Child v. Warne
| Decision Date | 09 August 1961 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Harold CHILD, dba Child Bros., et al., Petitioners and Respondents, v. William E. WARNE, Director of Agriculture of the State of California, Respondent and Appellant, Frank Capra et al., Intervenors and Appellants, Calavo Growers of California et al., Intervenors and Appellants. Civ. 6476. |
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Walter S. Rountree, Asst. Atty. Gen., Alberta Gattone, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent and appellant.
Sachse & Price and Franz R. Sachse, Fallbrook, for intervenors and appellants, Frank Capra, and others.
Tuttle & Taylor and William A. Norris, Los Angeles, for intervenors and appellants Calavo Growers, and others.
George Stahlman, Fallbrook, and Robert S. Walwick, Oceanside, for petitioners and respondents.
This is an appeal from a judgment enjoining the Director of Agriculture from enforcing a marketing order for the promotion of California avocados. The plaintiffs, who appear here as respondents, are growers and handlers of avocados. The defendant, as an appellant herein, is the Director of Agriculture of the State of California. Other avocado growers and handlers filed a complaint in intervention in support of the order, and appear here as appellants.
The marketing order in question was issued by the Director of Agriculture pursuant to the California Marketing Act. (Agr.Code, chap. 10, div. 6, secs. 1300.10-1300.29.) The plaintiffs contend that, in making such order, the director did not comply with the procedure prescribed by that Act; that the order is invalid for this reason; and that the judgment of the trial court enjoining its enforcement was proper.
As applied to the facts in this case, the Act provides that no marketing order shall become effective until the director finds that such order has been assented to in writing by 'producers' who produce not less than 65% of the volume of avocados produced and by 51% of the total number of 'producers' so engaged. (Agr.Code, sec. 1300.16(a)(2)(B).) As a part of the process incident to the making of such a finding the director is required to prepare a list of names of the avocado 'producers' who will be directly affected by the proposed marketing order and the volume of avocados produced or marketed by them in the preceding marketing season. (Agr.Code, sec. 1300.13(d)(3).) The alleged invalidity of the marketing order under consideration stems from the manner in which the director prepared the aforesaid list for use in the subject proceeding.
A determination of the issue thus presented requires a consideration of the procedure adopted by the Agricultural Director as related to and governed by the purposes and provisions of the Marketing Act.
The purposes of the Act are set forth in Section 1300.11 of the Agricultural Code; are concisely stated in Brock v. Superior Court, 109 Cal.App.2d 594, 598, 241 P.2d 283; and include the restoration and maintenance of adequate purchasing power for California agricultural producers. With respect to the latter purpose, the Legislature declared that, as a consequence of certain marketing practices, the purchasing power of agricultural producers 'has been in the past, and may continue to be in the future, unless such conditions are remedied, low in relation to that of persons engaged in other gainful occupations within the State,' and that such 'producers are thereby prevented from maintaining a proper standard of living and from contributing their fair share to the support of the necessary governmental and educational functions, * * *' (Agr.Code, sec. 1300.10(a).) The expressed purposes of the Act and the aforesaid declaration of the Legislature, as will appear from the consideration hereinafter given them, are pertinent to a determination of the meaning of the term 'producers' which is a vital issue in this case. As heretofore noted, one of the steps in the process of adopting a marketing order requires the Director of Agriculture to compile a list of the producers of the agricultural commodity which is the subject of such order. (Agr.Code, sec. 1300.13(d)(3).) The Act defines a producer as 'any person engaged within this State in the business of producing, or causing to be produced for market, any agricultural commodity as herein defined.' (Agr.Code, sec. 1300.12(d).) The director interpreted this definition to include only those persons engaged in the business of producing avocados or engaged in the business of causing avocados to be produced for market. The plaintiffs contend that the definition includes persons engaged in the business of producing avocados and persons causing avocados to be produced for market; that the limiting phrase 'the business' applies only to those who are producing avocados and not to those who are causing avocados to be produced; and that the director's interpretation is erroneous. The trial court found in accord with the plaintiffs' contention.
In preparing the list of avocado producers which was used in this case, the director followed his interpretation of the statutory definition and not that contended for by the plaintiffs. The preparation of this list occurred in the course of the proceedings resulting in the issuance of the marketing order in question. Preliminarily, a group of persons associated with the avocado industry formed a committee, known as the Avocado Promotion Committee, and requested the Director of Agriculture to cause a public hearing to be held on a proposed marketing order for avocados. Section 1300.13 of the Agricultural Code provides for such a meeting; requires that a notice thereof be given to all 'producers' or 'handlers' 1 of the subject commodity whose names and addresses appear upon lists of such persons on file in the Department of Agriculture; in the event the information with respect to the names and addresses of persons who might be directly affected by the proposed marketing order is not on file with the department, authorizes the director to notify all handlers of such commodity to file a report, showing among other things, the names and addresses of all producers from whom the handlers received such commodity in the marketing season next preceding the filing of such report, together with the quantities so received from each such producer; provides that a failure by any handler to file such a report 'shall not invalidate any proceeding taken or marketing order issued hereunder.' and that the 'director is authorized and directed to proceed upon the basis of such information and reports as may otherwise be available'; and directs that from the 'reports so filed and the information so received or available to the director, including any proper corrections,' he shall prepare a list of the names and addresses of such producers and the volume of such commodity 'produced or marketed' by them. The statute does not provide when this list shall be prepared, although it is clear that any list used as a basis for giving notice to producers of the meeting respecting the proposed order may not be the final list used by the director as an aid in making his finding as to whether the designated percentage of producers have assented to the proposed marketing order, because Section 1300.13 also provides that at the hearing in question the director shall receive testimony and evidence not only upon matters concerning the need for and propriety of the proposed marketing order, but also 'with respect to the accuracy and sufficiency of the lists on file with the director which show the names of the producers * * * directly affected by the provisions of such proposed marketing order.' (See Agr.Code, secs. 1300.13(c)(4) and 1300.14.) The provision of the statute requiring the director to prepare a list of producers does not limit his sources of information to the reports which he receives from the handlers of the commodity but permits him to use such information and reports as may otherwise be available, 'including any proper corrections.' (Agr.Code, sec. 1300.13(d)(2) and (3).) Obviously, the statute conceives the possibility that the information given by the handlers in their reports may not be accurate.
In the case at bar the director had no lists of producers available at the time the Avocado Promotion Committee requested a public hearing upon a proposed marketing order, and prepared such a list from the reports given him by handlers in response to the statutory notice requesting such; all of the handlers responded to this notice and furnished the director with the names of persons who had sold avocados to them; from the names so furnished, a list of 9,900 such persons was compiled; notice of the public hearing was sent to all these persons; and, thereafter, copies of the proposed marketing order and written assent forms were sent to them. Under the Act the required percentage of assents is determined by the ratio which the number of persons assenting bears to the total number of persons on the director's list; an assent constitutes an affirmative vote in favor of the proposed marketing order; a dissent or a failure to return the assent form constitutes a negative vote. As required by law, the director fixed the time within which assents should be returned and tabulated. (See Arg.Code, sec. 1300.16(a)(4).) Before the expiration of this time it came to the attention of the director, from some of the replies to the assent forms which had been returned and from a complaint made by the Avocado Promotion Committee, that some of the persons on his list were not producers within the statutory definition of that term as interpreted by him; were not in the business of producing avocados; but were what he called 'back-yard growers', i. e., householders who had two or three threes in their back yards. After consultation with members of his staff, the...
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