Childress v. Johnson Motor Lines

• Decision Date: 07 May 1952
• Docket Number: No. 245,245
• Citation: 70 S.E.2d 558,235 N.C. 522
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: CHILDRESS, v. JOHNSON MOTOR LINES, Inc.

Page 558

70 S.E.2d 558

235 N.C. 522

CHILDRESS, v. JOHNSON MOTOR LINES, Inc.

No. 245.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 7, 1952.

Smith, Leach & Anderson, Raleigh, W. W. Seymour and J. G. Edwards, Sanford, for defendant, appellant.

Gavin, Jackson & Gavin and Pittman & Staton, all of Sanford, for plaintiff, appellee.

JOHNSON, Justice.

The defendant places chief stress upon exceptions which relate (1) to the refusal of the trial court to allow the motion for judgment as of nonsuit, (2) to the charge of the court, and (3) the order of injunction restraining the prosecution of an action in Virginia involving the same subject matter.

It is admitted that the collision occurred in Virginia. Therefore the quesitons of liablity for negligence must be determined by the law of that State. The rule in such cases is that matters of substantive law are controlled by the law of the place--the lex loci, whereas matters of procedure are contolled by the law of the forum--the lex fori. Thus the mehtods by which the parties are required to prove their allegations, sihc as the rules of evidence and the quantum of proofs necessary to make oiut a prima facie case, are matters of proceudre governed by the law of the place of trial. Clodfelter v. Wells, 212 N.C. 823, 195 S.E. 11. Therefore, the question whether the evidence offered was sufficient to carry the case to the jury over the defendant's motion for judgment as of nonsuit is to be determined under application of the principles of law prevailing in this jurisdiction. Clodfelter v. Wells, supra; Harrison v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 168 N.C. 382, 84 S.E. 519.

1. The refusal to nonsuit. The controlling background facts are these: The highway is straigh for a considerable distance both north and south of the scene of the collision, but is over rolling country with crests and hills. The highway runs approximately north and south. It is 30 feet wide, paved with black asphalt materials, and divided into three traffic lanes. South of the point of collision these lanes are separated and marked by broken white lines, each lane being about ten feet wide. Beginning at a point about 235 feet south of the point of collision, the westernmost traffic lane (the one on the extreme left looking north) is separated form the middle land by a solid white line and a broken white line, constituting a double line. The solid line runs parallel with the broken white line northwardly for a distance of about 100 feet, at which point the solid line runs diagonally to the east and north across to the eaternmost and outside traffic lane (looking north), continuing in a solid white line from the point of collision up to the crest of a hill north of the scene of the collision. This solid line is east (to the right looking north) of the broken white lien which parallels the solid line formt he point where the solid line begins to run diagonally across the highway and until the solid white lien reaches the easternmost traffic lane. After the solid line reaches the eaternmost traffic lane, it is paralleled by anotehr solid white line form that point up to the crest of the hill north of the scene of the collision.

In force at the time of the collision were these pertinent rules of the road, as prescribed by the Code of Virginia 1950 (Michie):

"46-222. Special regulations applicable on streets and highways laned for traffic.--Whenever any highway has been divided into clearly marked lanes for traffic, drivers of vehicles shall obey the following regulations:

"(1) A vehicle shall normally be driven in the lane nearest the right hand edge or curb of the highway when such lane is available for travel except when overtaking another vehicle or in preparation for a left turn or as permitted in paragraph (4) of this section;

"(2) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as is practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.

"(3) Upon a highway which is divided into three lanes a vehicle shall not be driven in the center lane except when overtaking and passing another vehicle or in preparation for a left turn or unless such center lane is at the time allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the direction the vehicle is proceeding and is signposted or marked to give notice of such allocation;

"(4) (not applicable to instant case).

"(5) Wherever a highway is marked with double traffic lines consisting of solid line immediately adjacent to a broken line, no vehicle shall be driven to the left of such line if the solid line is on the right of the broken line;

"(6) Wherever a highway is marked with double traffic lines consisting of two immediately adjacent solid lines, no vehicle shall be driven to the left of such lines."

