Childers v. Darby
Decision Date | 19 September 2014 |
Docket Number | 1130530. |
Citation | 163 So.3d 323 |
Parties | David CHILDERS and Robert DeShawn Childers v. Leroy DARBY. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Charlie A. Bottoms, Jr., Florence, for appellants.
James Q. Stanphill, Jr., Florence, for appellee.
David Childers and Robert DeShawn Childers (“Shawn”) appeal the Lauderdale Circuit Court's judgment quieting title in a certain piece of real property, on which is situated a house, in Leroy Darby. We reverse and remand.
In August 2012, Darby filed a complaint to quiet title in certain real property, averring:
(Capitalization in original.) The complaint was subsequently amended to name Martha Creasy, Leslie Creasy's widow, and their children—Tina Creasy, Robert Creasy, and Roy Creasy—as defendants.2
Shawn answered the complaint. A trial was conducted on two separate days. After the first day, the trial court entered the following order:
Shawn retained counsel and moved the trial court, pursuant to Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P., to join David Childers, his father, as a defendant in the action. The trial court granted the motion, and David was added as a party to the action.
On December 3, 2013, the trial resumed. The trial court admitted into evidence the deposition of David, who testified that, at a foreclosure sale in 1995, he had purchased the real property at issue, which consisted of 2.7 acres and on which was situated a two-bedroom house with various outbuildings. He stated that he had repaired the house, had cleaned up the yard, and had used the surrounding land to train his horses from 1995 through 2003 or 2004. He explained that he had filed a deed reflecting his ownership of the property but that he had never paid taxes on the property because he had been informed by the “tax office” that he was exempt from taxes because he was 65 years old and totally disabled. According to David, his son Shawn has lived on the property since 2000. In support of his testimony, David presented a statement from the Florence Utilities Department indicating that in 1995 electricity had been connected to the house in his name and that the account for electrical service to the house has remained in his name.
Evidence was also presented indicating that the deed filed by David was not for the property at issue but for an adjoining one-acre lot. A copy of a quitclaim deed from Martha Creasy and one of her sons transferring the one-acre lot adjoining the property at issue to David was admitted into evidence. Additionally, a mortgage-foreclosure deed indicating that the one-acre lot owned by David had been foreclosed on in 2004 was admitted into evidence, and additional evidence was admitted indicating that that property had subsequently been sold several times.
After considering the testimony and other evidence, the trial court quieted title in the real property, including the house, in Darby. Shawn and David moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, arguing, among other grounds, that the trial court had erred in quieting title in Darby because, they asserted, the evidence did not establish that Darby was in peaceable possession of the property. The trial court denied the motion, and Shawn and David appealed.
First, Shawn and David maintain that the complaint filed by Darby did not satisfy the statutory pleading requirements to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction over a quiet-title action. They contend that the complaint is deficient because Darby did not aver specifically that he was in peaceable possession of the real property.
Section 6–6–540, Ala.Code 1975, provides:
“When any person is in peaceable possession of lands, whether actual or constructive, claiming to own the same, in his own right or as personal representative or guardian, and his title thereto, or any part thereof, is denied or disputed or any other person claims or is reputed to own the same, any part thereof, or any interest therein or to hold any lien or encumbrance thereon and no action is pending to enforce or test the validity of such title, claim, or encumbrance, such person or his personal representative or guardian, so in possession, may commence an action to settle the title to such lands and to clear up all doubts or disputes concerning the same.”
Rule 8, Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that a complaint is sufficient if it puts a defendant on notice of the claims asserted against him or her. A rule or statute, however, may qualify the rule of generalized notice pleading. Bethel v. Thorn, 757 So.2d...
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