriate legislation. In 1867, Congress enacted the Antipeonage Act....
In interpreting this Act, the United States Supreme Court has held that "Congress has put it beyond debate that no indebtedness warrants a right to be free from suspension of compulsory service." Imposing even a minimum financial requirement on [the father] in this case would be violative of his right to be free from compulsory service and therefore tantamount to involuntary servitude.
It was [the mother's] choice to have this child. She chose to do so over [the father's] objections and while assuring him that she (and her parents) would raise the child themselves with no help of any kind from him. [The mother] broke her agreement with [the father] and, as a result, the State of Hawai`i is now attempting to require [the father] to accept financial responsibility for the child. This is unfair, unjust, and unconstitutional.
At the February 7, 2001 hearing, Judge Bryant scheduled a short trial for April 4, 2001 and ordered the parties to prepare a list of stipulated facts. Following the trial, the court granted the relief requested by CSEA's amended complaint. In the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions of law, in addition to the stipulated facts, the court found, inter alia, that "[i]t was reasonably...
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