Therefore, according to the motor vehicle laws of Virginia and the manner in which the highway admittedly was marked and laned for traffic at the scene of the collision, the easternmost lane was reserved for use of northbound traffic and the center and westernmost lanes were reserved for the use of southbound traffic only.

Thus at the point of collision it was unlawful, and therefore negligence per se, Crist v. Fitzgerald, 189 Va. 109, 52 S.E.2d 145, for the driver of a northbound vehicle to cross to his left over the solid line, or for the driver of a northbound vehicle to travel into and upon the center traffic lane; whereas, for some distance north and south of the point of collision it was lawful and permissible for the driver of a southbound vehicle, in the exercise of due care, to travel into and upon the center traffic lane for the purpose of overtaking and passing a southbound vehicle traveling in the westernmost lane.

The plaintiff's tractor-trailer unti was proceeding north. The defendant's unit, going south, was overtaking and attempting to pass to the left of a Chevrolet automobile which was proceeding southwardly in the same direction. The collision occurred before the passing movement was completed. All three vehicles were involved in the collision.

The plaintiff alleges and contends that his tractor-trailer was where it rightly belonged-within the easternmost traffic lane, reserved for northbound traffic, and that the driver of defendant's vehicle, in overtaking and pulling put to pass the Chevrolet automobile, negligently swung too far to his left into the easternmost traffic lane and struck the plaintiff's tractor-trailer, thus causing the collision in suit.

The defendant, on the other hand, alleges and contends that its driver in so passing the Chevrolet automobile remained within the confines of the middle lane which at that point the defendant's driver had the right to use for passing purposes, and that the plaintiff's driver suddenly swerved across the forbidden solid line to his left and struck the defendant's tractor-trailer unit over in the middle lane.

An examination of the record discloses that the evidence is sharply conflicting on the crucial question of whether the collision occurred inside the easternmost lane reserved for northbound traffic. However, as bearing on the question of nonsuit, these phases of the evidence, tending to support the plaintiff's theory of the case, come into focus:

(1) the witness J. S. Baker, who was driving another tractor- trailer unit belonging to the plaintiff, testified that at the time of the collision he was just ahead of the plaintiff's vehicle that was in the collision. He said he left Sanford the morning of the collision with Neville, the driver of the tractor involved in the collision; that after various stops along the way they reached Dinwiddie, Virginia, in the late afternoon; that he got ahead of Neville coming out of Dinwiddie, and drove along northwardly therefrom at a speed of from 40 to 45 miles per hour; that Neville did not try to pass him, but drove along, keeping behind "a good 300 feet or more," to the scene of the collision. He said: "At various times I was looking in the mirror at what was behind me * * * Neville was traveling directly behind me * * * in the northbound lane of traffic. * * * I could see his lights in my rear-view mirror. * * * I was as far on the right-hand side as I could get and his right-hand light was in the view of my mirror, where I could see in the mirror." The witness Baker further stated that at a point about a mile and a half north of Dinwiddie he met the defendant's tractor-trailer unit. It was immediately behind a Chevrolet automobile. He said: "At the time I met the Johnson Motor Lines truck, Mr. Neville was right behind me." The defendant's truck "was traveling a very close distance, * * * 12 or 15 feet from * * * the Chevrolet car. * * * As I got past the car and truck coming over the hill, the Johnson truck swings to the middle lane in order to pass the car. * * * That's when the wreck taken place. * * * I saw the truck when it pulled out to pass the automobile. * * * It made a left turn to the middle of the road. * * * He was going toward the middle lane of the road going out from behind the automobile in order to get in the middle lane to pass." At that tiem he said Neville was traveling in the "northbound lane of traffic directly behind me. I could see his lights in my rear-view mirror. * * * I was as far on the right-hand side as I could get and his right- hand light was in the view of my mirror, where I could see in the mirror. * * * I looked in the mirror and seen the truck and when I looked back to see if he was doing all right, I looked in the mirror and the thing was on fire. * * * I can't say I seen anything that happened. I was looking in my mirror when the fire went up. I couldn't see the trucks when they went together. * * * I could not completely see over * * * the hill where the fire or collision took place,-riding in a truck like this I could not completely see across the hill and down to the bottom on the other side. * * * I could see the...